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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE PRESENTER ON APPEAL
The issue presented on appeal is whether the lower
court was correct in holding that a shareholder of a
professional corporation is not vicariously liable for the
alleged malpractice of another shareholder of the
professional corporation.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
This brief adapts and incorporates herein the
Plaintiff/Appellant' s statement of fact^.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Shareholders in professional corporations generally,
and lawyer shareholders specifically, ate

vicariously

liable for the malpractice of other professionals in their
professional corporation.

The legislative history of the

Utah Professional Corporation Act and of professional
corporations acts generally reveals an intent not to amend
liability relationships historically in place.

Both the

old and new rules for the regulation of the Bar
promulgated by the Utah Supreme Court reflect an intent to
require vicarious liability for members sf the bar.
ARGUMENT
I.
THE LEGISLATURE DID NOT INTEND THE
PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION ACT TO LIMIT
LIABILITY.
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The Appellant and Respondent each base their arguments on
interpretations of different sections of the Professional
Corporation Act, U.C.A. 16-11-1 et seq.
one section prevails over the other.

They each argue that

Their arguments clearly

show that, based on the history of the legal profession and the
Utah Corporate Code generally, the Professional Corporation Act
is internally inconsistent.
In analyzing professional corporation statute language
similar to that found in the Utah Professional Corporation Act
Smith and Ault, The Corporate Professional-United States v.
Empey, 54 Mass.L.Q. 14 (1969), also found the provisions of the
act to be internally inconsistent.

They found the

interpretations to be "equally reasonable", at 23.
This inconsistency requires this court to examine the
legislative history and intent of the Act, see Utah State Road
Commission v.- Friberg, 687 P2d 821 (Utah, 1984).
A.
THE UTAH LEGISLATURE INTENDED THAT THE
PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION ACT WOULD NOT
LIMIT LIABILITY.
Attachment A is a transcript of the debate in the Utah
State House of Representatives on March 19, ]963, on House
Bill 196 entitled Incorporation of Persons Rendering
Professional Services.

The intent of the Legislature in

enacting this statute is evident from the first line of
discussion in the record.

The Speaker of the House
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describes the act as one, "to incorporate for tax
benefits".

The discussion of Representative Watkins, the

primary sponsor of the bill, focuses exclusively on tax
benefits which are available for professional
corporations.
After the introduction of the bill Representative
Loverage asked the sponsor,
"In connection with liable [sicj suits, would
these individuals still be individuc lly liable in the
case of a suit or liable [sic]. I h now that in some
instances, corporation1s individuals may not be sued,
but only the corporation. What wou.ld_ be*
__ the* fitatuR of„
these people?"
Representative Watkins, the sponsor,! answers,
"This act does not alter any law applicable to the
relationship between a person rendering professional
services and a person receiving such services,
including liability arising out of such professional
services.
Therefore, the doctor who incorporates would not
be given .limited liability as most corporations
provide."
It is obvious from the tenor of the discussion that
Representative Loverage was referring to liability for
professional malpractice as opposed to ,dliable".
Representative Watkins' response was theft the liability
aspects of professional practice would not change.

Those

liability aspects as understood by both Representatives,
included the fact that professionals practicing together
were individually liable for the malpraqtice of one another.
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The Legislature intended to pass a statute
providing tax benefits to professionals, but did not
intend to amend the liability aspects of professional
practice.

It did not intend to shield Ms. Coffman from

the liability she would traditionally have faced as a
lawyer in practice with another lawyer.
B.
THE GENERAL LEGISLATIVE INTENT OF THE
PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION ACT WAS TO
ALLOW TAX BENEFITS BUT NOT TO LIMIT
LIABILITY.
At about the same time as the Utah Legislature enacted
the Utah Professional Corporation Act numerous other states
also considered and enacted professional corporation statutes.
In Petition of the Bar Association of Hawaii, 516 P.2d 1267
(Hawaii, 1973) the Hawaii Supreme Court quoted the Hawaii
Standing Committee Report,
"The basic reason for the establishment of
professional corporations is to place professional
persons on parity with persons in other business
corporations who are favored with tax benefits
under the Internal Revenue Code. This bill would
allow the professions to take advantage of the tax
benefit resulting in doing business through a
corporation." Id. at 1268.
See also In re: Rhode Island Bar Association, 263 A.2d 692,
695 (R.I., 1970) and In re; New Hampshire Bar Association, 266
A.2d 583,584 (N.H.,1970) and In re:
-5-

Florida Bar Association,

133 So.2d 554,555 (Fla., 1961).

Notably the Hawaii Supreme

Court refused to allow limited liability for lawyers not
personally involved in malpractice despite the fact that the
Hawaii Corporate Code would have otherwise immunized them.
The same result obtained in Ohio in Sopth High Development
Limited v. Weyner, Lippe and Cromley C<p. , L.P.A., 445 N.E. 2d
1106 (Ohio, 1983).
Those legal scholars who addressed the issue at the time
Professional Corporation statutes were being enacted also
focused on tax issues, see Smith and A^alt, The Corporate
Professional-United States v. Empey, 54 Mass.L.Q. 14 (1969);
Bittker, Professional Service Organizations:

A Critique of

the Literature, 23 Tax.L.Rev. 429 (196$); and O'Neill,
Professional Service Corporations:

Coping With Operational

Problems, 31 J.Taxation 94 (1969).
Those writers who addressed the liability issue found it
incongruous-that attorneys would be able to escape individual
liability merely by converting their practice to a corporate
format.

In Jones, The Professional Corporation 27

Fordham.L.R. 353, 360-362 (1958) the author described the
proposed form for a professional corporation.
included,
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That form

"The professional corporation shall afford no
limitation from the liability of its officers, directors
or shareholders or any errors, omissions, malpractice or
other torts committed by its agents, employees, officers,
directors, or shareholders in the scope of their
employment by or professional activities on behalf of the
corporation." Id. at 361.
Smith and Ault, supra, at 25, also addressed the
liability issue.

Their response to the limited

liability position, when comparing both sides of the
argument before the Court here was,
" . . . this limitation on traditional professional
responsbilities may raise both ethical problems
and problems in terms of the regulatory agencies
overseeing the practice of the various
professions."
II.
THE RULES OF THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
INVOKE RESPONDENT'S LIABILITY.
Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-51-14, provides that
rules and regulations pertaining to members of the Utah State
Bar shall be submitted and approved by the Utah Supreme
Court.

Further, Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-2-4(3),

provides "The Supreme Court shall, by rule, govern the
practice of law, including admission to practice law and the
conduct

and discipline of persons admitted to the practice of

law." (emphasis added).
By the Code of Professional Responsibility and the Rules
of Professional Conduct, the Supreme Court has exercised the
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authority granted in the judicial code*

The Code of

Professional Responsibility was in effect at the time the
incidents occurred which give rise to tjie Plaintiff's claim
against the Defendant.

The Code of Professional

Responsibility was approved on February 19, 1971, a copy is
attached as Attachment B.
Court approved

Subsequently^ the Utah Supreme

the Rules of Professional Conduct, to become

effective on January 1, 1988, a copy is attached as
Attachment C.
The introductory material to the Rules of Professional
Conduct contains a section entitled Scope.

In discussing the

rules, the Scope section describes, "Other [of these) rules
define the nature of relationships between the lawyer and
others."

In other words, some of the ryles establish a

standard of care.

A lawyer may be liable for the violation

of that standard, the classic definition of negligence.
A.
THE RESPONDENT WOULD NOT BE DISMISSED
FROM THIS ACTION UNDER RULE 5.1 OF
THE RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CQNDUCT.
Rule 5.1 of the Rules of Professional Conduct
provides,
(a) A partner in a law firm shdll make
reasonable efforts to insure that the firm has in
effect measures giving reasonable assurance that
all lawyers in the firm conform to the Rules of
Professional Conduct.
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(b) . . . A lawyer shall be responsible for
another lawyer's violations of the Rules of
Professional Conduct if: . . . (2) the lawyer is a
partner in the law firm in which the other lawyer
practices, or has direct supervisory authority over
the other lawyer, and know of the conduct at a time
when its consequences can be avoided or mitigated
but fails to take reasonable remedial actions."
The terminology section of the Rules of
Professional Conduct defines, "'Partner1 denotes a
member of a partnership or a shareholder in a law firm
organized as a professional corporation."
As a shareholder, with her husband, Ms. Coffman
was a "partner" in the law firm of Coffman and
Coffman.

In that capacity Ms. Coffman would have had,

under the Rules of Professional Conduct, a specific
duty to insure reasonable measures were taken to
insure adherence to the rules.
This matter was disposed of, below, on a Motion
to Dismiss.

In support of that motion, Ms. Coffman

provided an Affidavit stating that she was a member of
the firm and that she did not know anything about the
matter.

This clearly would not meet the criteria

established by Rule 5.1.

Whether or not steps taken by

her were sufficient to meet Rule 5.1 criteria would
constitute an issue of fact avoiding both Motions to
Dismiss and Motions for Summary Judgment in all but the
most straight forward cases.
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If Rule 5.1 had been in effect at toe time of the
negligence of the firm of Coffman and Coifman, as it
most assuredly will be at the time this case is
decided, Ms. Coffman would not have beeiji removed from
the lawsuit.

The legislative intent of the Act and the

other arguments set forth in this brief show that there
is no reason to otherwise distinguish between then and
now.
B.
LIMITED LIABILITY FOR A SHAREHOLDER
OF A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION
CONSTITUTES A PROSPECTIVE LIMITATION
OF LIABILITY.
Rule 1.8(h) of the Rules of Professional Conduct
provides,
"A lawyer shall not make an agreement prospectively
limiting the lawyer's liability to a client for
malpractice unless permitted by law and the client is
indepenndently represented in making the agreement • ."
Arguably the limitation of liability associated with
practicing in a professional corporation is legal. The
legality of a prospective limitation is lonly half the test.
The client must be independently represented.

The obvious

reason for independent representation is? so that the client
will be aware of the effect of the limited liability.

Very,

very few clients will be aware that by qnoosing Law Firm A,
a partnership, they will have the right :o look to each of
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the members of the law firm as well as the law firm itself,
as has traditionally been the case, and that by choosing Law
Firm B, a professional corporation, they may be limited to
pursuing the lawyer who negligently performs the work, the
corporation, if it has any assets, and the corporation's
Error's and Ommissions policy, if it actually has one, see
Smith & Ault, supra at 25.
Choosing to practice as a professional corporation
prospectively attempts to limit a law firm's liability just
, as assuredly as does having a provision in a retainer
agreement providing, "We will not be liable for any
negligent actions taken by any of our attorneys."

Neither

such limitation should be allowed.
The relevant provision of Rule 1.8(h) is similar to the
comparable provision of DR6-102(a) which addressed this
issue under the code of professional responsbility which was
in effect at the time this action arose.
III.
LIABILITY IMPOSED UPON A PERSON IS
LIABILITY IMPOSED UPON THE RESPONDENT.
The Respondent argues, at pages 3 and 4 of her brief,
that the effected relationship is the relationship between
a person rendering professional services and that she is
not liable because the person was her husband.

Utah Code

Annotated § 68-3-12 is part of the general rules of
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statutory construction. Subsection 5 of that statute
provides, "Person includes individuals, bodies politic and
corporate, partnerships, associations, knd companies."
Traditionally, a client had a relationship with many
persons when he employed a law firm.

Ope was the

individual lawyer with whom he worked, one was the
partnership or association, and the others were those
individuals in the association of partnership.

The

existence of these relationships with tne other attorneys
is evident from the existence and scope of DR 5-105 and
Rule 1.10 on disqualification, DR 5-101 and Rule 3.7 on
lawyers as witnesses and DR 2-102 and R(jle 7.5 on implying
association.
Traditionally all of these were liable for the
malpractice of the individual attorney Who represented the
client.

There is nothing in the Professional Corporation

Act which would infer that the personal professional
relationship referenced is an individual relationship or
that Ms. Coffman had no imputed relationship with the
appellant.
IV.
PUBLIC POLICY DEMANDS THE RESPONDENT'S
LIABILITY.
The public policy arguments for Respondent's liability
appear to be clear.

It is not inappropriate to briefly

state them.
-12-

Liability of individual shareholders encourages
involvement in and supervision of the work of others within
the firm.
Liability of individual shareholders encourages the use
of malpractice insurance by those who have the power to
require that the firm obtain it.
Liability of individual shareholders encourages
selective hiring and competent training by those within the
firm who govern these actions.
Liability of individual shareholders encourages
adherence to Rule 5.1 of the Rules of Professional Conduct.
CONCLUSION
Shareholders in professional corporations are liable
under the Professional Corporation Act and other relevant
regulations for the malpractice of professionals within
their firms. - This court should reverse the lower court and
remand this case so that Ms. Coffman remains a party.
DATED this 18th day of September, 1987.

4oBEOTH. WILDE
Attorney for Amicus Curiae
Utah Trial Lawyers Association
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ATTACHMENT A

HOUSE BILL 19|7
INCORPORATION OF PERSONS
RENDERING PROFESSIONAL SERVICES
Sponsors:

Reed A. Watkins, Eighth District
J. Robert Bullock, Eleventh District
George R. Aiken, (Twenty-Sixth District

BILL SIGNED BY THE GOVERNOR MARCH 19, 1963
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES DEBATE, THIRD DISCUSSION
MR.
benefits (inaudible)

SPEAKER:

To incorporate for tax

Representative Watkins?

REPRESENTATIVE WATKINS:

I move we accept the

Committee report.
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER:
SPEAKER:

Seconded.

Thank you. Illt has been moved and

seconded we adopt the Committee report. All in favor of this
motion, say Aye.
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKERS:
MR. SPEAKER:

Aye.

Cause in all?

The ayes have it.

It is now before us for consideration and explanation by
Representative Watkins.

Will you proceed?

REPRESENTATIVE WATKINS:
of the House.

Mr. Speaker and members

It is well known thait employees of

corporations receive some definite *:ax benefits under our
federal law.

And through the years individuals who have

operated sole proprietorships have been able to form

ORIGINAL

corporations and in effect become employees of their own
corporation, so that they too may participate along with the
rest of their employees for these benefits.
When it comes to the area of professional services,
there has been some questions in the ethics of the
professions as well as some possible question as to whether
say a doctor, could incorporation for the practice of his
profession*
The present House Bill 197 is a bill that would
enable professional individuals under regulation by their
own regulating board, as well as supervision by the
Secretary of State under the forming of the corporation.
But this Bill would enable professinal people to practice
their profession by the business means of a corporation.

It

would have no effect whatsoever, upon the personal
relationship treated between the doctor and his patient, for
example, or the dentist and his patient or the lawyer and
his client but would merely enable them to conduct their
business in a corporate form rather than as most of them do
now, as sole proprietorships or as partnerships.
I might mention this:

That this type legislation has

received very favorable treatment throughout the United
States.

As of one year ago about 15 states had met this

problem and had formed or have enacted enabling legislation
of one kind of another to allow the same result. Several of

2

1

those had done it by means of a professional corporation

2

act.

Other states by allowing wha |t they call an association

3

act.

As of today, one year later, about 23 or 24 states

4

have now passed this type of enabl tng legislation and, to my

5

knowledge, similar legislation is before most, if not all,

6

of the other states.

7

This is the basic purpose of the Act.

8

should say, a non-controversial bill.

9

the medical profession.

It is, I

It has the support of

It has the support of the dental

10

profession and other professions and I don't think that

11

there would be any particular objections.

12
13
14
15
16

If anyone has a question Irjll be certainly happy to
do my best to answer it.
MR. SPEAKER:

Representative Loverage?

REPRESENTATIVE LOVERAG^:

Mr. Speaker, I should

like to ask Representative Watkins a question,

17

MR. SPEAKER:

Will you respond?

18

REPRESENTATIVE WATKINS

19

REPRESENTATIVE LOVERAGfe:

Yes.
In connection with

20

suits, liable suits, would these individuals still be

21

individually liable in the case of a suit of liable?

22

that in some instances corporation^ may not be, individuals

23

may not be sued but only the corporation.

24

be the status of these people?

25

REPRESENTATIVE WATKINSfc

I know

Now, what would

I can read Section 10

1

of the Act which states:

2

applicable to the relationship between a person rendering

3

professional services and a person receiving such services,

4

"This Act does not alter any law

J including liability arising out of such professinal

5
6

Therefore, the doctor, for example, who

7

incorporates, would not be given limited liability as most

8

corporations provide.

9

too:

That is the—I might mention this

The term has been coined "Professional Corporation"

10

for this very reason, to point out that the professional

11

ethics and the same standards that now exist between the

12

professional person and his client or patient will remain

13

even though he incorporates.

14

If there are no other questions, Mr. Speaker—

15

REPRESENTATIVE PETERSON:

Mr. Speaker, I should

16

like to ask Representative Watkins a question.

17

just briefly tell us what these tax advantages are with

18

regards to these professional people?

19

REPRESENTATIVE WATKINS:

Could you

The main tax advantage,

20

Mr.

Peterson, is the adoption of what we call profit

21

sharing or pension plans.

22

course, it can adopt a plan for the benefit of its

23

employees.

24

benefit of the employees, but in the partnership the partner

25

is not an employee, he is an employer.

Under the corporation, of

A partnership can do the same thing for the

Whereas, under a

1

corporation, the owner-type person is both an employee as

2

well as an owner of stock.

3

that of the adoption of retirement plans such as pension and

4

profit sharing plans.

5

MR.

SPEAKER:

So this is the main benefit,

Any further questions?

6

question has been called for.

7

call the role on final passage.

8
9

I'll ask the chief clerk to
Representative Peterson?

REPRESENTATIVE PETERSON:

Mr.

Speaker, if there

is no opposition to this Bill I would move the rules be

10

suspended,

11

entire House in favor of this bill J

12

MR. SPEAKER:

13

The

The clerk be permitted to cast the vote of the

You heard the motion. All in

favor—

14

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER:

15

MR. SPEAKER:

(Inaudible).

Any final direction?

16

objections?

17

all in favor of this motion say aye.

All right.

Any other

All except Representative Anderson,

18

UNIDENTIFIES SPEAKERS:

19

MR. SPEAKER:

Aye.

All those; no?

The ayes have it

20

and if you'll remain in your seats I will ask the chief

21

clerk to make the count.

22

END OF RECORDING.
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I, Penny C. Abbott, do hereby certify I am a

5

Certified Shorthand Reporter and Notary Public in and for

6

the State of Utah.

7

transcribed into typewritten form, from tape recording, the

8

record a House of Representatives hearing regarding House

9

Bill 197 as herein contained in pages 1 through 5, both

That on the 9th day of September, 1987 I

10

inclusive.

11

of my knowledge and ability, some parts of the recording

12

being inaudible due to background noise and numerous persons

13

speaking at once.

And that said transcript is accurate to the best

14
15
16
17

WITNESS my hand and official seal this 1st day of
September, 1987.

18
19
Penny C^-^bbotl
Abbott, C.S.R.
& Notary/Publi<

20
21

My commission expires:

22

September 24, 1988
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Penny C. Abbott, C.S.R,
3241 South 4840 West
West Valley City, Utah 84120
Phone: 966-4862
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ATTACHMENT B

Professional Conduct of the Utah State Bar
Adopted May 28, 1936, approved by { he Utah Supreme
Court on March 1, 1937, and amendeq in 19 77, May 7,
1982, and September 16, 1985.

RULE !
SECTION 1. These rules of professional conduct for attorney and
counselors of the State of Utah, adopted by the Board of Commissioners
of the Utah State Bar and approved by the Supreme Court of Utah under
the inherent power of the Court to control and supervise the conduct of
members of the Utah State Bar and pursuant to tile provisions of Title 6,
Utah Code Annotated, 1943, are binding upon all members of the Utah
State Bar, and the breach of any of these rules shall be punishable by
reprimand, suspension or disbarment, including the assessment of costs.
SECTION 2. These rules may be cited and referred to as the Rules
of Professional Conduct of the Utah State Bar.
SECTION 3. Any false statement or failure to disclose all facts required for Admission to the Bar by an applicant, i|f calculated to deceive,
or any violation of the Rules of Conduct for members of the Bar prescribed
by statute or by rule, or any cause specified by statute as grounds for disbarment, suspension or reprimand, shall render the offending member of
the Utah State Bar subject to disciplinary proceedings.
SECTION 4. The enumeration of particular duties herein should not
be construed as a denial of the existence of othirs equally imperative,
though not specifically mentioned

RULE 1!
CONDUCT PRESCRIBED BY STARJTE
SECTION 1. It is the duty of an attorney aqa counselors:
L To support the constitution and the laws o| the United States and
of this State;
2. To maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and judicial
officers;
3. To counsel or maintain no other actions, proceedings or defenses
than those which appear to hi-m legal ^rd just, excepting the defense of
a person charged with a public offense;
4* To employ, for the purpose of maintaining the causes confided to
him, such means only as are consistent with truth, and never to seek to
mislead the judges by any artifice or false statement of fact or law;
5. To maintain inviolate the confidence, and, a1 every peril to himself,
to preserve the secrets of his client;
6. To abstain from all offensive personality, and to advance no fact
prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party or a fitness unless required
by the justice of the cause with which he is charged;
7. Not to encourage either the commencement or continuance of an
action or proceeding from any corrupt motive of passion or interest;

8. Never to reject, for any consideration personal to himself, the
cause of the defenseless or the oppressed;
9. To comply with all duly approved rules and regulations prescribed
by the Board of Commissioners of the Utah State Bar and to pay the annual
license fee provided by law.
SECTION 2- An attorney or counselor shall not:
1. Directly or indirectly buy, or be in any manner interested in
buying or having assigned to him for the purpose of collection, a bond,
promissory note, bill of exchange, book dept or other thing in action, with
the intent and for the purpose of bringing an' action thereon; provided,
that this section does not prohibit the receipt by an attorney or counselor
of a bond, promissory note, bill of exchange, book debt, or other thing in
action, in payment for property sold, or for services actually rendered,
or for a debt antecedently contracted, or from buying or receiving a bill
of exchange, draft, or other thing in action for the purpose of remittance,
and without intent to violate this section.
2. By himself, or by or in the name of another person either before
or after action brought promise or give, or procure to be promised or
given, a valuable consideration to any person as an inducement to placing,
or in consideration of having placed, in his hands, or in the hands of
another person, a demand of any kind, for the purpose of bringing action
thereon, or of representing the claimant in the pursuit of any civil remedy
for the recovery thereof; but this subdivision does not apply to any agreement between attorneys and counselors, or either, to divide between themselves the compensation to be received.
3. Knowingly permit any person, not being his general law partner
or a clerk in his office, to sue out any process or to prosecute or defend any
action in his name, as counsel or attorney for another.
4. Directly or indirectly advise in relation to, or aid or promote the
defense of any action or proceeding in any court the prosecution of which
is carried on, aided or promoted by a person as district attorney or other
public prosecutor with whom such attorney is directly or indirectly connected as a partner; or, having himself prosecuted or in any manner aided
or promoted any action or proceeding in any court, as district attorney or
other public prosecutor, afterwards directly or indirectly advise in relations
thereto, or take any part in, the defense thereof, as an attorney or otherwise; or take or receive any valuable consideration from or on behalf of
any defendent in any such action, upon any understanding or agreement
whatever, express or implied, having relation to the defense thereof; provided that this section does not prohibit an attorney from defending himself in person, as attorney or as counsel, when a party to a civil or criminal
action.
5. Take part in deceit or collusion, or consent thereto with intent
to deceive a court or judge or a party to an action or proceeding.
6. Knowingly without authority appear as an attorney for a party
to an action or proceeding.
7. Become a surety in any civil or criminal action, suit, or proceeding
which may be instituted in any of the courts of this state, in which he is
engaged as attorney.
SECTION 3. An attorney and counselor receiving money or property
of his client in the course of his orofessional business, shall pay or deliver

the same to the person entitled thereto within a (reasonable time, unless
he has just cause for retaining it
SECTION 4. An attorney and counselor may tte disbarred, suspended,
or reprimanded for violation of any of the foregoing rules, or for any of
the following causes, arising after his admission to practice:
1. His conviction of a felony, or of a misdemeanor involving moral
turpitude, in which case the record of conviction shall be conclusive
evidence;
2. Willful disobedience or violation of a valid and final order of the
court requiring hi™ to do or forebear an act connected with or in the course
of his profession, a violation of the oath taken by him, or any corrupt or
willful violation of his duties as an attorney or counselor;
3. For any other act to which such a consequence is by law attached.

RULE III
OATH OF THE ATTORNEY

The oath of an attorney, to be taken upon Adimission to the Bar and
to be followed in practice by each member of the Ut^h State Bar, is promulgated and prescribed as follows:
I Do SOLEMNLY SWEAR:

I wUI support the Constitution of the United Spates and the Constitution of the State of Utah, and that I wUI discharge the duties of
Attorney and Counselor at Law with fidelity;
I will maintain the respect due to Courts oj Justice and judicial
officers;
I wtZZ not counsel or maintain arty suit or proceeding which shall
appear to me to be unjust, nor any defense except si^ch as I believe to be
honestly debatable under the law of the land;
I will employ for the purpose of maintaining the causes cortfided to
me such means only as are consistent with truth and honor, and will
never seek to mislead the Judge or jury by any artifice or false statement
of fact or law;
I will maintain the confidence and preserve the secrets of my client,
and will accept no compensation in connection witty his business except
from him or with his knowledge and approval;
I will abstain from all offensive personality, and advance no fact
prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party or witness, unless required
by the justice of the cause with which I am charge^;
I will never reject, from any consideration personal to myself, the
cause of the defenseless or oppressed, or delay any i\iaris cause for lucre
or malice. So HELP ME GOD.

RULE IV
CONDUCT PRESCRIBED BY RULE
Code of Professional Responsibility
Adopted by Utah State Bar, May 7,1970
(Approved by Utah Supreme Court February 19, 1971)

CANON 1
A Lawyer Should Assist in
Maintaining the Integrity and
Competence of the Legal
Profession
ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS
EC 1-1 A basic tenet of the professional responsibility of lawyers is that every person
in our society should have ready access to the independent professional services of a
lawyer of integrity and competence. Maintaining the integrity and improving the competence of the bar to meet the highest standards is the ethical responsibility of every'
lawyer.
EC 1-2 The public should be protected from those who are not qualified to be lawyers
by reason of a deficiency in education or moral standards or of other relevant factors
but who nevertheless seek to practice law. To assure the maintenance of high moral
and educational standards of the legal profession, lawyers should affirmatively assist
courts and other appropriate bodies in promulgating, enforcing, and improving requirements for admission to the bar.. In like manner, the bar has a positive obligation to aid
in the continued improvement of all phases of pre-admission and post-admission legal
education.
EC 1-3 Before recommending an applicant for admission, a lawyer should satisfy himself that the applicant is of good moral character. Although a lawyer should not become
a self-appointed investigator or judge of applicants for admission, he should report to
proper officials all unfavorable information be possesses relating to the character or
other qualifications of an applicant
EC 14 The integrity of the profession can be maintained only if conduct of lawyers in
violation of the Disciplinary Rules is brought to the attention of the proper officials.
A lawyer should reveal voluntarily to those officials ail unprivileged knowledge of conduct of lawyers which he believes clearly to be in violation of the Disciplinary Rules.
A lawyer should, upon request, serve on and assist committees and boards having responsibility for the administration of the Disciplinary Rules.
EC 1-5 A lawyer should maintain high standards of professional conduct and should
encourage fellow lawyers to do likewise. He should be temperate and dignified, and he
should refrain from all illegal and morally reprehensible conduct. Because of his position
in society, even minor violations of law by a lawyer may tend to lessen public confidence in the legal profession. Obedience to law exemplifies respect for law. To lawyers
especially, respect for the law should be more than a platitude.
EC 1-6 An applicant for admission to the bar or a lawyer may be unqualified, temporarily or permanently, for other than moral and educational reasons, such as mental
or emotional instability. Lawyers should be diligent in taking steps to see that during
a period of disqualification such person is not granted a license or, if licensed, is not
permitted to practice. In like mannert when the disqualification has terminated, members of the bar should assist such person in being licensed, or, if licensed, in being
restored to his full right to practice.

DISCIPLINARY RUL£S

DR 1-101

Maintaining Integrity and Competence ofl the Legal Profession.

(A) A lawyer is subject to discipline if he has made a materially false statement in, or if he has deliberately failed to disclose a material fact
requested in connection with, his application for admission to the bar.
(B) A lawyer shall not further the application for admission to the bar of
another person known by him to be unqualified in respect to character,
education, or other relevant attribute.
DR 1-102

Misconduct

(A) A lawyer shall not:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)

Violate a Disciplinary Rule.
Circumvent a Disciplinary Rule through actions of another.
Engage in illegal conduct involving moral turpitude.
Engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation.
(5) Engage in conduct that is prejudicial to ±e administration of
justice.
(6) Engage in any other conduct that adverselv reflects on his fitness
to practice law.

DR 1-103 Disclosure of Information to Authorities.
(A) A lawyer possessing unprivileged knowledge of * viuiauon of DR 1-102
shall report such knowledge to a tribunal or othe^ authority empowered
to investigate or act upon such violation.
(B) A lawyer possessing unprivileged knowledge or evidence concerning
another lawyer or a judge shall reveal fully such | knowledge or evidence
upon proper request of a tribunal or other authority empowered to
investigate or act upon the conduct of lawyers or judges.

CANON 2
A Lawyer Should Assist the Legal Profession
in Fulfilling Its Duty
to Make Legal Counsel Available;
ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS

EC 2-1 The need of members of the public for legal services is met only if
they recognize their legal problems, appreciate the importance of seeking
assistance, and are able to obtain the services of acceptable legal counsel.
Hence, important functions of the legal profession are to educate laypersons,
to recognize their problems, to facilitate the process ofl intelligent selection of
lawyers, and to assist in making legal services fully available.
Recognition of Legal Problems

EC 2-2 The legal profession should assist laypersyiiS to recognize legal
problems because such problems may not be self-re veiling and often are not
timely noticed. Therefore, lawyers should encourage and participate in

particular reference to legal problems that frequently arise. Preparation of
advertisements and professional articles for lay publications and participation
in seminars, lectures, and civic programs should be motivated by a desire to
educate the public to an awareness of legal needs and to provide information
relevant to the selection of the most appropriate counsel rather than to
obtain publicity for particular lawyers. The problems of advertising on television and radio require special consideration, due to the style, cost, and
transitory nature of such media. If the interests of laypersons in receiving
relevant lawyer advertising are not adequately served by print media, and if
adequate safeguards to protect the public can reasonably be formulated,
television and radio advertising may serve a public interest,
(approved 12-5-77)
EC 2-3 Whether a lawyer acts properly in volunteering in-person advice to
a layperson to seek legal services depends upon the circumstances. The
giving of advice that one should take legal action could well be in fulfillment of the duty of the legal profession to assist laypersons in recognizing
legal problems. The advice is proper only if motivated by a desire to protect
one who does not recognize that he may have legal problems or who is ignorant of his legal rights or obligations. It is improper if motivated by a desire
to obtain personal benefit, secure personal publicity, or cause legal action to
be taken merely to harass or'injure another. A lawyer should not initiate an
in-person contact with a non-client, personally or through a representative,
for the purpose of being retained to represent him for compensation.
(approved 12-5-77)
EC 2-4 Since motivation is subjective and often difficult to judge, the
motives of a lawyer who volunteers in-person advice likely to produce legal
controversy may well be suspect if he receives professional employment or
other benefits as a result. A lawyer who volunteers in-person advice that
-itie should obtain the services of a lawyer generally -should not himself accept
-nployment, compensation, or other benefit in connection with that matter.
'owever, it is not improper for a lawyer to volunteer such advice and render
suiting legal services to close friends, relatives, former clients (in regard
.o matters germane to former employment), and regular clients.
(approved 12-5-77)
EC 2-5 A lawyer who writes or speaks for the pupose of educating members
of the public to recognize their legal problems should carefully refrain from
giving or appearing to give a general solution applicable to all apparently
similar individual problems, since slight changes in fact situations may
require a material variance in the applicable advice; otherwise, the public
may be misled and misadvised. Talks and writings by lawyers for laypersons
should caution them not to attempt to solve individual problems upon the
basis of the infonnation contained therein.
(approved 12-5-77)
Selection of a Lawyer: Generally
EC 2-6 Formerly a potential client usually knew the reputations of local
lawyers for competency and integrity and therefore could select a practitioner
in whom he had confidence. This traditional selection process worked well
because it was initiated by the client and the choice was an informed one.
(approved 12-5-77)
EC 2-7 Changed conditions, however, have seriously restricted the effectiveness of the traditional selection process. Often the reputations of lawyers
are not sufficiently known to enable laypersons to make intelligent choices.
The law has become increasingly complex and specialized. Few lawyers are
willing and competent to deal with every kind of legal matter, and many
laypersons have difficulty in determining the competence of lawyers to render
different types of legal services. The selection of legal counsel is particularly
difficult for transients, persons moving into new areas, persons of limited
education or means, and others who have little or no contact with lawyers.
Lack of information about the availability of lawyers, the qualifications of
particular lawyers, and the expense of legal representation leads laypersons
in avoid seeking legal advice.
(approved 12-5-77)
6
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basis. Advice and recommendation of third parties — relatives, friends,
acquaintances, business associates, or other lawyers L— and disclosure of relevant information about the lawyer and his practici may be helpful. A layperson is best served if the recommendation is disinterested and informed.
In order that the recommendation be disinterested, la lawyer should not seek
to influence another to recommend his employment A lawyer should not
compensate another person for recommending him, for influencing a prospective client to employ him, or to encourage future recommendations. Advertisement and public communications, whether in law lists, telephone directories
newspapers or other forms of print media should be formulated to convey
only information that is necessary to make an appropriate selection. Such
information includes: (1) office information, such as, name, including name of
law firm and names of professional associates; addresses; telephone numbers;
credit card acceptability; fluency in foreign languages; and office hours; (2)
relevant biographical information; (3) description of the practice, but only
by using designations and definitions authorized by tne Utah Supreme Court,
for example, one or more fields of law in which the lawyer or law firm practices; a statement that practice is limited to one or more fields of law; or a
statement that the lawyer or law firm concentrates in a particular field of
law practice, but only using designations, definitions and standards authorized by the Utah Supreme Court; and (4) permitted fee information. Selflaudation should be avoided
(approved 12-5-77)

Selection oi o Lflwyen

Lawyer Advertising

EC 2-9 The lack of sophistication on the part oil many members of the
public concerning legal services, the importance of tpe interests affected by
the choice of a lawyer and prior experience with unrestricted lawyer advertising, require that special care be taken by lawyers to avoid misleading the
public and to assure that the information set forth in any advertising is
relevant to the selection of a lawyer. The lawyer must be mindful that the
benefits of lawyer advertising depend upon its reliability and accuracy.
Examples of information in lawyer advertising that would be deceptive
include misstatements of fact, suggestions that the ingenuity or prior record
of a lawyer rather than the justice of the claim are the principal factors likely
to determine the result, inclusion of information irrelevant to selecting a
lawyer, and representations concerning the quality of service, which cannot
be measured or verified. Since lawyer advertising is calculated and not spontaneous, reasonable regulation of lawyer advertising Resigned to foster compliance with appropriate standards serves the public iterest without impeding the flow of useful, meaningful, and relevant infor ition to the public,
(approved 12-5-77)
EC 2-10 A lawyer should ensure that the infonnation contained in any
advertising which the lawyer publishes or causes to b^ published is relevant,
is disseminated in an objective and understandable
ion, and would facilitate the prospective client's ability to compare the qualifications of the
lawyers available to represent him. A lawyer should strive to communicate
such information without undue emphasis upon style id advertising stratagems which serve to hinder rather than to facilitate iteiligent selection of
counsel. Because technological change is a recurrent feature in communications forms, and because perceptions of what is relevant in lawyer selection
may change, lawyer advertising regulations should not be cast in rigid,
unchangeable terms. Machinery is therefore available to advertisers and
consumers for prompt consideration of proposals to change the rules governing lawyer advertising. The determination of any request for such change
should depend upon whether the proposal accords with standards of accuracy, reliability and truthfulness, and whether the proposal would facilitate
informed selection of lawyers by potential consumers of legal services. Representatives of lawyers and consumers should be heara in addition to the
applicant concerning any proposed change. Any change which is approved
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basis. Advice and recommendation of third parties — relatives, friends,
acquaintances, business associates, or other lawyers — and disclosure of relevant information about the lawyer and his practice may be helpful. A layperson is best served if the recommendation is disinterested and informed.
In order that the recommendation be disinterested, a lawyer should not seek
to influence another to recommend his employment A lawyer should not
compensate another person for recommending him, for influencing a prospective client to employ him, or to encourage future recommendations. Advertise
ment and public communications, whether in law lists, telephone directories
newspapers or other forms of print media should be formulated to convey
only information that is necessary to make an appropriate selection. Such
information includes: (1) office information, such as, name, including name of
law firm and names of professional associates; addresses; telephone numbers;
credit card acceptability; fluency in foreign languages; and office hours; (2)
relevant biographical information; (3) description of the practice, but only
by using designations and definitions authorized by the Utah Supreme Court,
for example, one or more fields of law in which the lawyer or law firm practices; a statement that practice is limited to one or more fields of law; or a
statement that the lawyer or law firm concentrates in a particular field of
law practice, but only using designations, definitions and standards authorized by the Utah Supreme Court; and (4) permitted fee information. Selflaudation should be avoided.
(approved 12-5-77)

Selection oi a Lawyer.

lowyeT Advertising

EC 2-9 The lack of sophistication on the part of many members of the
public concerning legal services, the importance of the interests affected by
the choice of a lawyer and prior experience with unrestricted lawyer advertising, require that special care be taken by lawyers to avoid misleading the
public and to assure that the information set forth in any advertising is
relevant to the selection of a lawyer. The lawyer must be mindful that the
benefits of lawyer advertising depend upon its reliability and accuracy.
Examples of information in lawyer advertising that would be deceptive
include misstatements of fact, suggestions that the ingenuity or prior record
of a lawyer rather than the justice of the claim are the principal factors likely
to determine the result, inclusion of information irrelevant to selecting a
lawyer, and representations concerning the quality of service, which cannot
be measured or verified. Since lawyer advertising is calculated and not spontaneous, reasonable regulation of lawyer advertising designed to foster compliance with appropriate standards serves the public interest without impeding the flow of useful, meaningful, and relevant information to the public,
(approved 12-5-77)
EC 2-10 A lawyer should ensure that the information contained in any
advertising which the lawyer publishes or causes to be published is relevant,
is disseminated in an objective and understandable fashion, and would facilitate the prospective client's ability to compare the qualifications of the
lawyers available to represent him. A lawyer should strive to communicate
such information without undue emphasis upon style and advertising stratagems which serve to hinder rather than to facilitate intelligent selection of
counsel. Because technological change is a recurrent feature in communications forms, and because perceptions of what is relevant in lawyer selection
may change, lawyer advertising regulations should not be- cast in rigid,
unchangeable terms. Machinery is therefore available to advertisers and
consumers for prompt consideration of proposals to change the rules governing lawyer advertising. The determination of any request for such change
should depend upon whether the proposal accords with standards of accuracy, reliability and truthfulness, and whether the proposal would facilitate
informed selection of lawyers by potential consumers of legal services. Representatives of lawyers and consumers should be heard in addition to the
applicant concerning any proposed change. Any change which is approved

lawyers practicing in the jurisdiction may avail theiaselves to its provisions.
(approved 12-5-77)
EC 2-11 The name under which a lawyer conducts his practice may be a
factor in the selection process. The use of a trade name or an assumed name
could mislead laypersons concerning the identity, responsibility, and status
of those practicing thereunder. Accordingly, a ^ lawyer in private practice
should practice only under a designation containing his own name, the name
of a lawyer employing him, the name of one or more of the lawyers practicing
in partnership, or, the name of a professional legal corporation, which should
be clearly designated as such. For many years some law firms have used
a firm name retaining one or more names of deceased or retired partners and
such practice is not improper if the firm is a bona fide successor of a firm in
which the deceased or retired person was a member, if the use of the name is
authorized by law or by contract, and if the public is not misled thereby.
However, the name of a partner who withdraws from a firm but continues to
practice law should be omitted from the firm name ig order to avoid misleading the public.
(approved 12-5-77)
EC 2-12 A lawyer occupyipg a judicial, legislative, or public executive or
administrative position who has the right to practice law concurrently may
allow his name to remain in the name of the firm if he actively continues to
practice law as a member thereof. Otherwise, his name should be removed
from the firm name, and he should not be identified as a past or present
member of the firm; and he should not hold himself $ut as being a practicing
lawyer.
EC 2-13 In order to avoid the possibility of misleading persons with whom
he deals, a lawyer should be scrupulous in the representation of his professional status. He should not hold himself out as being a partner or associate
of a law firm, if he is not one in fact; and thus shouia not hold himself out as
a partner or associate if he only shares offices with another lawyer.
EC 2-14 In some instances a lawyer confines his practice to a particular
field of law. In the absence of state controls to insure the existence of special
competence, a lawyer should not be permitted to hold himself out as a
specialist or as having official recognition as a specialist, other than in the
fields of admiralty, trademark, and patent law where a holding out as a
specialist historically has been permitted A lawyer may, however, indicate
in permitted advertising if it is factual, a limitation of his practice to one or
more particular areas or fields of law in which he practices using designations
and definitions for that purpose by the Utah Supreme Court,
(approved 12-5-77)
EC. 2-15 The legal profession has developed lawyfer referral systems designed to aid individuals who are able to pay fees but need assistance m
locating lawyers competent to handle their particui|kr problems. Use of a
lawyer referral system enables a layman to avoid an uninformed selection of
a lawyer because such a system makes possible the employment of competent
lawyers who have indicated an interest in the subject matter involved. Lawyers should support the principle of lawyer referral systems and should
encourage the evolution of other ethical plans whichl aid in the selection of
qualified counsel
EC 2-16 The legal profession cannot remain a viable force in fulfilling its
role in our society unless its members receive adequate compensation for
services rendered, and reasonable fees should be charged in appropriate cases
to clients able to pay them. Nevertheless, persons junable to pay ail or a
portion of a reasonable fee should be able to obtain necessary legal services,
and lawyers should support and participate in ethical activities designed to
achieve that objective.
8

Financial Ability to Employ Counsel:
Persons Able to Pay Reasonable Fees
EC 2-17 The determination of a proper fee requires consideration of the
interests of both client and lawyer. A lawyer should not charge more than
a reasonable fee, for excessive cost of legal services would deter laymen from
utilizing the legal system in protection of their rights. Furthermore, an
excessive charge abuses the professional relationship between lawyer and
client. On the other hand, adequate compensation is necessary in order to
enable the lawyer to serve his client effectively and to preserve the integrity
and independence of the profession.
EC 2-18 The determination of the reasonableness of a fee requires consideration of all relevant circumstances, including those stated in the Disciplinary
Rules. The fees of a lawyer will vary according to many factors, including
the time required, his experience, ability, and reputation, the nature of the
employment, the responsibility involved, and the results obtained. Suggested
fee schedules and economic reports of state and local bar associations provide
some guidance on the subject of reasonable fees. It is a commendable and
long-standing tradition of the bar that special consideration is given in the
fixing of any fee for services^ rendered a brother lawyer or a member of his
immediate family.
EC 2-19 As soon as feasible after a lawyer has been employed, it is desirable that he reach a clear agreement with his client as to the basis of the fee
charges to be made. Such a course will not only prevent later misunderstanding but will also work for good relations between the lawyer and the
client. It is usually beneficial to reduce to writing the understanding of the
parties regarding the fee, particularly when it is contingent. A lawyer should
be mindful that many persons who desire to employ him may have had little
or no experience with fee charges of lawyers, and for this reason he should
explain fully to such persons the reasons for the particular fee arrangement
he proposes.
EC 2-20 Contingent fee arrangements in civil cases have long been commonly accepted in the United States in proceedings to enforce claims. The
historical bases of their acceptance are that (1) they often, and in a variety
of circumstances, provide the only practical means by which one having a
claim against another can economically afford, finance, and obtain the services of a competent lawyer to prosecute his claim, and (2) a successful prosecution of the claim produces a res out of which the fee can be paid. Although
a lawyer generally should decline to accept employment on a contingent fee
basis by one who is able to pay a reasonable fixed fee, it is not necessarily
improper for a lawyer, where justified by the particular circumstances of a
case to enter into a contingent fee contract in a civil case with any client
who, after being fully informed of all relevant factors, desires that arrangement Because of the human relationships involved and the unique character of the proceedings, contingent fee arrangements in domestic relation
ca«*«* are rarely justified. In administrative agency proceedings contingent
fee contracts should be governed by the same consideration as in other civil
cases. Public policy properly condemns contingent fee arrangements in criminal cases, largelv on the ground that legal services in criminal cases do not
produce a res with which to pay the fee.
EC 2-21 A lawyer should not accept compensation or any thing of value
incident to his employment or services from one other than his client without
the knowledge and consent of his client after full disclosure.
EC 2-22 Without the consent of his client, a lawyer should not associate
u: d particular matter another lawyer outside his firm. A fee may properly
be divided between lawyers properly associated if the division is in proportion
to the services performed and the responsibility assumed by each lawyer and
if tH« total fee is reasonable.

over fees with clients and should attempt to resolvd amicablye any differences on the subject He should not sue a client for a fee unless necessary
to prevent fraud or gross imposition by the client
Financial Ability to Employ Counsel:
Persons Unable to Pay Reasonable Fees

EC 2-24 A layman whose financial ability is not sufficient to permit payment of any fee cannot obtain legal services, other than in cases where a
contingent fee is appropriate, unless the services are provided for him. Even
a person of moderate means may be unable to pay a reasonable fee which is
large because of the complexity, novelty, or difficulty of the problem or
similar factors.
E C 2-25 Historically, the need for legal services df those unable to pay
reasonable fees has been met in part by lawyers who donated their services or
accepted court appointments on behalf of such individpals. The basic responsibility for providing legal services for those unable ^o pay ultimately rests
upon the individual lawyer, and personal involvementj in the problems of the
disadvantaged can be one of-the most rewarding experiences in the life of a
lawyer. Every lawyer, regardless of professional proi^unence or professional
workload, should find time to participate in serving the disadvantaged. The
reasonable fees conrendition of free legal services to those unable to
tinues to be an obligation of each lawyer, but the efforb of individual lawyers
are often -not enough to meet the need. Thus it has been necessary for the
profession to institute additional programs to provide legal services. Accordingiy, legal aid offices, lawyer referral services, and ^ther related programs
have been developed, and others will be developed by| the profession. Every
lawyer should support all proper efforts to meet this need for legal services.
Acceptance and Retention of Employment

EC 2-26 A lawyer is under no obligation to act as kdviser or advocate for
for every person who may wish to become his client! but in furtherance of
the objective of the bar to make legal services fully available, a lawyer should
not lightly decline proffered employment. The fulfillment of this objective
requires acceptance by a lawyer of his share of tendered employment which
may be unattractive both to him and the bar generally,
EC 2-27 History is replete with instances of distinguished and sacrificial
services by lawyers who have represented unpopular clients and causes.
Regardless of his personal feelings, a lawyer should noi decline representation
because a client or a cause is unpopular or community reaction is adverse.
EC 2-28 The personal preference of a lawyer to avoid adversary alignment
against judges, other lawyers, public officials, or influential members of the
community does not justify his rejection of tendered employment.
EC 2-29 When a lawyer is appointed by a court pr requested by a bar
association to undertake representation of a person uriable to obtain counsel,
whether for financial or other reasons, he should not seek to be excused from
undertaking the representation except for compelling reasons. Compelling
reasons do not include such factors as the repugnancl of the subject matter
of the proceeding, the identity or position of a person involved in the case,
the belief of the lawyer that the defendant in a criminal proceeding is guilty,
or the belief of the Lawyer regarding the merits of the civil case.
EC 2-30 Employment should not be accepted by a lawyer when he is
unable to render competent service or when he kno^s or it is obvious that
the person seeking to employ him desires to institute or maintain an action
merely for the purpose of harassing or maliciously in'
injuring another. Likewise,
a lawyer should decline employment if the intensity oi his personal feeling as
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distinguished from a community attitude, may impair his effective representation of a prospective dent. If a lawyer knows a client has previously
obtained counsel, he should not accept employment in the matter unless
the other counsel approves or withdraws, or the client terminates the prior
employment.
EC 2-31 Full availability of legal counsel requires both that persons be able
to obtain counsel and that lawyers who undertake representation complete
the work involved. Trial counsei for a convicted defendant should continue
to represent his client by adv;sing whether to take an appeal and, if the
appeal is prosecuted, by representing him through the appeal unless new
counsel is substituted or withdrawal is permitted by the appropriate court.
EC 2-32 A decision by a lawyer to withdraw should be made only on the
basis of compelling circumstances, and in a matter pending before a tribunal
he must comply with the rules of the tribunal regarding withdrawal. A lawyer should not withdraw without considering carefully and endeavoring to
mirrinine the possible adverse effect on the rights of his client and the possibility of prejudice to his client as a resuit of his withdrawal Even when he
justifiably withdraws, a lawyer should protect the welfare of his client by
giving due notice of his withdrawal, suggesting emplovment of other counsei,
delivering to the client ail papers and property to which the client is entitled.
cooperating with counsel subsequently employed, and otherwise endeavoring
to minimizp the poss'biiity of harm. Further, he should refund to the client
any compensation not earned during the employment.

DISCIPLINARY RULES
DR 2-l01(A) :
(1) Subject to the requirements of this rule,
a lawyer may advertise services through public media,
such as a telephone directory, legal directory, newspaper or other periodical, outdoor, radio or television,
or through written communication noij involving solicitation as defined in DR 2-lO^(H).
(2) A copy or recording of an advertisement or
written communication shall be kept for two years after
its last dissemination along with a record of-when
and where it was used.
(3) A lawyer shall not give anything of value
to- a person for recommending the lawyer's services,
except that a lawyer may pay the reasonable cost of
advertising or written communication permittee oy
this rule and may pay the usual charfees of a notfor-profit lawyer referral service op other legal
service organization,
(4) Any communication made pursuant to this rule
shall include the name of at least ope lawyer responsible
for its content,
(5) A lawyer shall not make a false, fraudulent
or misleading statement about the lawyer or the lawyer's
services to a client or prospective client.

DR 2-102(3):
A lawyer shall not use a firm name, letterhead or
other professional designation that violates DR 2-10KA).
A trade name may be used by a lawyer m private practice
if it does not imply a connection withh a government
agency or with a public or charitabld legal services

(b)

A law firm with offices in more than one jurisdiction

may use the same name in each jurisdiction, but
identification of the lawyers in an office of the firm shall
indicate the jurisdiction limitations on those not licensed
to practice in the jurisdiction where the office is located.
(c)

The name of a lawyer holding a public office shall not

be used in the name of the law firm, or in communications on
its behalf, during any substantial period in which the
lawyer is not actively practicing with the firm.
(d)

Lawyers may state or imply that they practice in a

partnership or other organization only' when that is the
fact.
DR 2-102(0 Deleted.
DR 2-102(D)

A lawyer shall not compensate or give anything

of value to a:representative of the press, radio,
television, or other communication medium in anticipation of
or in return for professional publicity in a news item.

A

paid advertisement must be identified as such unless it is
apparent from the context that it is a paid advertisement.
If the paid advertisement is communicated to the public

by

use of electronic broadcast media, a recording of the actual
transmission in the form in which the advertisement is to be
broadcast shall be first approved by the lawyer(s)
authorizing it and a recording thereof retained by the
lawyer(s).

In addition to
the provisions
advertisements
fees, shall be

the further provisions of this DR 2-101 and
of DR 2-102 through DR 2-105, fee
and other publication of information as to
subject to the following:

(1)

If a Lawyer advertises a fee for a service, the
Lawyer must render that service tor no more than the
fee advertised.

(2)

Unless otherwise specified in thfc advertisement, if a
lawyer publishes any fee information in a publication
that is published more frequently than one time per
month, the lawyer shall be bound]by any
representation made therein for a period of not less
than 30 days after such publication. If a lawyer
publishes any fee information in a publication that
is published once a month or less frequently, he
shall be bound 'by any representation made therein
until the publication of the succeeding issue.- If a
lawyer publishes any fee information in a publication
which has no fixed date for publication of a
succeeding issue, the Lawyer shall be bound by any
representation made therein for 4 reasonable period
of time after publication but in no event less than
one year.

(3)

Unless otherwise specified in th*
advertisement, if a Lawyer broadc asts any fee
information, the Lawyer shall be bound by any
representation made therein for al period of not
less than 30 days after such broadcast.

A copy or record of an advertisement in its entirety shall
be kept for one year after its dissemiqat:ion.
Every advertisement for legal services shall identify the
name of the Lawyer or law firm whose se|rvices are
advertised.
Solicitation.
(1)

Except as permitted under DR 2—10[3 and 2-104, and
subparagraph (2) of this DR 2-10*(H), in-person, and
similar direct forms of contact with a prospective
client by a lawyer for the purpose of soliciting
business, are prohibited.

(2)

A lawyer may inititiate written cbntact with
prospective clients in the following circumstances:
(a)

By a general mailing, not concerning a
specific case, cause of action, transaction,
or other such event.

(b)

(3)

(4)

(I)

By direct mail under the auspices of a public
or charitable legal services organization or a
bona fide political, social, civic,
fraternal, employee, or trade organization
whose purposes include, but are not limited to
providing or recommending legal services•

A lawyer may not initiate written contact with
prospective clients, as set forth in subparagraph (2;
of this DR 2-10X(H) if:
(a)

The Lawyer knows or reasonably should know that
the physical, emotional or mental state of any
person so contacted is such that the person
could not exercise reasonable judgment in
employing a lawyer.

(b)

The communication involves coercion, duress,
harassment, or overreaching.

A copy or record, in its entirety, of a written
contact with prospective clients pursuant to the
provisions of DR 2-10X(H) (2) , above, shall be kept
for one year after its dissemination, and a copy of
such written communication shall be mailed to the
office of the Utah State Bar simultaneously with its
dissemination to prospective clients; provided,
however, that receipt of such copy by the Utah State
Bar and subsequent failure to act with respect
thereto, whether on one or more occasions, shall not
be dee.med to constitute approval by the Utah State
Bar of* the contents thereof, and shall not constitute
the basis for a defense of waiver, estoppel,
laches, or other such defense by the lawyer sending
such communication in the event of any subsequent
disciplinary proceeding against the lawyer.

Any form of communication by a lawyer referred to in
this DR 2-101, by any medium of communication, for the
purpose of advertising, publicizing, or promoting the
services of a lawyer or of an affiliated lawyer shall
comply with the Limitations contained in paragraphs DR
2-101 (A) and (B), as well as, where applicable, the
provisions contained in DR 2-102 through DR 2-105.

DR 2-103

Recommendation of Professional Employment

(A) A lawyer shall not, except as authorized in DEI 2-101 (B), recommend
employment as a private practitioner, of himseli his partner, or associate to a layperson who has not sought his advice regarding employment
of a lawyer.
(approved 12-5-77)
(B) A lawyer shall not compensate or give anything! of value to a person or
organization to recommend or secure his employment by a client, or as
a reward for having made a recommendation resulting in his employment by a client, except that he may pay the usual and reasonable fees
or dues charged by any of the organizations listed in DR 2-103(D).
(approved 12-5-77)
(C.) A lawyer shall not request a person or organization to recommend or
promote the use of his services or those of his bartner or associate, or
any other lawyer affiliated with him or his Sim, as a private practitioner, except as authorized in DR 2-101, and except that:
(1) He may request referrals from a lawyer repeirai service operated,
sponsored, or approved by a bar association and may pay its fees
incident thereto(approved 12-5-77)

(4) and may perform legal services for those to whom he was
recommended by it to do such work if:
(a) The person to whom the recommendation is made is a member
or beneficiary of such office or organization; and
(b) The lawyer remains free to exercise his independent professional judgment on behalf of his client (approved 12-5-77)
(D) A lawyer or his partner or associate or any other lawyer affiliated with
him or his firm may be recommended, employed or paid by, may cooperate with, one of the following offices or organizations that promote
the use of his services or those of his partner or associate or any other
lawyer affiliated with him or his firm if there is not interference with
the exercise of independent professional judgment in behalf of his
client:
(1) A legal aid office or public defender office:
(a) Operated or sponsored by a doily accredited law schooL
(b) Operated or sponsored by a bona fide nonprofit community
organization.
(c) Operated or sponsored by a governmental agency.
(d) Operated, sponsored, or approved by a bar association.
(approved 12-5-77)
(2) A military legal assistance office.

(approved 12-5-77)

(3) A lawyer referral service operated, sponsored, or approved by a
bar association.
(approved 12-5-77)
(4) Any Dona fide organization that recommends, furnishes or pays for
legal services to its members or beneficiaries provided the following
conditions are satisfied:
(approved 12-5-77)
(a) Such organization, including any affiliate, is so organized and
operated that no profit is derived by it from the rendition of
legal services by lawyers, and that, if the organization is
organized for profit, the legal services are not rendered by
lawyers employed, directed, supervised or selected by it except
in connection with matters where such organization bears ultimate liability of its members or beneficiary.
(approved 12-5-77)
(b) Neither the lawyer, nor his partner, nor associate, nor any
other lawyer affiliated with him or his firm, nor any nonlawyer, shaJl have initiated or promoted such organization for
the primary purpose of providing financial or other benefit to
such lawyer, partner, associate or affiliated lawyer.
(approved 12-5-77)
(c) Such organization is not operated for the purpose of procuring
legal work or financial benefit for any lawyer as a private
practitioner outside of the legal services program of the
organization.
(approved 12-5-77)
13-c

furnished, and not such organization, is recognized as the
client ox the lawyer in the matter(approved 12-5-77)
(e) Any member or beneficiary who is entitled to have legal serv*
ices furnished or paid for by the organization may, if such
member or beneficiary so desires, select counsel other than
that furnished, selected or approved by the organization for
the particular matter involved; and the legal service plan of
such organization provides approprintel relief for any member
or beneficiary who asserts a claim tpat representation by
counsel furnished, selected or approved would be unethical,
improper or inadequate under the circumstances of the matter
involved and the plan provides an appropriate procedure for
seeking such relief.
(approved 12-5-77)
(f) The lawyer does not know or have cause to know that such
organization is in violation of applicable laws, rules of court
and other legal requirements that govern its legal service
operation,
(approved 12-5-77)
(g) Such organization has filed with the appropriate disciplinary
authority at least annually a report with respect to its legal
service plan, if any, showing its terms, its schedule of benefits,
its subscriptions charges, agreements with counsel, and financial results of its legal service activities or, if it has failed to
do so, the lawyer does not know or hpve cause to know of
such failure.
(approved 12-5-77)
(E) A lawyer shall not accept employment when he knows or it is obvious
that the person who seeks his services does so as a result ox conduct
prohibited under this Disciplinary Rule,
(approved 12-5-77)

DR 2-104 Suggestion of Need of Legal Services.
(A) A lawyer who has given in-person unsolicited advice to a layperson that
he should obtain counsel or take legal action snail not accept employment resulting from that advice, except that:
(1) A lawyer may accept employment by a ^lose friend, relative,
former client (if the advice is germane to the former employment),
or one whom the lawyer reasonably believes to be a client.
(approved 12-5-77)
A
lawyer
may
accept
employment
that
resulb
from his participa(2)
tion in activities designated to educate laypersons to recognize
legal problems, to make intelligent selection of counsel, or to utilize
available legal services if such activities are conducted or sponsored
by a qualified legal assistance organization. (approved 12-5-77)
(3) A lawyer who is recommended, furnished o; paid by a Qualified
legal assistance organization enumerated
DR 2-103(D)(l)
through (4) may represent a member or b eticary thereof, to
the extent and under the conditions prescribe therein.
(approved 12-5-77)
(4) Without affecting his right to accept emplo ent, a lawyer may
speak publicly or write for publication on leg; topics so long as he
does not emphasize his own professional experience or reputation
and does not undertake to give individual advice.
(approved 12-5-77)
(5) If success in asserting rights or defenses of his client in litigation
in the nature of a class action is dependent I upon the joinder of
others, a lawyer may accept, but shall not seek, employment from
those contacted for the purpose of obtaining their joinder.
(approved 12-5-77)

(A) A lawyer shall not hold himself out publicly as a specialist, as practicing
in certain areas of law or as limiting his practice except as permitted
under DR 2-101 (3) and except as follows:
(1) A lawyer admitted to practice before the United States Patent andTrademark Office may use the designation "Patent Lawyer," or
"Registered Patent Attorney" or any combination of those terms,
on his letterhead and oince sign.
(approved 12-0-77)
(2) A lawyer available to act as a consultant to or as an associate ox
other lawyers in a particular branch of law or legal service may
distribute to other lawyers and publish in legal journals a dignified
announcement of such availability, but the announcement shail
not contain a representation of special competence or experienceThe announcement"shail not be distributee to lawyers core fre^
quently than once in a calendar year, but it may be published
periodically in legal journals.

D* 2-106
(A)

Fees for Legal Services

A lawyer shall not enter into an agreement for, charge, or collect an
illegal or clearly excessive fee.

(B) A fee is clearly excessive when, after a review olf the facts, a lawyer of
ordinary prudence would be left with a definite and firm conviction that
the fee is in excess of a reasonable fee. Factors to be considered as
guides in determining the reasonableness of a fee include the following:
(1) The time and labor required, the novelty an4 difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal services
properly,
(2) The likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of the
particular employment will preclude other employment by the
lawyer,
(3) The fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services.
(4) The amount involved and the results obtained.
(5) The time limitations imposed by the client oif by the circumstances.
(6) The nature and length of the professional relationship with the client.
(7) The experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing the services.
(8) Whether the fee is fixed or contingent.
(C) A lawyer shall not enter into an arrangement for,
tpr, (charge, or collect a
contingent fee for representing a defendant in alcrii
a [criminal case.
DR 2-107

Division of Fees Among Lawyers.

(A) A lawyer shall not divide a fee for legal services with another lawyer
who is not a partner in or associate of his law firm or law office, unless:
(1) The client consents to employment of the other lawyer after a full
disclosure that a division of fees will be made.
(2) The division is made in proportion to the services performed and responsibility assumed by each.
(3) The total fee of the lawyers does not clearly etsceed reasonable compensation for all legal services they rendered the client
(B) This Disciplinary Rule does not prohibit payment to a former partner
or associate pursuant to a separation or retirement agreement
DR 2-108

Agreements Restricting the Practice of s Lawyer.

(A) A lawyer shall not be a party to or participate ill a partnership or employment agreement with another lawyer that restricts the right of a
lawyer to practice law after the termination of a relationship created by
the agreement, except as a condition to payment of retirement benefits.
(B) In connection with the settlement of a controversy or suit, a lawyer shall
not enter into an agreement that restricts his right to practice law.
DR 2-109

Acceptance of Employment

(A) A lawyer shall not accept employment on behalf of a person if he knows
or it is obvious that such person wishes to:
(1) Bring a legal action, conduct a defense, or assort a position in litigation, or otherwise have steps taken for him, merely for the purpose of
harassing or maliciously injuring any person.

(2) Present a claim or defense in litigation that is not warranted under
existing law, unless it can be supported by good faith argument for
an extension, modification, or reversal of existing law.

DR 2-110 Withdrawal from Employment.
(A) In general.
(1) If permission for withdrawal from employment is required by the
rules of a tribunal, a lawyer shall not withdraw from employment in
a proceeding before that tribunal without its permission,
(2) In any event, a lawyer shall not withdraw from employment until
he has taken reasonable steps to avoid foreseeable prejudice to the
rights of his client, including giving due notice to his client, allowing
time for employment of other counsel, delivering to the client all
papers and property to which the client is entitled, and complying
with applicable laws and rules.
(3) A lawyer who withdraws from employment shall refund promptly
any part of a fee paid in advance that has not been earned.
(B) Mandatory withdrawal,
A lawyer representing a client before a tribunal, with its permission
if required by its rules, shall withdraw from employment and a lawyer
representing a client in other matters shall withdraw from employment
if:
(1) He knows or it is obvious that his client is bringing the legal action,
conducting the defense, or asserting a position in the litigation, or
is otherwise having steps taken for him, merely for the purpose of
harassing or maliciously injuring any person,
(2) He knows or it is obvious that his continued employment will result
in violation of a Disciplinary Rule.
(3) His mental or physical condition renders it unreasonably difficult
for him to carry out the employment effectively.
(4) He is discharged by his client.
(C) Permissive withdrawal.
If DR 2-110 (B) is not applicable, a lawyer may not request permission to withdraw in matters pending before a tribunal, and may not withdraw in other matters, unless such request or such withdrawal is because:
(1) His client:
(a) Insists upon presenting a claim or defense that is not warranted
under existing law and cannot be supported by good faith argument for an extension, modification, or reversal of existing law.
(b) Personally seeks to pursue an illegal course of conduct.
(c) Insists that the lawyer pursue a course of conduct that is illegal or
that is prohibited under the Disciplinary Rules.
(d) By other conduct renders it unreasonably difficult for the lawyer
to carry out his employment effectively.

(e) Insists, in a matter not pending befote a tribunal, that the
lawyer engage in conduct that is contrary to the judgment and
advice of the lawyer but not prohibiten under the Disciplinary
Rules.
(f) Deliberately disregards an agreement or obligation to the lawyer
as to expenses or fees.
(2) His continued employment is likely to result in a violation of a
Disciplinary Rule.
(3) His inability to work with co-counsel indicates that the best interests
of the client likely will be served by withdrawal.
(4) His mental or physical condition renders it difficult for him to carry
out the employment effectively.
(5) His client knowingly and freely assents to termination of his employment
(6) He believes in good faith, in a proceeding pending before a tribunal,
that the tribunal will find the existence of otper good cause for withdrawal.

CANON 3
A Lawyer Should Assist iri
Preventing

the Unauthoriz2\d

Practice of Law
ETHICAL CONSIDERATION?
is grounded in the need
EC 3-1 The prohibition against the practice of law by a la?
ce to render legal serv^
of the public for-integrity and competence of those who undi
ices. Because of the fiduciary and personal charaaer of t lawyer-client relationship
and the inherently complex nature of our legal system, the public can berter be assured
of the requisite responsibility and competence if the practii of law is confined to those
who are subject to the requirements and regulations
upon members of the legal
profession.
EC 3-2 The sensitive variations in the considerations that bear on legal determinations
often make it difficult even for a lawyer to exercise appropriate professional judgment,
and it is therefore essential that the personal nature of the relationship of client and
lawyer be preserved. Competent professional judgment is the product of a trained
familiarity with law and legal processes, a disciplined, analytical approach to legal
problems, and a firm ethical commitment.
EC 3-3 A non-lawyer who undertakes to handle legal matters is not governed as to
integrity or legal competence by the same rules that govern the conduct of a lawyer.
A lawyer is not only subject to that regulation but also is committed to high standards
of ethical conduct. The public interest is best served in legal matters by a regulated
profession committed to such standards. The Disciplinary Rules protect the public in
that they prohibit a lawyer from seeking employment by improper overtures, from acting in cases of divided loyalties, and from submitting to tne control of others in the
exercise of his judgment. Moreover, a person who entrusts legal matters to a lawyer is
protected by the attorney-client privilege and by the duty of the lawyer to hold inviolate
the confidences and secrets of his client.
EC 3-4 A layman who seeks legal services often is not in a position to judge whether
he will receive proper professional attention. The entnistment of a legal matter may
well involve the confidences, the reputation, the property, tht^freedom, or even the life
of the client. Proper protection of members of the public qemands that no person be

permitted to act in tfie connaennai ana aemanaing capacity ox a lawyer ume^ ae ia
subject to the regulations of the legal profession,
EC 3-5 It is neither necessary nor desirable to attempt the formulation of a single,
specific definition of what constitutes the practice of law. Functionally, the practice of
law relates to the rendition of services for others that call for the professional judgment
of a lawyer. The essence of the professional judgment of the lawyer is his educated
ability to relate the general body and philosophy of law to a specific legal problem of a
client; and thus, the public interest will be better served if only lawyers are permitted
to act in matters involving professional judgment. Where this professional judgment is
not involved, non-lawyers, such as court clerks, police officers, abstractors, and many
governmental employees, may engage in occupations that require a special knowledge
of law in certain areas. But the services of a lawyer are essential in the public interest
whenever the exercise of professional legal judgment is required.
EC 3-6 A lawyer often delegates tasks to clerks, secretaries, and other lay persons.
Such delegation is proper if the lawyer maintains a direct relationship with his client,
supervises the delegated work, and has complete professional responsibility for the work
product. This delegation enables a lawyer to render legal service more economically
and efficiently.
EC 3-7 The prohibition against a non-lawyer practicing law does not prevent a layman
from representing himself, for then he is ordinarily exposing only himself to possible
injury. The purpose of the legal profession is to make educated legal representation
available to the public; but anyone who does not wish to avail nimseif of such representation is not required to do so. Even so, the legal profession should help members- of the
public to recognize legal problems and to understand why it may be unwise for them to
act for themselves in matters having legal consequences.
EC 3-8 Since a lawyer should not aid or encourage a layman to practice law, he should
not practice law in association with a layman or otherwise share legal fees with a layman. This does not mean, however, that the pecuniary value of the interest of a deceased
lawyer in his firm or practice may not be paid to his estate or specified persons such as
his widow or heirs. In like manner, profit-sharing retirement plans of a lawyer or law
firm which include non-lawyer office employees are not improper. These limited exceptions to the rule against sharing legal fees with laymen are permissible since they do
not aid or encourage laymen to practice law.
EC 3-9 Regulation of the practice of law is accomplished principally by the respective
states. Authority to engage in the practice of law conferred in any jurisdiction is not per
se a grant of the right to practice elsewhere, and it is improper for a lawyer to engage
in practice where he is not permitted by law or by court order to do so. However, the
demands of business and the mobility of our society pose distinct problems in the regulation of the practice of law by the states. In furtherance of the public interest, the legal
profession should discourage regulation that unreasonably imposes territorial limitations
upon the right of a lawyer to handle the legal affairs of his client or upon the Opportunity
of a client to obtain the services of a lawyer of his choice in all matters induding the
presentation of a contested matter in a tribunal before which the lawyer is not permanently admitted to practice.

DISCIPLINARY RULES
DR 3-101 Aiding Unauthorized Practice of Law.
(A) A lawyer shall not aid a non-lawyer in the unauthorized practice of law.
(B) A lawyer shall not practice law in a jurisdiction where- to do so would be
in violation of regulations of the profession in that jurisdiction.
DR 3-102 Dividing Legal Fees with a Non-Lawyer.
(A) A lawyer or law firm shall not share legal fees with a non-lawyer, except
that:
(1) An agreement by a lawyer with his firm, partner, or associate may
provide for the payment of money, over a reasonable period of time
after his death, to his estate or to one or more specified persons.

(2) A lawyer who undertakes to complete unfinished legal business of a
deceased lawyer may pay to the estate of the deceased lawyer that
proportion of the total compensation whith fairly represents the
services rendered by the deceased lawyer.
(3) A lawyer or law firm may include non-lawyler employees in a retirement plan, even though the plan is based in whole or in part on a
profit-sharing arrangement
DR 3-103 Forming a partnership with a Non-Lawfyer
(A) A lawyer shall not form a partnership with a pon-lawyer if any of the
activities of the partnership consist of the practice of law.

CANON 4
A Lawyer Should Preserve the
Confidences and Secrets of a
Client
ETHICAL CONSIDERATION^
EC 4-1 Both the fiduciary relationship existing between lawyer and client and the
proper functioning of the legal system require the preservation by the lawyer of confidences and secrets of one who has employed or sought to impioy him. A client must
feci free to discuss whatever he wishes with his lawyer ana a lawyer must be equally
free to obtain information beyond that volunteered by his client. A lawyer should be fully
informed of all the facts of the matter he is handling in orper for his client to obtain
the full advantage of our legal system. It is for the lawyer in the exercise of his independent professional judgment to separate the relevant and important from the irrelevant and unimportant The observance of the ethical obligation of a lawyer to hold
inviolate the confidences and secrets of his client not only facilitates the full development
of facts essential to proper representation of the client but also encourages laymen to
seek early legal assistance.
EC 4-2 The obligation to protect confidences and secrets obviously does not preclude
a lawyer from revealing information when his client consents after full disclosure, when
necessary to perform his professional employment, when permitted by a Disciplinary
Rule, or when required by law. Unless the client otherwise directs, a lawyer may disclose the affairs of his client to partners or associates of m firm. It is a matter of
common knowledge that the normal operation of a law office exposes confidential professional information to non-lawyer employees of the office, particularly secretaries and
those having access to the files; and this obligates a lawyer to exercise care in seiecdng
and training his employees so that the sanctity of all confidences and secrets of his
clients may be preserved. If the obligation extends to two or more clients as to the
same information, a lawyer should obtain the permission of all before revealing the
information. A lawyer must always be sensitive to the rights and wishes of his client
and act scrupulously in the making of decisions which may involve the disclosure of
information obtained in his professional relationship. Thus, in the absence of consent
of his client after full disclosure, a lawyer should not associate another lawyer in the
handling of a matter; nor should he, in the absence of consent, seek counsel from another
lawyer if there is a reasonable possibility that the identity of the client or his confidences
or secrets would be revealed to such lawyer. Both social amenities and professional
duty should cause a lawyer to shun indiscreet conversation^ concerning his clients.
EC 4-3 Unless the client otherwise directs, it is not impi
limited information from his files to an outside agency n«
keeping, accounting, data processing, banking, printing, ._
provided he exercises due care in the selection of the agent
that the information must h* \e**st fwif^own*!

for a lawyer to give
for statistical, booklegitimate purposes,
and warns the agency

EC 4-4 The attorney-dient privilege is more limited than the ethical obligation or a
lawyer to guard the confidences and secrets of his client. This ethical precept, unlike
the evidentiary privilege, exists without regard to the nature or source of information
or the fact that others share the knowledge. A lawyer should endeavor to act in a
manner which preserves the evidentiary privilege; for example, he should avoid professional -discissions in the presence of persons to whom the privileges does not extend.
A lawyer owes an obligation to advise the client of the attorney-client privilege and
timely to assert the privilege unless it is waived by the client.
EC 4-5 A lawyer should not use information acquired in the course of the representation
of a client to the disadvantage of the client and a lawyer should not use, except with
the consent of his client after full disdosure, such information for his own purposes.
Likewise, a lawyer should be diligent in his efforts to prevent the misuse of such information by his employees and associates. Care should be exercised by a lawyer to prevent the disdosure of the confidences and secrets of one client to another, .and no
employment should be accepted that might require such disdosure.
EC 4-6 The obligation of a lawyer to preserve the confidences and secrets of his client
continues after the termination of his employment. Thus a lawyer should not attempt to
sell a law practice as a going business because, among other reasons, to do so would
involve the disdosure of confidences and secrets. A lawyer should also provide for the
protection of the confidences and secrets of his client following the termination of the
practice of the lawyer, whether termination is due to death, disability, or retirement.
For erample, a lawyer might provide,for the personal papers of the client to be returned to him and for the papers of the 'lawyer to be delivered to another lawyer or to
be destroyed. In determining the method of disposition, the instructions and wishes of the
client should be a dominant consideration.

DISCIPLINARY RULES
DR 4-101

Preservation of Confidences and Secrets of a Client.

(A) "Confidence" refers to information protected by the attorney-client privilege under applicable law, and "secret" refers to other information
gained in the professional relationship that the client has requested be
held inviolate or the disdosure of which would be embarrassing or would
be likely to be detrimental to the client.
(B) Except when permitted under DR 4-101 (Q, a lawyer shall not knowingly:
(1) Reveal a confidence or secret of his client
(2) Use a confidence or secret of his client to the disadvantage of the
client
(3) Use a confidence or secret of his client for the advantage of himself
or of a third person, unless the client consents after full disclosure.
(C) A lawyer may reveal:
(1) Confidences or secrets with the consent of the client or clients affected, but only after a full disdosure to them.
(2) Confidences or secrets when permitted under Disdplinary Rules or
required by law or court order.
(3) The intention of his client to commit a crime and the information
necessary to prevent the crime.
(4) Confidences or secrets necessary to establish or collect his fee or to
to defend himself or his employees or assodates against an accusation
of wrongful conduct
(D) A lawyer shall exercise reasonable care to prevent his employees, associates, and others whose services are utilized by him from disdosing or
using confidences or secrets of a client, except that a lawyer may reveal
the information allowed by DR 4-101 (C) through an employee.

CANON 5
A Lawyer Should Exercise
Independent Professional
Judgment on Behalf of a Client
ETHICAL CONSIDERATION^
EC 5-1 The professional judgment of a lawyer should be exercised, within the bounds
of the law, solely for the benefit of his client and free of compromising influences and
loyalties. Neither his personal interests, the interests of other clients, nor the desires
of third persons should be permitted to dilute his loyalty tp his client.
Interests of a Lawyer That May Affect His Judgment
EC 3-2 A lawyer should not accept proffered employment U his personal interests or
desires will, or there is a reasonable probability that they will, affect adversely the
advice to be given or services to be rendered the prospective client. After accepting
employment, a lawyer carefully should refrain from acquiring a property right or assuming a position that would tend to ma^n his judgment less protective of the interests of
his client
EC 3-3 The self-interest of a lawyer resulting from his ownership of property in which
his client also has air interest or which may affect property of his client may interfere
with the exercise of free judgment on behalf of his client. If such interference would
occur with respect to a prospective client, a lawyer should decline employment proffered
by him. After accepting employment, a lawyer should not acquire property rights that
would adversely affect his professional judgment in the representation of his client. Even
if the property interests of a lawyer do not presently interfere with the exercise of his
independent judgment, but the likelihood of interference can reasonably be foreseen by
him, a lawyer should explain the situation to his client and should decline employment
or withdraw unless the client consents to the continuance o< the relationship after full
disclosure. A lawyer should not seek to persuade his client to permit him to invest in an
undertaking of his client nor make improper use of his professional relationship to
influence his client to invest in an enterprise in which the lawyer is interested.
EC 5-4 If, in the course of his representation of a dient,] a lawyer is permitted to
receive from his dient a beneficial ownership in publication rights relating to the subject
matter of the employment, he may be tempted to subordinate the interests of his client
to his own anticipated pecuniary gain. For example, a lawyer in a criminal case who
obtains from his dient television, radio, motion picture, newspaper, magazine, book, or
other publication rights with respect to the case may be influenced, consciously or unconsciously, to a course of conduct that will enhance the value of his publication rights
to the prejudice of his client. To prevent these potentially differing interests, such arrangements should be scrupulously avoided prior to the termination of all aspects of
the matter giving rise to the employment, even though his employment has previously
aided.
EC 5-3 A lawyer should not suggest to his client that a gift be made to himself or for
his benefit. If a lawyer accepts a gift from his client, he is pi^cuiiariy susceptible to the
charge that he unduly influenced or over-reached the client, If a client voluntarily offers
to make a gift to his lawyer, the lawyer may accept the £tft but before doing so, he
should urge that his client secure disinterested advice from ^n independent, competent
person who is cognizant of all the circumstances. Other than in exceptional circumstances, a lawyer should insist that an instrument in which |his client desires to name
him beneficially be prepared by another lawyer selected b^ the client.
EC 5-6 A lawyer should not consciously influence a client to name him as executor,
trustee, or lawyer in an instrument. In those cases where a client wishes to name his
lawyer as such, care should be taken by the lawyer to avo^d even the appearance of
impropriety.
EC 5-7 The possibility of an adverse effect upon the exercise of free judgment by a
lawyer on behalf of his client during litigation generally m^kes it undesirable for the
lawyer to acquire a proprietary interest in the cause of his dilsnz or otherwise to become
financially interested in the outcome of the litigation. However, it is not improper for a

lawyer to protect his right to collect a fee for his services by the assertion of legally
permissible liens, even though by doing so he may acquire an interest in the outcome
of litigation. Although a contingent fee arrangement gives a lawyer a financial interest
in the outcome of litigation, a reasonable contingent fee is permissible in civil cases
because it may be the only means by which a layman can obtain the services of a lawyer
of his choice. But a lawyer, because he is in a better position to evaluate a cause of action, should enter into a contingent fee arrangement only in those instances where the
arrangement will be beneficial to the client.
EC 5-8 A financial interest in the outcome of litigation also results if monetary advances
are made by the lawyer to his client. Although this assistance generally is not encouraged, there are instances when it is not improper to make loans to a client. For example,
the advancing or guaranteeing of payment of the costs and expenses of litigation by a
lawyer may be the only way a client can enforce his cause of action, but the ultimate
liability for such costs and expenses must be that of the client.
EC 3-9 Occasionally a lawyer is called upon to decide in a particular case whether he
will be a witness or an advocate. If a lawyer is both counsel and witness, he becomes
more easily impeachable for interest and thus may be a less effective witness. Conversely, the opposing counsel may be handicapped in challenging the credibility of the
lawyer when the lawyer also appears as an advocate in the case. An advocate who
becomes a witness is in the unseemly and ineffective position of arguing his own credibility. The roles of an advocate and of a witness are inconsistent; the function of an
advocate is to advance or argue the cause of another, while that of a witness is to state
facts objectively.
EC 5-10 Problems incident to the lawyer-witness relationship arise at different stages;
they relate either to whether a lawyer should accept employment or should withdraw
from employment* Regardless of when the problem arises, his decision is to be governed
by the same basic considerations. It is not objectionable for a lawyer who is a potential
witness to be an advocate if it is unlikely that he will be called as a witness because his
testimony would be merely cumulative or if his testimony will relate only to an uncontested issue. In the exceptional situation where it will be manifestly unfair to the client
for the lawyer to refuse employment or to withdraw when he will likely be a witness on
a contested issue, he may serve as adyocate even though he may be a witness. In
making such decision, he should determine the personal or financial sacrifice of the
client that may result from his refusal of employment or withdrawal therefrom, the
materiality of his testimony, and the effectiveness of his representation in view of his
personal involvement. In weighing these factors, it should be dear that refusal or withdrawal will impose an unreasonable hardship upon the client before the lawyer accepts
or continues the" employment. Where the question arises, doubts should be resolved in
favor of the lawyer testifying and against his becoming or continuing as an advocate.
EC 5-U A Lawyer should not permit his personal interests to influence his advice relative to a suggestion by his client that additional counsel be employed. In like manner, his
personal interests should not deter him from suggesting that additional counsel be employed; on the contrary, he should be alert to the desirability of recommending additional
counsel when, in his judgment, the proper representation of his client requires it. However, a lawyer should advise his client not to employ additional counsel suggested by
the client if the lawyer believes that such employment would be a disservice to the client,
and he should disclose the reasons for his belief.
EC 5-12 Inability of co-counsel to agree on a matter vital to the representation of their
client requires that their disagreement be submitted by them jointly to their client for
his resolution, and the decision of the client shall control the action to be taken.
EC 5-13 A lawyer should not maintain membership in or be influenced by any organization of employees that undertakes to prescribe, direct, or suggest when or how he should
fulfill his professional obligations to a person or organization that employs him as a
lawyer. Although it is not necessarily improper for a lawyer employed by a corporation
or ^milar entity to be a member of an organization of employees, he should be vigilant
to safeguard his fidelity as a lawyer to his employer, free from outside influences.
Interests of Multiple Clients
EC 5-14 Maintaining the independence of professional judgment required of a lawyer
precludes his acceptance or continuation of employment that will adversely affect his
judgment on behalf of or dilute his loyalty to a client. This problem arises whenever a

lawyer is asked to represent two or more clients who may have differing interests,
whether such interests be conflicting, inconsistent, diverse, or otherwise discordant
EC 3-15 If a lawyer is requested to undertake or to continiie representation of multiple
clients having potentially differing interests, he must weigh carefully the possibility that
his judgment may be impaired or his loyalty divided if he accepts or continues the
employment He should resolve all doubts against the propriety of the representation.
A lawyer should never represent in litigation multiple clients with differing interests;
and there are few situations in which he would be justified in representing in litigation
multiple clients with potentially differing interests. If a lawyer accepted such employment and the interests did become actually differing, he wiuld have to withdraw from
employment with likelihood of resulting hardship on the clients; and for this reason it
is preferable that he refuse the employment initially. On the other hand, there are many
instances in which a lawyer may properly serve multiple clents having potentially differing interests in matters not involving litigation. If the interest vary only slightly,
it is generally likely that the lawyer will not be subjected to an adverse influence and
that he can retain his independent judgment on behalf of eacp client; and if the interests
become differing, withdrawal is less likely to have a disruptive effect upon the causes
of his clients.
EC 5-16 In those instances in which a lawyer is justified ih representing two or more
clients having differing interests, it is nevertheless essential that each client be given the
opportunity to evaluate his need for representation free of any potential conflict and to
obtain other counsel if he so desires. Thus before a lawytr may represent multiple
clients, he should explain fully to each client the implications of the common representation and should accept or continue employment only if the clients consent. If there are
present other circumstances that might cause any of the multiple clients to question the
undivided loyalty of the lawyer, he should also advise all of the clients of those circumstances.
EC 5-17 Typically recurring situations involving potentially differing interests are those
in which a lawyer is asked to represent co-defendants in a criminal case, co-plaintiffs
in a personal injury case, an insured and his insurer, and beneficiaries of the estate of
a decedent Whether a lawyer can fairiy and adequately prottect the interests of multiple
clients in these and similar situations depends upon an analysis of each case. In certain
circumstances, there may exist little chance of the judgment of the lawyer being adversely affected by the slight possibility that the interests wiU| become actually differing;
in other circumstances, the chance of adverse effect upon his judgment is not unlikely.
EC 5-18 A lawyer employed or retained by a corporation or similar entity owes his
allegiance to the entity and not to a stockholder, director, officer, employee, representative, or other person connected with the entity. In advising me entity, a lawyer should
keep paramount its interests and his professional judgment should not be influenced by
the personal desires of any person or organization. Occasionally a lawyer for an entity is
requested by a stockholder, director, officer, employee, representative, or other person
connected with the entity to represent him in an individual capacity; in such case the
lawyer may serve the individual only if the lawyer is convinced that differing interests
are not present.
EC 5-19 A lawyer may represent several clients whose interests are not actually or
potentially differing. Nevertheless, he should explain any circumstances that might
cause a client to question his undivided loyalty. Regardless o^ the belief of a lawyer that
he may properly represent multiple clients, he must drier to a client who holds the
contrary belief and withdraw from representation of thar client
EC 5-20 A lawyer is often asked to serve as an impartial arbitrator or mediator in
matters which involve present or former clients. He may serve in either capacity if he
first discloses such present or former relationships. After a]lawyer has undertaken to
act as an impartial arbitrator or mediator, he should not thereafter represent in the
dispute any of the parties involved.
Desires of Third Persons
EC 5-21 The obligation of a lawyer to exercise professional jjurigment solely on behalf
of his client requires that he disregard the desires of others that might impair his free
judgment The desires of a third person will seldom adversely affect a lawyer vn\*t* that
person is in a position to exert strong economic, political, or social pressures upon the
lawyer. These influences are often subtle, and a lawyer must pe alert to their existence.
A lawyer subjected to outside pressures should make full disclosure of them to his

client; and if he or his client believes that the effectiveness of his representation has been
or will be impaired thereby, the lawyer should take proper steps to withdraw from representation of his client
EC 5-22 Economic, political, or social pressures by third persons are less likely to
impinge upon the independent judgment of a lawyer in a matter in which he is compensated directly by his client and his professional work is exclusively with his client.
On the other hand, if a lawyer is compensated from a source other than his client, he
may feel a sense of responsibility to someone other than his client.
EC 5-23 A person or organization that pays or furnishes lawyers to represent others
possesses a potential power to exen strong pressures against the independent judgment
of those lawyers. Some employers may be interested in furthering their own economic,
political, or social goals without regard.to the professional responsibility of the lawyer
to his individual client. Others may be far more concerned with establishment or extension of legal principles than in the immediate protection of the rights of the lawyer's individual client. On some occasions, decisions on priority of work may be made by the
employer rather than the lawyer with the result that prosecution of work already undertaken for clients is postponed to their detriment. Similarly, an employer may seek, consciously or unconsciously, to further its own economic interests through the actions of
the lawyers employed by it. Since a lawyer must always be free to exercise his professional judgment withoui refard to the interests or motives of a third person, the lawyer who is employed by one to represent another must constantly guard against erosion
of his professional freedom.
EC 5-24 To assist a lawyer in preserving his professional independence, a number of
courses are available to him. For example, a lawyer should not practice with or in the
form of a professional legal corporation, even though the corporate form is permitted
by law, if any director, officer, or stockholder of it is a non-lawyer. Although a lawyer
may be employed by a business corporation with non-lawyers serving as directors or
officers, and they necessarily have the right to make decisions of business policy, a lawyer must decline to accept direction of his professional judgment from any layman.
Various types of legal aid offices are administered by boards of directors composed of
lawyers and laymen. A lawyer should not accept employment from such an organization
unless the board sets only broad policies and there is no interference in the relationship
of the lawyer and the individual client he serves. Where a lawyer is employed by an
organization, a written agreement that defines the relationship between him and the
organization and provides for his independence is desirable since it may serve to prevent
misunderstanding as to their respective roles. Although other innovations in the means of
supplying legal counsel may develop, the responsibility of the lawyer to maintain his
professional independence remains constant, and the legal profession must insure that
changing circumstances do not result in loss of the professional independence of the
lawyer.
DISCIPLINARY RULiS
DR 5-101

Refusing Employment When the Interests of the Lawyer May
Impair His Independent Professional Judgment.

(A) Except with the consent of his client after full disclosure, a lawyer shall
not accept employment if the exercise of his professional judgment on
behalf of his client will be or reasonably may be affected by his own
financial, business, property, or personal interests.
(B) A lawyer shall not accept employment in contemplated or pending litigation if he knows or it is obvious that he or a lawyer in his firm ought to
be called as a witness, except that he may undertake the employment
and he or a lawyer in his firm may testify:
(1) If the testimony will relate solely to an uncontested matter.
(2) If the testimony will relate solely to a matter of formality and there
is no reason to believe that substantial evidence will be offered in
opposition to the testimony.
(3) If the testimony will relate solely to the nature and value of legal services rendered in the case by the lawyer or his firm to the client.

(4) As to any matter, if refusal would work a substantial hardship on the
client because of the distinctive value of tl^e lawyer or his firm as
counsel in the particular case.
DR 5-102

Withdrawal as Counsel When the Lawyer Becomes a Witness.

(A) If, after undertaking employment in contemplated or pending litigation,
a lawyer learns or it is obvious that he or a lawyer in his firm ought to
be called as a witness on behalf of his client, he shall withdraw from the
conduct of the trial and his firm, if any, shall not continue representation
in the trial, except that he may continue the representation and he or a
lawyer in his firm may testify in the circumstances enumerated in
DR 5-101(B) (1) through (4).
(B) If, after undertaking employment in contemplated or pending litigation,
a lawyer learns or it is obvious that he or a lawyer in his firm may be
called as a witness other than on behalf of his client, he may continue the
representation until it is apparent that his testimony is or may be prejudicial to his client
DR 5-103

Avoiding Acquisition of Interest in Litigation.

(A) A lawyer shall not acquire a proprietary interest in the cause of action
or subject matter of litigation he is conducting for a client, except that
he may:
(1) Acquire a lien granted by law to secure his f ep or expenses..
(2) Contract with a client for a reasonable contingent fee in a civil case.
(B) While representing a client in connection with contemplated or pending
litigation, a lawyer shall not advance or guarantee financial assistance to
his client, except that a lawyer may advance or guarantee the expenses
of litigation, including court costs, expenses of investigation, expenses of
medical examination, and costs of obtaining add presenting evidence,
provided the client remains ultimately liable for such expenses.
DR 5-104

Limiting Business Relations with a Client.

(A) A lawyer shall not enter into a business transaction with a client if they
have differing interests therein and if the client expects the lawyer to
exercise his professional judgment therein fori the protection of the
client, unless the client has consented after full disclosure.
(B) Prior to conclusion of all aspects of the matter giving rise to his employment, a lawyer shall not enter into any arrangement or understanding
with a client or a prospective client by which he acquires an interest in
publication rights with respect to the subject matter of his employment
or proposed employment
DR 5-105

Refusing to Accept or Continue Employment if the Interests of
Another Client May Impair the Independent Professional Judgment of the Lawyer.

(A) A lawyer shall decline proffered employment if the exercise of his independent professional judgment in behalf of a clieht will be or is likely to
be adversely affected by the acceptance of the proffered employment,
except to the extent permitted under DR 5-105(C)l
(B) A lawyer shall not continue multiple employment if the exercise of his
independent professional judgment in behalf of a client will be or is

likely to be adversely affected by his representation of another client,
except to the extent permitted under DR 5-105(C).
(C) In the situations covered by DR 5-105 (A) and (B), a lawyer may represent
multiple clients if it is obvious that he can adequately represent the interest of each and if each consents to the representation after full disclosure of the possible effect of such representation on the exercise of
his independent professional judgment on behalf of each.
(D) If a lawyer is required to decline employment or to withdraw from employment under DR 5-105, no partner or associate of his or his firm may
accept or continue such employment
DR 5-106 Settling Similar Claims of Clients.
(A) A lawyer who represents two or more clients shall not make or participate in the making of an aggregate settlement of the claims of or against
his clients, unless each client has consented to the settlement after being
advised of the existence and nature of all the claims involved in the proposed settlement, of the total amount of the settlement, and of the participation of each person in the settlement.
DR 5-107 Avoiding Influence by Others Than the Client
(A) Except with the consent of his client after full disclosure, a lawyer
shall not:
(1) Accept compensation for his legal services from one other than his
client
(2) Accept from one other than his client any thing of value related to
his representation of or his employment by his client
(B) A lawyer shall not permit a person who recommends, employs, or pays
him to render legal services for another to direct or regulate his professional judgment in rendering such legal services.
(C) A lawyer shall not practice with or in the form of a professional corporation or association authorized to practice law for a profit, if:
(1) A non-lawyer owns any interest therein, except that a fiduciary representative of the estate of a lawyer may hold the stock or interest
of the lawyer for a reasonable time during administration;
(2) A non-lawyer is a corporate director or officer thereof; or
(3) A non-lawyer has the right to direct or control the professional judgment of a lawyer.

CANON 6
A Lawyer Should Represent a
Client

Competently

ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS
EC 6-1 Because of his vital role in the legal process, a lawyer should act with competence and proper care in representing clients. He should strive to become and remain
proficient in his practice and should accept employment only in matters which he is or
intends to become competent to handle.
EC 6-2 A lawyer is aided in attaining and maintaining his competence by keeping
abreast of current legal literature and developments, participating in continuing legal

education programs, concentrating in particular areas of the law, and by utilizing other
available means. He has the additional ethical obligation to assist in improving the legal
profession, and he may do so by participating in bar activities intended to advance the
quality and standards of members of the profession. Of particular importance is the
careful training of his younger associates and the giving of sound guidance to all lawyers
who consult him. In short, a lawyer should strive at all levels to aid the legal profession
in advancing the highest possible standards of integrity anp competence and tc meet
those standards himself.
EC 5-3 While the licensing of a lawyer is evidence that he |ias met the standards then
prevailing for admission to the bar, a lawyer generally shoiiid not accept*employment
in any area of the law in which he is not qualified. Howeveh he may accept such employment if in good faith he expects to become qualified through study and investigation,
as long as such preparation would not result in unreasonable delay or expense to his
client. Proper preparation and representation may require the association by the lawyer
of professionals in other disciplines. A lawyer offered employment in a matter in
which he is not and does not expect to become so qualified should either decline the
employment or, with the consent of his client, accept the employment and associate a
lawyer who is competent in the matter.
EC S4 Having undertaken representation, a lawyer should use proper care to safeguard the interests of his client If a lawyer has accepted employment in a matter
beyond his competence but in which he expected to become competent, he should diligently undertake the work and study necessary to qualify himself. In addition to being
qualified to handle a particular matter, his obligation to his client requires him to prepare adequately for and give appropriate attention to his legal work.
EC 6-3 A lawyer should have pride in his professional endeavors. His obligation to act
competently calls for higher motivation than that arising frpm fear of civil liability or
disciplinary penalty.
EC 6-6 A lawyer should not seek, by contract or other mdans, to limit his individual
liability to his client for his malpractice. A lawyer who handles the affairs of his client
properly has no need to attempt to limit his liability for his professional activities and
one who does not handle the affairs of his client properly should not be permitted to do
so. A lawyer who is a stockholder in or is associated with a professional legal corporation may, however, limit his liability for malpractice of his associates in the corporation,
but only to the extent permitted by law.

DISCIPLINARY RULES
DR 6-101

Failing to Act Competently.

(A) A lawyer shall not:
/l) Handle a legal matter which he knows or shbuld know that he is not
competent to handle, without associating w i p him a lawyer who is
competent to handle it.
(2) Handle a legal matter without preparation adequate in the circumstances.
(3) Neglect a legal matter entrusted to him.

DR 6-102

Limiting Liability to Client.

(A) A lawyer shall not attempt to exonerate himself tttrom or limit his liability
to his client for his personal malpractice.

CANON 7
A Lawyer Should Represent a Client
Zealously Within the Bounds
of the Law
ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS
EC 7-1 The duty of a lawyer, both to his client and to the legal system, is to represent
his client zealously within the bounds of the law, which includes Disciplinary Rules and
enforceable professional regulations. The professional responsibility of a lawyer derives
from his membership in a profession which has the duty of assisting members of the
public to secure and protect available legal rights and benefits. In our government of
laws and not of men, each member of our society is entitled to have his conduct judged
and regulated in accordance with the law; to seek any lawful objective through legally
permissible means; and to present for adjudication any lawful claim, issue, or defense.
EC 7-2 The bounds of the law in a given case are often difficult to ascertain. The language of legislative enactments and judicial opinions may be uncertain as applied to
varying factual situations. The limits and specific meaning of apparently relevant law
may be made doubtful by changing or developing constitutional interpretations, inadequately expressed statutes or judicial opinions, and changing public and judicial attitudes. Certainty of law ranges from well-settled rules through areas of conflicting
authority to areas without precedent,
EC 7-3 Where the bounds of law are uncertain, the action of a lawyer may depend on
whether he is serving as advocate or adviser. A lawyer may serve simultaneously as
both advocate and adviser, but the two roles are essentially different. In asserting a
position on behalf of his client, an advocate for the most pan deals with past conduct
and must take the facts as he finds them. By contrast, a lawyer serving as adviser primarily accicr* his client in determining the course of future conduct and relationships.
While serving as advocate, a lawyer should resolve in favor of his client doubts as to
the bounds of the law. In serving a client as adviser, a lawyer in appropriate circumstances should give his professional opinion as to what the ultimate decisions of the
courts would likely be as to the applicable law.
Doty of the Lawyer to a Client
EC 7-4 The advocate may urge-any permissible construction of the law favorable to
his client, without regard to his professional opinion as to the likelihood that the construction will ultimately prevail. His conduct is within the bounds of the law, and therefore permissible, if the position taken is supported by the law or is supportable by a good
faith argument for an extension, modification, or reversal of the law. However, a lawyer
is not justified in asserting a position in litigation that is frivolous.
EC 7-5 A lawyer as adviser furthers the interest of his client by giving his professional
opinion as to what he believes would likely be the ultimate decision of the courts on the
matter at hand and by informing his client of the practical effect of such decision. He
may continue in the representation of his client even though his client has elected to
pursue a course of conduct contrary to the advice of the lawyer so long as he does not
thereby knowingly assist the client to engage in illegal conduct or to take a frivolous
legal position. A lawyer should never encourage or aid his client to commit criminal
acts and avoid punishment therefor.
EC 7-6 Whether the proposed action of a lawyer is within the bounds of the law may
be a perplexing question when his client is contemplating a course of conduct having
legal consequences that vary according to the client's intent, motive, or desires at the
time of the action. Often a lawyer is asked to assist his client in developing evidence
relevant to the state of mind of the client at a particular time. He may properly assist
his client in the development and preservation of evidence of existing motive, intent, or
desire; obviously, he may not do anything furthering the creation or preservation of
false evidence. In many cases a lawyer may not be certain as to the state of mind of
his client, and in those situations he should resolve reasonable doubts in favor of his
client.
EC 7-7 In certain areas of legal representation not affecting the merits of the cause or
substantially prejudicing the rights of a. client, a lawyer is entitled to make decisions on

his own. But otherwise the authority to make decisions is fexdusiveiy that of the dient
and, if made within the framework of the law, such decisions are binding on his lawyer.
As typical examples in civil .cases, it is for the client to dedde whether he will accept
a settlement offer or whether he will waive his right to plejad an affirmative defense. A
client fully on whether a
defense lawyer in a criminal case has the dury to advise
to the prospects of success
particular plea to a charge appears to be desirable and
on appeal, but it is for the client to decide what plea shouli be entered and whether an
appeal should be taken.
EC 7-8 A lawyer should exen his best efforts to insure tfakt decisions of his client are
made only after the dient has been informed of relevant considerations. A lawyer ought
to initiate this decision-making process if the client does not do so. Advice of a lawyer to
his client need not be confined to purely leral considerations. A lawyer should advise his
client of the possible effect of each legal alternative. A lawyer should bring to bear upon
this decision-making process the fullness of his experience as well as his objective viewpoint. In 3S-si-?ing his client to reach a proper decision, it is often desirable for a lawyer
to point out those factors which may lead to a decision that is morally just as weil
as legally permissible. He may emphasize the possibility of harsh consequences that
might result from assertion of legally permissible positions! In the final analysis, however, the lawyer should always remember that the decision whether to forego legally
available objectives or methods because of nonlegal factors is ultimately for the client
and not for himself. In the event that the client in a nonjadjudicatory matter insists
upon a course of conduct that is contrary to the judgment abd advice of the lawyer but
not prohibited by Disdplinary Rules, the lawyer may witfaaraw from the employment.
EC 7-9 In the exercise of his professional judgment on those decisions which are for
his determination in the handling of a legal matter, a lawyer should always act in a
manner consistent with the best interests of his client. However, when an acrion in the
best interest of his client seems to him to be unjust, he ma^ ask his client for permission to forego such action.
EC 7-10 The duty of a lawyer to represent his client with zefed does not militate against
his concurrent obligation to treat with consideration all persons involved in the legal
process and to avoid the infliction of needless harm.
EC 7-11 The responsibilities of a lawyer may vary according to the intelligence,
experience, mental condition or age of a client, the obligation of a public officer, or the
nature of a particular proceeding. Examples indude the representation of an illiterate
or an incompetent, service as a public prosecutor or other government lawyer, and
appearances before administrative and legislative bodies.
EC 7-12 Any mental or physical condition of a client that renders him incapable of
making a considered judgment on his own behalf casts additional responsibilities upon
his lawyer. Where an incompetent is acting through a guardian or other legal representative, a lawyer must look to such representative for those dejcisions which are normally
the prerogative of the client to make; If a client under disability has no legal representative, his lawyer may be compelled in court proceedings to make decisions on behalf
of the client. If the client is capable of understanding the matter in question or of contributing to the advancement of his interests, regardless of whether he is legally disqualified from performing certain acts, the lawyer should obtain from him all possible
aid. If the disability of a client and the lack of a legal representative compel the lawyer
to make decisions for his client, the lawyer should consider all circumstances then
prevailing and act with care to safeguard and advance the interests of his client. But
obviously a lawyer cannot perform any act or make any decision which the law requires
his client to perform or make, either acting for himself if I competent, or by a duly
constituted representative if legally incompetent.
EC 7-13 The responsibility of a public prosecutor differs frokn that of the "<»ai advocate; his dury is to seek justice, not merely to convict. This special duty exists because:
(1) the prosecutor represents the sovereign and therefore mould use restraint in the
discretionary exercises of governmental powers, such as in) the selection of cases to
prosecute; (2) during trial the prosecutor is not only an advocate but he also may
make decisions normally made by an individual dient, and those affecting the public
interest should be fair to ail; and (3) in our system of criminal justice the accused is
to be given the benefit of all reasonable doubts. With respect (o evidence and witnesses,
the prosecutor has responsibilities different from these of a lawyer in private practice;
the prosecutor should make timely disdosure to the defense ofavailable evidence, known
to him, that tends to negate the guilt of the accused, mitigate (the degree of the offense,
or reduce the punishment. Further, a prosecutor should not intentionally avoid uursuit

of evidence merely because he believes it will damage the prosecutor's case or aid me
accused
EC 7-14 A government lawyer who has discretionary power relative to litigation should
refrain from instituting or continuing litigation that is obviously unfair. A government
lawyer not having such discretionary power who believes there is lade of merit in a
controversy submitted to him should so advise his superiors and recommend the avoidance of unfair litigation. A government lawyer in a cril action or administrative proceeding has the responsibiity to seek justice and to de eiop a full and fair record, and
he should not use his position or the economic power of the government to harass parties
or to bring about unjust settlements or results.
EC 7-15 The nature and purpose of proceedings before administrative agencies vary
widely. The proceedings may be legislative or quasi-judicial, or a combination of both.
They may be ex parte in character, in which event they may originate either at the
instance of the agency or upon motion of an interested party. The scope of an inquiry
may be purely investigative or it may be truly adversary looking toward the adjudication of specific rights of a party or of classes of parties. The foregoing are but examples
of some of the types of proceedings conducted by administrative agencies. A lawyer appearing before an administrative agency, regardless of the nature of the proceeding it
is conducting, has the continuing duty to advance the cause of his client within the
bounds of the law. Where the applicable rules of the agency impose specific obligations
upon a lawyer, it is his duty to comply therewith, unless the lawyer has a legitimate
basis for challenging the validity thereof. In all appearances before administrative
agencies, a lawyer should identify himself, his client if identity of his client is not
privileged, and the representative nature of his appearance. It is not improper, however,
for a lawyer to seek from an agency information available to the public without identifying his client.
EC 7-16 H e primary business of a legislative body is to enact laws rather than to
adjudicate controversies, although on occasion the activities of a legislative" body may
take on the characteristics of an adversary proceeding, particularly in investigative and
impeachment matters. The role of a lawyer supporting or opposing proposed legislation nomally is quite different from his role in representing a person under investigation
or on trial by a legislative body. When a lawyer appears in connection with proposed
legislation, he seeks to affect the lawmaking process, but when he appears on behalf
of a client in investigatory or impeachment proceedings, he is concerned with the protection of the nghts of his client. In either event, he should identify himself and his
client, if identity of his client is not privileged, and should comply wth applicable laws
and legislative rules.
EC 7-17 The obligation of loyalty to his client applies only to a lawyer in the discharge
of his professional duties and implies no obligation to adopt a personal viewpoint favorable to the interests or desires of his client. While a- lawyer must act always with circumspection in order that his conduct will not adversely affect the rights of a client in a
matter he is then handling, he may take positions on public issues and espouse legal
reforms he favors without regard to the individual views of any client.
EC 7-18 The legal system in its broadest sense functions best when persons in need of
legal advice or assistance are represented by their own counsel. For this reason a lawyer
should not communicate on the subject matter of the representation of his client with a
person he knows to be represented in the matter by a lawyer, unless pursuant to law or
rule of court or unless he has the consent of the lawyer for that person. If one is not
represented by counsel, a lawyer representing another may have to deal directly with
the unrepresented person; in such an instance, a lawyer should not undertake to give
advice to the person who is attempting to represent himself, except that he may advise
him to obtain a lawyer.
Doty of the Lawyer to the Adversary System of Justice
EC 7-19 Our legal system provides for the adjudication of disputes governed by the
rules of substantive, evidentiary, and procedural law. An adversary presentation counters the natural human tendency to judge too swiftly in terms of the familiar that which
is not yet fully known, the advocate, by his zealous preparation and presentation of facts
and law, enables the tribunal to come to the hearing with an open and neutral mind and
to render impartial judgments. The dury of a lawyer to his client and his duty to the
legal system are the same: to represent his client zealously within the bounds of the
law.

EC 7-20 In order to function properly, our adjudicative process requires an informed,
impartial tribunal capable of administering justice promptly and effidentiy according
to procedures that command public confidence and respect. Not only must there be
competent, adverse presentation of evidence and issues, but a tribunal must be aided
by rules appropriate to an effective and dignified process. The procedures under which
tribunals operate in our adversary system have been prescribed largely by legislanve
enactments, court rules and decisions, and administrative rules. Through the years certain concepts of proper professional conduct have become rules of law applicable to the
adversary adjudicative process. Many of these concepts are the bases for standards of
professional conduct set forth in the Disdplinary Rules.
EC 7-21 The dvil adjudicative process is primarily designee ior uie settlement of
disputes between parties, while the criminal process is designed for the protection of
sodety as a whole. Threatening to use, or using, the criminal process to coerce adjustment of private dvil claims or controversies is a subversioiji of that process, further, the
person against whom the criminal process is so misused mdy be deterred from asserting
his legal rights and thus the usefulness of the dvil process in settling private disputes
is impaired. As in all cases of abuse of judicial process, tne improper use of criminal
process tends to diminish public confidence in our legal system.
EC 7-22 Respect for judicial rulings is essential to the proper administration of justice;
however, a litigant or his lawyer may, in good faith and within the framework of the
law, take steps to test the correctness of a ruling of a tribunal
EC 7-23 The complexity of law often makes it difficult fcfr a tribunal to be fully informed unless the pertinent law is presented by the lawyers in the cause. A tribunal
that is fully informed on the applicable law is better able to make a fair and accurate
determination of the matter before it The adversary system contemplates that each
lawyer will present and argue the existing law in the light most favorable to his client.
Where a lawyer knows of legal authority in the controlling jurisdiction directly adverse
to the position of his client, he should inform the tribunal) of its existence unless his
adversary has done so; but, having marie such disdosure, $e may challenge its soundness in whole or in part
EC 7-24 In order to bring about just and informed decisionsj evidentiary and procedural
rules have been established by tribunals to permit the inclusion of relevant evidence
and argument and the exdusion of ail other considerations. The expression by a lawyer
of his personal opinion as to the justness of a cause, as to the credibility of a witness, as
to the culpability of a dvil litigant, or as to the guilt or innocence of an accused is not
a proper subject-for argument to the trier of fact It is improper as to factual matters
because admissible evidence possessed by a lawyer should pe presented only as sworn
testimony. It is improper as to all other matters because, were the rule otherwise, the
silence of a lawyer on a given occasion could be construed unfavorably to his client
However, a lawyer may argue, on his analysis of the evidence, for any position or condusion with respect to any of the foregoing matters.
EC 7-2S Rules of evidence and procedure are designed to lead to just decisions and are
part of the framework of the law. Thus while a lawyer may take steps in good faith
and within the framework of the law to test the validity of pies, he is not justified in
consdousiy violating such rules and he should be diligent in jiis efforts to guard against
his unintentional violation of them. As examples, a lawyer should subscribe to or verify
only those pleadings that he believes are in compliance with applicable law and rules;
a lawyer should not make any prefatory statement before a tribunal in regard to the
purported facts of the case on trial unless he believes that [his statement will be supported by admissible evidence; a lawyer should not ask a witness a question solely for
the purpose of harassing or embarrassing him; and a lawyer should not by subterfuge
put before a jury matters which it cannot properly consider.
EC 7-26 The law and Disdplinary Rules prohibit the use o^ fraudulent, false, or perjured testimony or evidence. A lawyer who knowingly partidpktes in introduction of such
testimony or evidence is subject to disdpline. A lawyer should, however, present any
admissible evidence his client desires to have presented unless he knows, or from facts
within his knowledge should know, that such testimony or evidence is false, fraudulent,
or perjured.
EC 7-27 Because it interferes with the proper administration bf justice, a lawyer should
not suppress evidence that he or his client has a legal obligation to reveal or produce.
In like manner, a lawyer should not advise or cause a person to secrete himself or to

leave the jurisdiction of a tribunal for the purpose of making him unavailable as a
witness therein.
EC 7-28 Witnesses should always testify truthfully and should be free from any financial
inducements that might tempt them to do otherwise. A lawyer should not pay or agree
to pay a non-expert witness an amount in excess of reimbursement for expenses and
financial loss incident to his being a witness; however, a lawyer may pay or agree to
pay an expen witness a reasonable fee for his services as m expen. But in no event
should a lawyer pay or agree to pay a contingent fee to any witness. A lawyer should
exercise reasonable diligence to see that his client and lay associates conform to these
standards,
EC 7-29 To safeguard the impartiality that is essential to the judicial process, veniremen and jurors should be protected against extraneous influences. When impartiality is
present, public confidence in the judicial system is enhanced. There should be no extrajudicial communication with veniremen prior to trial or with jurors during trial by or
on behalf of a lawyer connected with the case. Furthermore, a lawyer who is not connected with the case should not communicate with or cause another to communicate
with a venireman or a juror about the case. After the trial, communication by a lawyer
with jurors is permitted so long as he refrains from asking questions or making comments that tend to harass or embarrass the juror or to influence actions of the juror in
future cases Were a lawyer to be prohibited from communicating after trial with a
juror, he could not ascenain if the verdict might be subject to legal challenge, in
which event the invalidity of a verdict might go undetected. When an extrajudicial
communication by a lawyer with a juror is permitted by law, it should be made considerately and with deference to the personal feelings of the juror.
EC 7-30 Vexatious or harassing investigations of veniremen or jurors seriously impair
the effectiveness of our jury system. For this reason, a lawyer or anyone on his behalf
who conducts an investigation of veniremen or jurors should act with circumspection
and restraint.
EC 7-31 Communications with or investigations of members of families of veniremen or
jurors by a lawyer or by anyone on his behalf are subject to the restrictions imposed
upon, the lawyer with respect to his communications with or investigations of veniremen
and jurors.
EC 7-32 Because of his duty to aid in preserving the integrity of the jury system, a
lawyer who learns of improper conduct by or towards a venireman, a juror, or a member of the family of either should make a prompt repon to the court regarding such
conduct.
EC 7-33 A goal of our legal system is that each party shall have his case, criminal
or civil, adjudicated by an impartial tribunal. The attainment of this goal may be defeated by dissemination of news or comments which tend to influence judge or jury. Such
news or comments may prevent propective jurors from being impartial at the outset
of the trial and may also interefere with the obligation of jurors to base their verdict
soieiy upon the evidence admitted in the trial. The release by a lawyer of out-of-court
statements regarding an anticipated or pending trial may improperly affect the impartiality of the tribunal. For these reasons, standards for permissible and prohibited conduct of a lawyer with respect to trial publicity have been established.
EC 7-34 The impartiality of a public servant in our legal system may be impaired by
the receipt of gifts or loans. A lawyer, therefore, is never, justified in making a gift or a
loan to a judge, a hearing officer, or an official or employee of a tribunal.
EC 7-35 All litigants and lawyers should have access to tribunals on an equal basis.
Generally, in adversary proceedings a lawyer should not communicate with a judge
relative to a matter pending before, or which is to be brought before, a tribunal over
which he presides in circumstances which might have the effect or give the appearance
of granting undue advantage to one party. For example, a lawyer should not communicate with a tribunal by a writing unless a copy thereof is promptly delivered to opposing
counsel or to the adverse party if he is not represented by a lawyer. Ordinarily an oral
communication by a lawyer with a judge or hearing officer should be made only upon
adequate notice to opposing counsel, or, if there is none, to the opposing party. A lawyer
should not condone or lend himself to private importunities by another with a judge or
hearing officer on behalf of himself or his client.

EC 7-36 Judicial hearings ought to be conducted through dignified and orderly procedures designed to protect the rights of all parties. Although a lawyer has the dury
to represent his client zealously, he should not engage in any conduct that offends the
dignity and decorum of proceedings. While maintaining his independence, a lawyer
should be respectful, courteous, and above-board in his relations with a judge or hearing
officer before whom he appears. He should avoid undue solicitude for the comfort or
convenience of judge or jury and should avoid any oth^r conduct calculated to gain
special consideration,
EC 7-37 In adversary proceedings, clients are Utigants ana though ill feelings may exist
between clients, such ill feeling should not influence a lawyer in his conduct, anirude,
and demeanor towards opposing lawyers. A lawyer should not make unfair or derogatory personal reference to opposing counsel. Haranguing and offensive tactics by lawyers
interfere with the orderly administration of justice and nave no proper place in our
legal system.
EC 7-38 A lawyer should be courteous to opposing counsel and should accede to reasonable requests regarding court proceedings, settings, continuances, waiver of procedural
formalities, and similar matters which do not prejudice the rights of his client. He should
follow local customs of courtesy or practice, unless he gives timely notice to opposing
counsel of his intention not to do so. A lawyer should be punctual in fulfilling all professional commitments.
EC 7-39 In the final analysis, proper functioning of the adversary system depends upon
cooperation between lawyers and tribunals in utilizing procedures which will preserve
the impartiality of tribunals and make their decisional processes prompt and just, without impinging upon the obligation of lawyers to represent jtheir clients zealously within
the framework of the law.

DISCIPLINARY RULES
DE 7-101

Representing a Client Zealously.

(A) A lawyer shall not intentionally:
(1) Fail to seek the lawful objectives of his client through reasonably
available means permitted by law and the Disciplinary Rules, except
as provided by DR 7-101 (B). A lawyer does not violate this Disciplinary Rule, however, by acceding to reasonable requests of opposing
counsel-which do not prejudice the rights of nis client, by being punctual in fulfilling all professional commitments, by avoiding offensive
tactics, or by treating with courtesy and consideration all persons
involved in the legal process.
j
(2) Fail to carry out a contract of employment entered into with a client
for professional services, but he may withdraw as permitted under
DR 2-110, DR 5-102, and DR 5-105.
(3) Prejudice or damage his client during the course of the professional
relationship, except as required under DR 74102 (B).
(B) In his representation of a client, a lawyer may:
(1) Where permissible, exercise his professional judgment to waive or
fail to assert a right of position of his client.
(2) Refuse to aid or participate in conduct that he believes to be unlawful, even though there is some support fo^ an argument that the
conduct is legal.
DR 7-102

Representing a Client Within the Bounds 0f the Law.

(A) In his representation of a client, a lawyer shall not:
(1) File a suit, assert a position, conduct a defence, delay a trial, or take
other action on behalf of his client when he knows or when it is
obvious that such action would serve merely to harass or maliciously
injure another.

(2) Knowingly advance a claim or defense that is unwarranted under
existing law, except that he may advance such claim or defense if it
can be supported by good faith argument for an extension, modification, or reversal .of existing law.
(3) Conceal or knowingly fail to disclose that which he is required by
law to reveal.
(4) Knowingly use perjured testimony or false evidence.
(5) Knowingly make a false statement of law or fact.
(6) Participate in the creation or preservation of evidence when Ee
knows or it is obvious that the evidence is false.
(7) Counsel or assist his client in conduct that the lawyer knows to be
illegal or fraudulent.
(8) Knowingly engage in other illegal conduct or conduct contrary to a
Disciplinary Rule.
(B) A lawyer who receives information clearly establishing that:
(1) His client has, in the course of the representation, perpetrated a
fraud upon a person or tribunal shall promptly call upon his client to
rectify the same, and if his client refuses or is unable to do so, he
shall reveal the fraud to the affected person or tribunal.
(2) A person other than his client has perpetrated a fraud upon a tribunal sb^il promptly reveal the fraud to the tribunal
DR 7-103 Performing the Duty of Public Prosecutor or Other Government
Lawyer.
(A) A public prosecutor or other government lawyer shall not institute or
cause to be instituted criminal charges when he knows or it is obvious
that the charges are not supported by probable cause.
(B) A public prosecutor or other government lawyer in criminal litigation
shall make timely disclosure to counsel for the defendant, or to the defendant if he has no counsel, of the existence of evidence, known to the
prosecutor or other government lawyer, that tends to negate the guilt of
the accused, mitigate the degree of the offense, or reduce the punish
ment
DR 7-104 Communicating With One of Adverse Interest.
(A) During the course of his representation of a client a lawyer shall not:
(1) Communicate or cause another to communicate on the subject of the
representation with a party he knows to be represented by a lawyer
in that matter unless he has the prior consent of the lawyer representing such other party or is authorized by law to do so.
(2) Give advice to a person who is not represented by a lawyer, other
than the advice to secure counsel, if the interests of such person are
or have a reasonable possibility of being in conflict with the interests
of his client
DR 7-105 Threatening Criminal Prosecution.
(A) A lawyer shall not present, participate in presenting, or threaten to present criminal charges solely to obtain an advantage in a civil matter.
DR 7-106 Trial Conduct
(A) A lawyer shall not disregard or advise his client to disregard a standing
rule of a tribunal or a ruling of a tribunal made in the course of a pro-

ceeding, but he may take appropriate steps 14 good faith to test the validity of such rule or ruling.
(B) In presenting a matter to a tribunal, a lawyer sljiall disclose:
(1) Legal authority in the controlling jurisdiction known to him to be
directly adverse to the position of his client! and which is not disclosed
by opposing counsel.
(2) Unless privileged or irrelevant, the identities of the clients he represents and of the persons who employed him.
(C) In appearing in his professional capacity befor^ a tribunal, a lawyer shall
not:
(1) State or allude to any matter that he has ho reasonable basis to believe is relevant to the case or that will nqt be supported by admissible evidence.
(2) Ask any question that he has no reasonably basis to believe is relevant to the case and that is intended to degrade a witness or other
person.
(3) Assert his personal knowledge of the facts in issue, except when
testifying as a witness.
(4) Assert his personal opinion as to the justness of a cause, as to the
credibility of a witness, as to the culpability lof a civil litigant, or as to
the guilt or innocence of an accused; but he may argue, on his analysis of the evidence, for any position or conclusion with respect to the
matters stated herein.
(5) Fail to comply with known local customs of courtesy or practice of
the bar or a particular tribunal without giving to opposing counsel
timely notice of his intent not to comply.
(6) Engage in undignified or discourteous conduct which is degrading to
a tribunal.
(7) Intentionally or habitually violate any estabj^hed rule of procedure
or of evidence.

DR 7-107

Trial Publicity.

(A) A lawyer participating in or associated with the I investigation of a criminal matter shall not make or participate in making an extrajudicial statement that a reasonable person would expect to be disseminated by means
of public communication and that does more than state without elaboration:
(1) Information contained in a public record.
(2) That the investigation is in progress.
(3) The general scope of the investigation including a description of the
offense and, if permitted by law, the identity of the victim.
(4) A request for assistance in apprehending a Suspect or assistance in
other matters and the information necessary I thereto.
(5) A warning to the public of any dangers.
(B) A lawyer or law firm associated with the prosecution or defense of a
criminal matter shall not, from the time of the filing of a complaint, information, or indictment, the issuance of an arrest warrant, or arrest
until the commencement of the trial, or disposition of without, trial,
make or participate in making an extrajudicial statement that a reasonable person would expect to be disseminated by means of public communication and that relates to:

(1) The character, reputation, or prior criminal record (including arrests,
indictments, or other charges of crime) of tbe accused.
(2) The possibility of a plea of guilty to the offense charged or to a lesser
offense.
(3) The existence or contents of any confession, admission, or statement
given by the accused or his refusal or failure to make a statement.
(4) The performance or results of any examinations or tests or the refusal or failure of the accused to submit to examinations or tests.
(5) The identity, testimony, or credibility of a prospective witness.
(6) Any opinion as to the guilt or innocence of the accused, the evidence,
or the merits of the case.
(C) DR 7-107 (B) does not preclude a lawyer during such period from announcing:
(1) The name, age, residence, occupation, and family status of the
accused.
(2) If the accused has not been apprehended, any information necessary
to aid in his apprehension or to warn the public of any dangers he
may present
(3) A request for assistance in obtaining evidence.
(4) The identity of the victim of the crime.
(5) The fact, time, and place of arrest, resistance, pursuit, and use of
weapons.
(6) The identity of investigating and arresting officers or agencies and
the length of the investigation.
(7) At the time of seizure, a description of the physical evidence seized,
other than a confession, admission, or statement
(8) The nature, substance, or text of the charge.
(9) Quotations from or references to public records of the court in the
case.
(10) The ^scheduling or result of any step in the judicial proceedings.
(11) That the accused denies the charges made against him.
(D) During the selection of a' jury or the trial of a criminal matter, a lawyer
or law firm associated with the prosecution or defense of a criminal
matter shall not make or participate in making an extra-judicial statement that a reasonable person would expect to be disseminated by
means of public communication and that relates to the trial, parties, or
issues in the trial or other matters that are reasonably likely to interfere
with a fair trial, except that he may quote from or refer without comment
to public records of the court in the case.
(E) After the completion of a trial or disposition without trial of a criminal
matter and prior to the imposition of sentence, a lawyer or law firm
associated with the prosecution or defense shall not make or participate
in making an extrajudicial statement that a reasonable person would
expect to be disseminated by public communication and that is reasonably likely to affect the imposition of sentence.
(F) The foregoing provisions of DR 7-107 also apply to professional disciplinary proceedings and juvenile disciplinary proceedings when pertinent
and consistent with other law applicable to such proceedings.
(G) A lawyer or law firm associated with a civil action shall not during its
investigation or litigation make or participate in making an extrajudicial
statement, other than a quotation from or reference to public records,

that a reasonable person would expect to be jiisseminated by means of
public communication and that relates to:
(1) Evidence regarding the occurrence or transaction- involved.
(2) The character, credibility, or criminal record of a party, witness, or
prospective witness.
(3) The performance or results of any examinations or tests or the refusal or failure of a party to submit to such, j
(4) His opinion as to the merits of the claims <jr defenses of a party, except as required by law or administrative rule.
(5) Any other matter reasonably likely to interfere with a fair trial of
the action.
(H) During the pendency of an administrative proceeding, a lawyer or law
firm associated therewith shall not make or participate in making a statement, other than a quotation from or reference to public records, that
a reasonable person would expect to be disseminated by means of public
communication if it is made outside the official! course of the proceeding
and relates to:
(1) Evidence regarding the occurrence or transaction involved.
(2) The character, credibility, or criminal record of a party, witness, or
prospective witness,
(3) Physical evidence or the performance or results of any examinations
or tests or the refusal or failure of a party to submit to such.
(4) His opinion as to the merits of the claims, defenses, or positions of an
interested person.
(5) Any other matter reasonably likely to interfere with a fair hearing.
(I) The foregoing provisions of DR 7-107 do not preclude a lawyer from replying to charges of misconduct publicly made against him or from participating in the proceedings of legislative, administrative, or other investigative bodies.
(J) A lawyer shall exercise reasonable care to present his employees and
associates 'from making an extra-judicial statement that he would be
prohibited from making under DR 7-107.

DR 7-108

Communication with or Investigation of [Jurors.

(A) Before the trial of a case a lawyer connected therewith shall not communicate with or cause another to communicate with anyone he knows to
be a member of the venire from which the jury J will be selected for the
trial of the case.
(B) During the trial of a case:
(1) A lawyer connected therewith shall not communicate with or cause
another to communicate with any member of the jury."
(2) A lawyer who is not connected therewith shall not communicate with
or cause another to communicate with a juror concerning the case.
(C) DR 7-108 (A) and (B) do not prohibit a lawyer from communicating with
veniremen or jurors in the course of official proceedings.
(D) After discharge of the jury from further consideration of a case with
which the lawyer was connected, the lawyer shall not ask questions of
or make comments to a member of that jury thai are calculated merely
to harass or embarrass the juror or to influence his actions in future
jury service.

(E) A lawyer shall not conduct or cause, by financial support or otherwise,
another to conduct a vexatious or harassing investigation of either a
venireman or a juror.
(F) All restrictions imposed by DR 7-108 upon a lawyer also apply to communications with or investigations of members of a family of a venireman or a juror.
(G) A lawyer shall reveal promptly to the court improper conduct by a
venireman or juror, or by another toward a venireman or a juror, or a
member of his family, of which the lawyer has knowledge.

DR 7-109

Contact with Witnesses.

(A) A lawyer shall not suppress any evidence that he or his client has a legal
obligation to reveal or produce.
(B) A lawyer shall not advise or cause a person to secrete himself or to leave
the jurisdiction of a tribunal for the purpose of making him unavailable
as a witness therein.
(C) A lawyer shall not pay, offer to pay, or acquiesce in the payment of compensation to a witness contingent upon the content of his testimony or
the outcome of the case. But a lawyer may advance, guarantee, or acquiesce in the payment of:
(1) Expenses reasonably incurred by a witness in attending or testifying.
(2) Reasonable compensation to -a witness for his loss of time in attending or testifying.
(3) A reasonable fee for the professional services of an expert witness.

DR 7-110

Contact with Officials,

(A) A lawyer shall not give or lend any thing of value to a judge, official, or
employee of a tribunal.
(B) In an adversary proceeding, a lawyer shall not communicate, or cause
another to communicate, as to the merits of the cause with a judge or
an official before whom the proceeding is pending, except:
(1) In the course of official proceedings in the cause.
(2) In writing if he promptly delivers a copy of the writing to opposing
counsel or to the adverse party if he is not represented by a lawyer.
(3) Orally upon adequate notice to opposing counsel or to the adverse
party if he is not represented by a lawyer.
(4) As otherwise authorized by law.

CANON 8
A Lawyer Should Assist in
Improving the Legal System
ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS
EC 8-1 Changes in human affairs and imperfections in numan institutions make necessary constant efforts to maintain and improve our legal system. This system should
function in a manner that commands public respect and fosters the use of legal remedies
to achieve redress of grievances. By reason of education and experience, lawyers are
especially qualified to recognize deficiencies in the legal system and to initiate corrective
measures therein. Thus they should participate in proposing and supporting legislation
and programs to improve the system, without regard to th4 general interests or desires
of clients or former clients.
EC 8-2 Rules of law are deficient if they are not just, understandable, and responsive
to the needs of society. If a lawyer believes that the existence or absence of a rule of
law, substantive or procedural, causes or contributes to an unjust result, he should endeavor by lawful means to obtain appropriate changes in the law. He should encourage
the simplification of laws and the repeal or amendment of laws that are outmoded. Likewise, legal procedures should be improved whenever experience indicates a change is
needed.
EC 8-3 The fair administration of justice requires the availability of competent lawyers.
Members of the public should be educated to recognize the existence of legal problems
and the resultant need for legal services, and should be provided methods for intelligent
selection of counsel. Those persons unable to pay for legal services should be provided
needed services. Clients and lawyers should not be penalized by undue geographical restraints upon representation in legal matters, and the bar should address itself to improvements in licensing, reciprocity, and admission procedures consistent with the needs
of modern commerce.
EC 8-4 Whenever a lawyer seeks legislative or administrative changes, he should
identify the capacity in which he appears, whether on behalf of himself, a client, or the
public. A lawyer may advocate such changes on behalf of a client even though he does
not agree with them. But when a lawyer purports to act on behalf of the public, he
should espouse only those changes which he conscientiously believes to be in the public
interest.
EC 8-5 Fraudulent, deceptive, or otherwise illegal conduct by a participant in a proceeding before a tribunal or legislative body is inconsistent with fair administration of
justice, and it should never be participated in or condonea by lawyers. Unless constrained by his obligation to preserve the confidences and secrets of his client, a lawyer
should reveal to appropriate authorities any knowledge he may have of such improper
conduct.
EC 8-6 Judges and administrative officials having adjudicatory powers ought to be
persons of integrity, competence, and suitable temperament. Generally, lawyers are
qualified, by personal observation or investigation, to evaluate the qualifications of
persons seeking or being considered for such public offices, and for this reason they have
a special responsibility to aid in the selection of only those who are qualified. It is the
dury of lawyers to endeavor to prevent political considerations from ourweighing judicial
fitness in the selection of judges. Lawyers should protest earnestly against the appointment or election of those who are unsuited for the bench and should strive to have
elected or appointed thereto only those who are willing to forego pursuits, whether of a
business, political, or other nature, that may interfere with the free and fair consideration of questions presented for adjudication. Adjudicatory officials, not being wholly free
to defend themselves, are entitled to receive the support of the bar against unjust criticism. While a lawyer as a citizen has a right to criticize such officials publicly, he should
be certain of the merit of his complaint, use appropriate language, and avoid petty
criticisms, for unrestrained and intemperate statements tend to lessen public confidence
in our legal system. Criticisms motivated by reasons other th^k a desire to improve the
legal system are not justified.
EC 8-7 Since lawyers are a vital pan of the legal system, they should be persons of
integrity, of professional skill and of dedication to the mr^pv^rry^r nf th* «~~—

Thus a lawyer should aid in establishing, as well as enforcing, standards of conduct adequate to protect the public by insuring that those who practice law are qualified to do so.
EC 8-8 Lawyers often serve as legislators or as holders of other public offices. This is
highly desirable, as lawyers are uniquely qualified to make significant contributions
to the improvement of the legal system. A lawyer who is a public officer, whether full
or pan-time, should not engage in activities in which his personal or professional
interests are or foreseeably may be in conflict with his official duties.
EC 8-9 The advancement of our legal system is of vital imponance in maintaining
the rule of law and in facilitating orderly changes; therefore, lawyers should encourage,
and should aid in making, needed changes and improvements.

DISCIPLINARY RULES
DR 8-101 Action as a Public Official.
(A) A lawyer who holds public office shall not:
(1) Use his public position to obtain, or attempt to obtain, a special advantage in legislative matters for himself or for a client under circumstances where he knows or it is obvious that such action, is not in the
public interest
(2) Use his public position to influence, or attempt to influence, a tribunal to act in favor of himself or of a client
(3) Accept any thing of value from any person when the lawyer knows
or it is obvious that the offer is for the purpose of influencing his
action as a public official.

DR 8-102 Statements Concerning Judges and Other Adjudicatory Officers.
(A) A lawyer shall not knowingly make false statements of fact concerning
the qualifications of a candidate for election or appointment to a judicial
office.
(B) A lawyer shall not knowingly make false accusations against a judge or
other adjudicatory officer.

DR 9-102

Preserving Identity of Funds and Property of a Client,

(A) All funds of clients paid to a lawyer or law firni, other than advances for
costs and expenses, shall be deposited in one or more identifiable bank
accounts maintained in the state in which the law office is situated and
no funds belonging to the lawyer or law firm spall be deposited therein
except as follows:
(1) Funds reasonably sufficient to pay bank dirges may be deposited
therein.
(2) Funds belonging in part to a client and in jpart presently or potentially to the lawyer or law firm must be deposited therein, but the
portion belonging to the lawyer or law firm may be withdrawn when
due unless the right of the lawyer or law linn to receive it is disputed by the client, in which event the disputed portion shall not be
withdrawn until the dispute is finally resolved,
(B) A lawyer shall:
(1) Promptly notify a client of the receipt of Ms funds, securities, or
other properties.
(2) Identify and label securities and properties o^ a client promptly upon
receipt and place them in a safe deposit box or other place of safekeeping as soon as practicable.
(3) Maintain complete records of all funds, securities, and other properties of a client coming into the possession of the lawyer and render
appropriate accounts to his client regarding them.
(4) Promptly pay or deliver to the client as requested by a client the
funds, securities, or other properties in the possession of the lawyer
which the client is entitled to receive.

DEFINITIONS
essic
As used in the Disciplinary Rules of the Code of Professional
Responsibility:

(1) "Differing interests" include every interest that will adversely affect
either the judgment or the loyalty of a lawyer to a client, whether it
be a conflicting, inconsistent, diverse, or other interest.
(2) "Law firm" includes a professional legal corporation.
(3) "Person" includes a corporation, an association, a trust, a partnership, and any other organization or legal entity.
(4) "Professional legal corporation* means a corporation, or an association treated as a corporation, authorized by law to practice law for
profit
(5) "State" includes the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and other
federal territories and possessions.
(6) "Tribunal" includes all courts and all other adjudicatory bodies.
(7) "A bar association representative of the general bar" includes a bar
association of specialists as referred to in DR i-105fA) (1) or (4).

DR 9-102

Preserving Identity of Funds and Property of a Client.

(A) All funds of clients paid to a lawyer or law firm, other than advances for
costs and expenses, shall be deposited in one or more identifiable bank
accounts maintained in the state in which the law office is situated and
no funds belonging to the lawyer or law firm shall be deposited therein
except as follows:
(1) Funds reasonably sufficient to pay bank charges may be deposited
therein.
(2) Funds belonging in part to a client and in part presently or potentially to the lawyer or law firm must be deposited therein, but the
portion belonging to the lawyer or law firm may be withdrawn when
due unless the right of the lawyer or law firm to receive it is disputed by the client, in which event the disputed portion shall not be
withdrawn until the dispute is finally resolved,
(B) A lawyer shall:
(1) Promptly notify a client of the receipt of his funds, securities, or
other properties.
(2) Identify and label securities and properties of a client promptly upon
receipt and place them in a safe deposit box or other place of safekeeping as soon as practicable.
(3) Maintain complete records of all funds, securities, and other properties of a client coming into the possession of the lawyer and render
appropriate accounts to his client regarding them.
(4) Promptly pay or deliver to the client as requested by a client the
funds, securities, or other properties in the possession of the lawyer
which the client is entitled to receive.

DEFINITIONS
As used in the Disciplinary Rules of the Code of Professional Responsibility:
(1> "Differing interests" include every interest that will adversely affect
either the judgment or the loyalty of a lawyer to a client, whether it
be a conflicting, inconsistent, diverse, or other interest.
(2) "Law firm" includes a professional legal corporation.
(3) "Person" includes a corporation, an association, a trust, a partnership, and any other organization or legal entity.
(4) "Professional legal corporation" means a corporation, or an association treated as a corporation, authorized by law to practice law for
profit
(5) "State" includes the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and other
federal territories and possessions.
(6) "Tribunal" includes all courts and all other adjudicatory bodies.
(7) "A bar association representative of the general bar" includes a bar
association of specialists as referred to in DR 2-105(A) (1) or (4).
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PREAMBLE: A LAWYER'S
RESPONSIBILITIES
A lawyer is a representative of clients, an officer
of the legal system and a public citizen having
special responsibility for the quality of justice.
As a representative of clients, a lawyer performs
various functions. As advisor, a lawyer provides a
client with an informed understanding of the
client's legal rights and obligations and explains
their practical implications. As advocate, a lawyer
zealously asserts the client's position under the rules
of the adversary system. As negotiator, a lawyer
seeks a result advantageous to the client but consistent with requirements of honest dealing with
others. As intermediary between clients, a lawyer
seeks to reconcile their divergent interests as an
advisor and, to a limited extent, as a spokesperson
for each client. A lawyer acts as evaluator by examining a client's legal affairs and reporting about
them to the client or to others. A lawyer's representation of a client, including representation by
appointment, does not constitute an endorsement of
the client's political, economic, social or moral
views or activities.
In all professional functions a lawyer should be
competent, prompt and diligent. A lawyer should
maintain communication with a client concerning
the representation. A lawyer should keep in confidence information relating to representation of a
client except so far as disclosure is required or permitted by the Rules of Professional Conduct or
other law.
A lawyer's conduct should conform to the requirements of the law, both in professional service to
clients and in the lawyer's business and personal
affairs. A lawyer should use the law's procedures
only for legitimate purposes and not to harass or
intimidate others. A lawyer should demonstrate
respect for the legal system and for those who serve
it, including judges, other lawyers and public officials. While it is a lawyer's duty, when necessary, to
challenge the rectitude of official action, it is also a
lawyer's duty to uphold legal process.
As a public citizen, a lawyer should seek improvement of the law, the administration of justice and
the quality of service rendered by the legal profession. As a member of a learned profession, a
lawyer should cultivate knowledge of the law
beyond its use for clients, employ that knowledge in
reform of the law and work to strengthen legal
education. A lawyer should be mindful of deficiencies in the administration of justice and of the fact
that the poor, and sometimes persons who are not
poor, cannot afford adequate legal assistance, and
should therefore devote professional time and civic
influence in their behalf. A lawyer should aid the

legal profession in pursuing these objectives and
should help the Bar regulate itself in the public interest.
Many of a lawyer's professional responsibilities
are prescribed in the Rules of Professional Conduct,
as well as substantive and procedural law.
However, a lawyer is also guided by personal conscience and the approbation of professional peers. A
lawyer should strive to attain the highest level of
skill, to improve the law and the legal profession
and to exemplify the legal profession's ideal of
public service.
A lawyer's responsibilities as a representative of
clients, an officer of the legal system and a public
citizen are usually harmonious. Thus, when an
opposing party is well represented, a lawyer can be a
zealous advocate on behalf of a client and at the
same time assume that justice is being done. So
also, a lawyer can be sure that preserving client
confidences ordinarily serves the public interest
because people are more likely to seek legal advice,
and thereby heed their legal obligations, when they
know their communications will be private.
In the nature of law practice, however, conflicting
responsibilities are encountered. Virtually all difficult ethical problems arise from conflict between a
lawyer's responsibilities to clients, to the legal
system and to the lawyer's own interest in remaining an upright person while earning a satisfactory
living. The Rules of Professional Conduct prescribe
terms for resolving such conflicts. Within the framework' of these Rules many difficult issues of
professional discretion can arise. Such issues must
be resolved through the exercise of sensitive professional and moral judgment guided by the basic
principles underlying the Rules.
The legal profession is largely self-governing.
Although other professions also have been granted
powers of self-government, the legal profession is
unique in this respect because of the close relationship between the profession and the processes of
government and law enforcement. This connection
is manifested in the fact that ultimate authority over
the legal profession is vested largely in the courts.
To the extent that lawyers meet the obligations of
their professional calling, the occasion for government regulation is obviated. Self-regulation also
helps maintain the legal profession's independence
from government domination. An independent legal
profession is an important force in preserving government under law, for abuse of legal authority is
more readily challenged by a profession whose
members are not dependent on government for the
right to practice.
The legal profession's relative autonomy carries
with it special responsibilities of self-government.
The profession has a responsibility to assure that its
regulations are conceived in the public interest and
not in furtherance of parochial or self-interested
concerns of the Bar. Every lawyer is responsible for
observance of the Rules of Professional Conduct.
A lawyer should also aid in securing their observance by other lawyers. Neglect of these responsibilities compromises the independence of the profession and the public interest which it serves.
Lawyers play a vital role in the preservation of
society. The fulfillment of this role requires an
understanding by lawyers of their relationship to our
legal system. The Rules of Professional Conduct,
when properly applied, serve to define that relationship.
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SCOPE
The Rules of Professional Conduct are rules of
reason. They should be interpreted with reference to
the purposes of legal representation and of the law
itself. Some of the Rules are imperatives, cast in
the terms "shall" or "shall not." These define proper
conduct for purposes of professional discipline.
Others, generally cast in the term "may," are permissive and define areas under the Rules in which
the lawyer has professional discretion. No disciplinary action should be taken when the lawyer
chooses not to act or acts within the bounds of such
discretion. Other Rules define the nature of relationships between the lawyer and others. The Rules
are thus partly obligatory and disciplinary and
partly constitutive and descriptive in that they define
a lawyer's professional role. Many of the Comments use the term "should." Comments do not add
obligations to the Rules but provide guidance for
practicing in compliance with the Rules.
The Rules presuppose a larger legal context
shaping the lawyer's role. That context includes
court rules and statutes relating to matters of licensure, laws defining specific obligations .of lawyers
and substantive and procedural law in general.
Compliance with the Rules, as with all law in an
open society, depends primarily upon understanding
and voluntary compliance, secondarily upon reinforcement by peer and public opinion and finally,
when necessary, upon enforcement through disciplinary proceedings. The Rules do not, however,
exhaust the moral and ethical considerations that
should inform a lawyer, for no worthwhile human
activity can be completely defined by legal rules/
The Rules simply provide a framework for the
ethical practice of law.
Furthermore, for purposes of determining the
lawyer's authority and responsibility, principles of
substantive law external to these Rules determine
whether a client-lawyer relationship exists. Most
of the duties flowing from the client-lawyer relationship attach only after the client has requested the
lawyer to render legal services and the lawyer has
agreed to do so. But there are some duties, such as
that of confidentiality under Rule 1.6, that may
attach when the lawyer agrees to consider whether a
client-lawyer relationship shall be established.
Whether a client-lawyer relationship exists for any
specific purpose can depend on the circumstances
and may be a question of fact.
Under various legal provisions, including constitutional, statutory and common law, the responsibilities of government lawyers may include authority
concerning legal matters that ordinarily reposes in
the client in private client-lawyer relationships.
For example, a lawyer for a government agency may
have authority on behalf of the government to
decide upon settlement or whether to appeal from
an adverse judgment. Such authority in various
respects is generally vested in the attorney general
and the state's attorney in state government, and
their federal counterparts, and the same may be true
of other government law officers. Also, lawyers
under the supervision of these officers may be authorized to represent several government agencies in
intragovernmental legal controversies in circumstances where a private lawyer could not represent
multiple private clients. They also may have authority to represent the "public interest" in circumst-

ancesi where a private lawyer would not be authorized io do so. These Rules do not abrogate any
such authority.
Failure to comply with an obligation or prohibition imposed by a Rule is a basis for invoking the
disciplinary process. The Rules presuppose that
disciplinary assessment of a lawyer's conduct will be
made on the basis of the facts and circumstances as
they existed at the time of the conduct in question
and in recognition of the fact that a lawyer often
has to act upon uncertain or incomplete evidence of
the situation. Moreover, the Rules presuppose that
whether or not discipline should be imposed for a
violation, and the severity of a sanction, depend on
all the circumstances, such as the willfulness and
seriousness of the violation, extenuating factors and
whether there have been previous violations. Disciplinary action shall be governed by the Procedures
of Discipline of the Utah State Bar and the burden
of proof shall be on the State Bar to sustain any
allegation of violation by clear and convincing evidence.
Violation of a Rule should not give rise to a cause
of action nor should it create any presumption that
a legal duty has been breached. The Rules are designed to provide guidance to lawyers and to provide
a structure for regulating conduct through disciplinary agencies. They are not designed to be a basis
for civil liability. "Furthermore, the purpose of the
Rules can be subverted when they are invoked by
opposing parties as procedural weapons. The fact
that a Rule is a just basis for a lawyer's selfassessment, or for sanctioning a lawyer under the
administration of a disciplinary authority, does not
imply that an antagonist in a collateral proceeding
or transaction has standing to seek enforcement of
the Rule. Accordingly, nothing in the Rule should
be deemed to augment any substantive legal duty of
lawyers or the extra-disciplinary consequences of
violating such a duty.
Moreover, these Rules are not intended to govern
or affect judicial application of either the attorneyclient or work product privilege. Those privileges
were developed to promote compliance with law and
fairness in litigation. In reliance on the attorneyclient privilege, clients are entitled to expect that
communications within the scope of the privilege
will be protected against compelled disclosure. The
attorney-client privilege is that of the client and
not of the lawyer. The fact that in exceptional situations the lawyer under the Rules has a limited
discretion to disclose a client confidence does not
vitiate the proposition that, as a general matter, the
client has a reasonable expectation that information
relating to the client will not be voluntarily disclosed
and that disclosure of such information may be
judicially compelled only in accordance with the
recognized exceptions to the attorney-client and
work product privileges.
lawyer's exercise of discretion not to disclose
lation under Rule 1.6 should not be subject to
[nation.
Permitting such reexamination
be incompatible with the general policy of
promoting compliance with law through assurances
that communications will be protected against disclosure.
The Comment accompanying each Rule explains
and illustrates the meaning and purpose of the Rule.
The Preamble and this note on Scope provide
general orientation. The Comments are intended as
guides to interpretation, but the text of each Rule is
authoritative. Research notes were prepared to
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compare counterparts in the Code of Professional
Responsibility (approved by the Utah Supreme
Court February 19, 1971) and to provide selected
references to other authorities. The notes have not
been adopted, do not constitute part of the Rules,
and are not intended to affect the application or
interpretation of the Rules and Comments.

CLIENT-LAWYER
RELATIONSHIP

TERMINOLOGY

RULE 1.1 COMPETENCE

'Belief* or "Believes"' denotes that the person
involved actually supposed the fact in question to be
true. A person's belief may be inferred from circumstances.
• "Consult" or "Consultation" denoics communication of information reasonably sufficient to permit
the client to appreciate the significance of the matter
in question.
"Firm" or "Law firm" denotes a lawyer or
lawyers in a private firm, lawyers employed in the
legal department of a corporation or other organization and lawyers employed in a legal services
organization. See Comment, Rule 1.10.
"Fraud" or "Fraudulent" denotes conduct having
a purpose to deceive and not merely negligent misrepresentation or failure to apprise another of relevant information.
"Knowingly," "Known," or "Knows" denotes
actual knowledge of the fact in question. A
person's knowledge may be inferred from circumstances.
"Partner" denotes a member of a partnership and
a shareholder in a law firm organized as a professional corporation.
"Reasonable" or "Reasonably" when used in relation to conduct by a lawyer denotes the conduct of
a reasonably prudent and competent lawyer.
"Reasonable belief" or "Reasonably believes"
when used in reference to a lawyer denotes that the
lawyer believes the matter in question and that the
circumstances are such that the belief is reasonable.
"Reasonably should know" when used in reference to a lawyer denotes that a lawyer of reasonable
prudence and competence would ascertain the
matter in question.
"Substantial" when used in reference to degree or
extent denotes a material matter of clear and
weighty importance.

A LAWYER SHALL PROVIDE COMPETENT
REPRESENTATION TO A CLIENT. COMPETENT REPRESENTATION REQUIRES THE
LEGAL KNOWLEDGE, SKILL, THOROUGHNESS AND PREPARATION REASONABLY
NECESSARY FOR THE REPRESENTATION.
COMMENT:
Legal Knowledge and Skill
In determining whether a lawyer employs the
requisite knowledge and skill in a particular matter,
relevant factors include the relative complexity and
specialized nature of the matter, the lawyer's
general experience, the lawyer's training and experience in the field in question, the preparation- and
study the lawyer is able to give the matter and
whether it is feasible to refer the matter to, or associate or consult with, a lawyer of established
competence in the field in question. In many instances, the required proficiency is that of a general
practitioner. Expertise in a particular field of law
may be required in some circumstances.
A lawyfer need not necessarily have special training or prior experience to handle legal problems of
a type with which the lawyer is unfamiliar. A newly
admitted lawyer can be as competent as a practitioner with long experience. Some important legal
skills, such as the analysis of precedent, the evaluation of evidence and legal drafting, are required in
all legal problems. Perhaps the most fundamental
legal skill consists of determining what kind of legal
problems a situation may involve, a skill that necessarily transcends any particular specialized knowledge. A lawyer can provide adequate representation
in a wholly novel field through necessary study.
Competent representation can also be provided
through the association of a lawyer of established
competence in thefieldin question.
In an emergency a lawyer may give advice or
assistance in a matter in which the lawyer does not
have the skill ordinarily required where referral to
or consultation or association with another lawyer
would be impractical. Even in an emergency,
however, assistance should be limited to that reasonably necessary in the circumstances, for ill considered action under emergency conditions can jeopardize the client's interest.
A lawyer may accept representation where the
requisite level of competence can be achieved by
reasonable preparation. This applies as well to a
lawyer who is appointed as counsel for an unrepresented person. See also Rule 6.2.
Thoroughness and Preparation
Competent handling of a particular matter includes inquiry into and analysis of the factual and
legal elements of the problem, and use of methods
and procedures meeting the standards of competent
practitioners. It also includes adequate preparation.
The required attention and preparation are determined in part by what is at stake; major litigation and
complex transactions ordinarily require more elab-
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orate treatment than matters of lesser consequence.
Maintaining Competence
To maintain the requisite knowledge and skill, a
lawyer should engage in continuing study and education.
CODE COMPARISON
DR 6-101(A)(l) provided that a lawyer shall not
handle a matter "which he knows or should know
that he is not competent to handle, without associating himself with a lawyer who is competent to
handle it." DR 6-101(A)(2) required "preparation
adequate in the circumstances." Rule 1.1 more fully
particularizes the elements of competence. Whereas
DR 6-101(A)(3) prohibited the "[njeglect of a legal
matter" Rule 1.1 does not contain such a prohibition. Instead, Rule 1.1 affirmatively requires the
lawyer to be competent.

RULE 1.2 SCOPE OF
REPRESENTATION
(a) A LAWYER SHALL ABIDE BY A
CLIENT'S DECISIONS CONCERNING THE
OBJECTIVES OF REPRESENTATION, SUBJECT
TO PARAGRAPHS (b), (c), (d), AND SHALL
CONSULT WITH THE CLIENT AS TO THE
MEANS BY WHICH THEY ARE TO BE
PURSUED. A LAWYER SHALL ABIDE BY A
CLIENT'S DECISION WHETHER TO ACCEPT
AN OFFER OF SETTLEMENT OF A MATTER.
IN A CRIMINAL CASE, A LAWYER SHALL
ABIDE BY THE CLIENT'S DECISION, AFTER
CONSULTATION WITH THE LAWYER, AS TO
A PLEA TO BE ENTERED, WHETHER TO
WAIVE JURY TRIAL AND WHETHER THE
CLIENT WILL TESTIFY.
(b) A LAWYER MAY LIMIT THE OBJECTIVES OF THE REPRESENTATION IF THE
CLIENT CONSENTS AFTER CONSULTATION.
(c) A LAWYER SHALL NOT COUNSEL A
CLIENT TO ENGAGE, OR ASSIST A CLIENT,
IN CONDUCT THAT THE LAWYER KNOWS IS
CRIMINAL OR FRAUDULENT, BUT A
LAWYER MAY DISCUSS THE LEGAL CONSEQUENCES OF ANY PROPOSED COURSE OF
CONDUCT WITH A CLIENT AND MAY
COUNSEL OR ASSIST A CLIENT TO MAKE A
GOOD FAITH EFFORT TO DETERMINE THE
VALIDITY, SCOPE, MEANING OR APPLICATION OF THE LAW.
<d) WHEN A LAWYER KNOWS THAT A
CLIENT EXPECTS ASSISTANCE NOT PERMITTED BY THE RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT OR OTHER LAW, THE LAWYER
SHALL CONSULT WITH THE CLIENT REGARDING THE RELEVANT LIMITATIONS ON
THE LAWYER'S CONDUCT.
COMMENT:
Scope of Representation
Both lawyer and client have authority and responsibility in the objectives and means of representation.. The client has ultimate authority to determine
the purposes to be served by legal representation,
within the limits imposed by law and the lawyer's
professional obligations. Within those limits, a client
also has a right to consult with the lawyer about the
means to be used in pursuing those objectives. At
the same time, a lawyer is not required to pursue
objectives or employ means simply because a client

may^ wish that the lawyer do so. A clear distinction
between objectives and means sometimes cannot be
dra^n, and in many cases the client-lawyer relationship partakes of a joint undertaking. In questions
of means, the lawyer should assume responsibility
for technical and legal tactical issues, but should
defer to the client regarding such questions as the
expense to be incurred and concern for third persons
who might be adversely affected. Law Jefming the
lawyer's scope of authority in litigation varies
among jurisdictions.
Services Limited in Objectives or Means
The objectives or scope of services provided by a
lawyer may be limited by agreement with the client
or py the terms under which the lawyer's services
are Jmade available to the client. For example, a
retainer may be for a specifically defined purpose.
Representation provided through a legal aid agency
may be subject to limitations on the types of cases
the agency handles. When a lawyer has been retained by an insurer to represent an insured, the representation may be limited to matters related to the
insurance coverage. The terms upon which representation is undertaken may exclude specific objectives
or means. Such limitations may exclude objectives
or means that the lawyer regards as repugnant or
imprudent.
An agreement concerning the scope of representation must accord vrith the Rules of Professional
Conduct and other law. Thus, the client may not be
asked to agree to representation so limited in scope
as to violate Rule 1.1, or to surrender the right to
terminate the lawyer's services or the right to settle
litigation that the lawyer might wish to continue.
Criminal, Fraudulent and Prohibited Transactions
A lawyer is required to give an honest opinion
about the actual consequences that appear likely to
result from a client's conduct. The fact that a client
uses advice in a course of action that is criminal or
fraudulent does not, of itself, make a lawyer a party
to the course of action. However, a lawyer may not
knowingly assist a client in criminal or fraudulent
conduct. There is a critical distinction between presenting an analysis of legal aspects of questionable
conduct and recommending the means by which a
crime or fraud might be committed with impunity.
When the client's course of action has already
begun and is continuing, the lawyer's responsibility
is especially delicate. The lawyer *is not permitted to
reveal the client's wrongdoing, except where permitted by Rule 1.6. However, the lawyer is required to
avoid furthering the purpose, for example, by suggesting how it might be concealed. A lawyer may
not continue assisting a client in conduct that the
lawyer originally supposes is legally proper but then
discovers is criminal or fraudulent. Withdrawal
from the representation, therefore, may be required.
Where the client is a fiduciary, the lawyer may be
charged with special obligations in dealings with the
beneficiary. _
Paragraph (c) applies whether or not the defrauded party is a party to the transaction. Hence, a
lawyer should not participate in a sham transaction;
for example, a transaction to effectuate criminal or
fraudulent escape of tax liability. Paragraph (c) does
not preclude undertaking a criminal defense incident
to a general retainer for legal service to a lawful
enterprise. The last clause of paragraph (c) recognizes that determining the validity or interpretation of
a statute or regulation may require a course of
action involving disobedience of the statute or regi*r
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ulation or of the interpretation placed upon it bv
governmental authorities.
CODE COMPARISON
Paragraph (a) has no counterpart in the Disciplinary Rules of the Code. EC 7-7 stated: "In certain
areas of legal representation not affecting the merits
of the cause or substantially prejudicing the rights
of a client, a lawyer is entitled to make decisions on
his own. But otherwise the authority to make decisions is exclusively that of the client ..." EC 7-8
stated that *[i]n the final analysis, however, the ...
decision whether to forego legally available objectives or methods because of nonlegal factors is ultimately for the client ... In the event that the client
in a nonadjudicatory matter insists upon a course of
conduct that is contrary to the judgment and advice
of the lawyer but not prohibited by Disciplinary
Rules, the lawyer may withdraw from the employment/ DR 7-101(A)(l) provided that a lawyer
'shall not intentionally ... fail to seek the lawful
objectives of his client through reasonably available
means permitted by law .... A lawyer does not
violate this Disciplinary Rule, however, by ... avoiding offensive tactics ...."
. With regard to paragraph (b), DR 7-101(B)(l)
provided that a lawyer may, "where permissible,
exercise his professional judgment to waive or fail to
assert arightor position of his client /
With regard to paragraph (c), DR 7-102(AX7)
provided that a lawyer shall not "counsel or assist
his client in conduct that the lawyer knows to be
illegal or fraudulent/ DR 7-102(A)(6) provided
that a lawyer shall not "participate in the creation or
preservation of evidence when he knows or it is
obvious that the evidence is false." DR 7-106
provided that a lawyer shall not "advise his client to
disregard a standing rule of a tribunal or a ruling of
a tribunal ... but he may take appropriate steps in
good faith to test the validity of such rule or
ruling." EC 7-5 stated that a lawyer "should never
encourage or aid his client to commit criminal acts
or counsel his clients on how to violate the law and
avoid punishment therefor."
With regard to paragraph (d), DR 2-110(C)(lXc)
provided that a lawyer may withdraw from representation if a client "insists" that the lawyer engage
in "conduct that is illegal or that is prohibited under
the Disciplinary Rules." DR 9-101(C) provided that
"a lawyer shall not state or imply that he is able to
influence improperly ... any tribunal, legislative
body or public official."

RULE 1.3 DILIGENCE
A LAWYER SHALL ACT WITH REASONABLE DILIGENCE AND PROMPTNESS IN
REPRESENTING A CLIENT.
COMMENT:
A lawyer should pursue a matter on behalf of a
client despite opposition, obstruction or personal
inconvenience to the lawyer, and may take whatever
lawful and ethical measures are required to vindicate
* client's cause or endeavor. A lawyer should act
with commitment and dedication to the interests of
the client and with zeal in advocacy upon the
client's behalf. However, a lawyer is not bound to
press for every advantage that might be realized for
a client. A lawyer has professional discretion in
determining the means by which a matter should be
pursued. See Rule 1.2. A .lawyer's workload should

be controlled so that each matter can be handled
adequately.
'. Clients resent professional procrastination. A
client's interests often can be adversely affected by
the passage of time or the change of conditions; in
extreme instances, as when a lawyer overlooks a
statute of limitations, the client's legal position may
be destroyed. Even when the client's interests are
not affected in substance, however, unreasonable
delay can cause a client needless anxiety and undermine confidence in the lawyer's trustworthiness.
Unless the relationship is terminated as provided
in Rule 1.14 a lawyer should carry through to conclusion all matters undertaken for a client. If a
lawyer's employment is limited to a specific matter,
the relationship terminates when the matter has been
resolved. If a lawyer has served a client over a substantial period in a variety of matters, the client
sometimes may assume that the lawyer will continue
to serve on a continuing basis unless the lawyer
gives notice of withdrawal. Doubt about whether a
client-lawyer relationship still exists should be
clarified by the lawyer, preferably in writing, so that
the client will not mistakenly suppose the lawyer is
looking after the client's affairs when the lawyer
has ceased to do so. For example, if a lawyer has
handled a judicial or administrative proceeding that
produced a result adverse to the client but has not
been specifically instructed concerning pursuit of an
appeal, the lawyer should advise the client of the
possibility of appeal before relinquishing responsibility for the matter.
CODE COMPARISON
DR 6-101(A)(3) required that a lawyer not
"[njeglect a legal matter entrusted to him." EC 6-4
stated that a lawyer should "give appropriate attention to his legal work." Canon 7 stated that "a
lawyer should represent a client zealously within the
bounds of the law." DR 7-101(A)(l) provided that
a lawyer "shall not intentionally ... fail to seek the
lawful objectives of his client through reasonably
available means permitted by law and the Disciplinary Rules ...." DR 7-101(A)(3) provided that a
lawyer "•shall not intentionally ... [prejudice or
damage his client during the course of the professional relationship...."

RULE 1.4 COMMUNICATION
(a) A LAWYER SHALL KEEP A CLIENT
REASONABLY INFORMED ABOUT THE
STATUS OF A MATTER AND PROMPTLY
COMPLY WITH REASONABLE REQUESTS
FOR INFORMATION.
(b) A LAWYER SHALL EXPLAIN A MATTER
TO THE EXTENT REASONABLY NECESSARY
TO ENABLE THE CLIENT TO MAKE INFORMED DECISIONS REGARDING THE REPRESENTATION.
COMMENT:
The client should have sufficient information to
participate intelligently in decisions concerning the
objectives of the representation and the means by
which they are to be pursued, to the extent the client
is willing and able to do so. For example, a lawyer
negotiating on behalf of a client should provide the
client with facts relevant to the matter, inform the
client of communications from another party and
take other reasonable steps that permit the'client to
make a decision regarding a serious offer from
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another party. A lawyer who receives from opposing
counsel an offer of settlement in a civil controversy
or a proffered plea bargain in a criminal case shall
promptly inform the client of its substance unless
prior discussions with the client have left it clear
that the proposal will be unacceptable. See Rule
1.2(a). Even when a client delegates authority to the
lawyer, the client should be kept advised of the
status of the matter.
Adequacy of communication depends in part on
the kind of advice or assistance involved. For
example, in negotiations where there is time to
explain a prpposal, the lawyer should review all
important provisions with the client before proceeding to an agreement. In litigation a lawyer should
explain the general strategy and prospects of success
and ordinarily should consult the client on tactics
that might injure or coerce others. On the other
hand, a lawyer ordinarily cannot be expected to
describe trial or negotiation strategy in detail. The
guiding principle is that the lawyer should fulfill
reasonable client expectations for information,
whether written or oral, consistent with the duty to
act in the client's best interest, and the client's
overall requirements as to the character of representation.
Ordinarily, the information to be provided is that
appropriate for a client who is a comprehending and
responsible adult. However, fully informing the
client according to this standard may be impracticable, for example, where the client is a child or
suffers from mental disability. When the client is an
organization or group, it is often impossible or
inappropriate to inform every one of its members
about its legal affairs; ordinarily, the lawyer should
address communications to the appropriate officials
of the organization. Where many routine matters
are involved, a system of limited or occasional reporting may be arranged with the client. Practical
exigency may also require a lawyer to act for a
client without prior consultation.
Withholding Information
In some circumstances, a lawyer may be justified
in delaying transmission of information when the
client would be likely to react imprudently to an
immediate communication. Thus, a lawyer might
withhold a psychiatric diagnosis of a client when the
examining psychiatrist indicates that disclosure
would harm the client. A lawyer may not withhold
information to serve the lawyer's own interest or
convenience. Rules or court orders governing litigation may provide that information supplied to a
lawyer may not be disclosed to the client. Rule
3.4(c) directs compliance with such rules or orders.
CODE COMPARISON
Rule 1.4 has no direct counterpart in the Disciplinary Rules of the Code. DR 6-101 (A)(3) provided
that a lawyer shall not '[njeglect a legal matter
entrusted to him.* DR 9-102(B)(1) provided that a
lawyer shall '[promptly notify a client of the
receipt of his funds, securities, or other properties."
EC 7- stated that a lawyer "should exert his best
efforts to insure that decisions of his client are made
only after the client has been informed of relevant
considerations." EC 9-2 stated that "a lawyer
should fully and promptly inform his client of
material developments in the matters being handled
for the client/
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RULE 1.5 FEES
(i) A LAWYER SHALL NOT ENTER INTO AN
AGREEMENT FOR, CHARGE, OR COLLECT
AN ILLEGAL OR CLEARLY EXCESSIVE FEE.
A FEE IS CLEARLY EXCESSIVE WHEN,
AFTER A REVIEW OF THE FACTS, A
LAWYER OF ORDINARY PRUDENCE WOULD
BE JLEFT WITH A DEFINITE AND FIRM CONVICTION THAT THE FEE IS IN EXCESS OF A
REASONABLE FEE. FACTORS TO BE CONSIDERED AS GUIDES IN DETERMINING THE
REASONABLENESS OF A FEE INCLUDE THE
FOLLOWING:
(1) THE TIME AND LABOR REQUIRED,
THE NOVELTY AND DIFFICULTY OF THE
QUESTIONS INVOLVED, AND THE SKILL
REQUISITE TO PERFORM THE LEGAL
SERVICE PROPERLY;
(2) THE LIKELIHOOD, IF APPARENT TO
THE CLIENT, THAT THE ACCEPTANCE OF
THE PARTICULAR EMPLOYMENT WILL
PRECLUDE OTHER EMPLOYMENT BY THE
LAWYER*
[(3) THE FEE CUSTOMARILY CHARGED IN
THE LOCALITY FOR SIMILAR LEGAL SERVICES;
(4) THE AMOUNT INVOLVED AND THE
RESULTS OBTAINED;
1 (5) THE TIME LIMITATIONS IMPOSED BY
THE CLIENT OR BY THE CIRCUMSTANCES;
(6) THE NATURE AND LENGTH OF THE
PROFESSIONAL RELATIONSHIP WITH THE
CLIENT;
(7) THE EXPERIENCE, REPUTATION,
AND ABILITY OF THE LAWYER OR
LAWYERS PERFORMING THE SERVICES;
AND
(8) WHETHER THE FEE IS FIXED OR
CONTINGENT.
(b) WHEN THE LAWYER HAS NOT REGULARLY REPRESENTED THE CLIENT, THE
BASIS OR RATE OF THE FEE SHALL BE
COMMUNICATED TO THE CLIENT, PREFERABLY IN WRITING, BEFORE OR WITHIN A
REASONABLE TIME AFTER COMMENCING
THE REPRESENTATION.
(c) A FEE MAY BE CONTINGENT ON THE
OUTCOME OF THE MATTER FOR WHICH
THE SERVICE IS RENDERED, EXCEPT IN A
MATTER IN WHICH A CONTINGENT FEE IS
PROHIBITED BY PARAGRAPH (d) OR OTHER
LAW. A CONTINGENT FEE AGREEMENT
SHALL BE IN WRITING AND SHALL STATE
THE METHOD BY WHICH THE FEE IS TO BE
DETERMINED, INCLUDING THE PERCENTAGE OR PERCENTAGES THAT SHALL
ACCRUE TO THE LAWYER IN THE EVENT OF
SETTLEMENT, TRIAL OR APPEAL, LITIGATION AND OTHER EXPENSES TO BE DEDUCTED FROM THE RECOVERY, AND
WHETHER SUCH EXPENSES ARE TO BE
DEDUCTED BEFORE OR AFTER THE CONTINGENT FEE IS CALCULATED. UPON CONCLUSION OF A CONTINGENT FEE MATTER,
THE LAWYER SHALL PROVIDE THE CLIENT
WITH A WRITTEN STATEMENT STATING
THE OUTCOME OF THE MATTER AND, IF
THERE IS A RECOVERY, SHOWING THE
REMITTANCE TO THE CLIENT AND THE
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METHOD OF ITS DETERMINATION.
(d) A LAWYER SHALL NOT ENTER INTO
AN ARRANGEMENT FOR, CHARGE, OR
COLLECT:
(1) ANY FEE IN A DOMESTIC RELATIONS
MATTER, THE PAYMENT OR AMOUNT OF
WHICH IS CONTINGENT UPON THE SECURING OF A DIVORCE OR UPON THE
AMOUNT OF ALIMONY OR SUPPORT, OR
PROPERTY SETTLEMENT IN LIEU THEREOF;
OR
(2) A CONTINGENT FEE FOR REPRESENTING A DEFENDANT IN A CRIMINAL CASE.
(e) A DIVISION OF FEE BETWEEN LAWYERS
WHO ARE NOT IN THE SAME FIRM MAY BE
MADE ONLY IF:
(1) THE DIVISION IS IN PROPORTION TO
THE SERVICES PERFORMED BY EACH
LAWYER OR, BY WRITTEN AGREEMENT
W I T H T H E C L I E N T , E A C H LAWYER
ASSUMES JOINT RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE
REPRESENTATION;
(2) THE CLIENT IS ADVISED OF AND
DOES NOT OBJECT TO THE PARTICIPATION
OF ALL LAWYERS INVOLVED; AND
(3) THE TOTAL FEE IS REASONABLE.
COMMENT:
Basis or Rate of Fee
When the lawyer has regularly represented a
client, they ordinarily will have evolved an understanding concerning the basis or rate of the fee. In a
new client-lawyer relationship, however, an understanding as to the fee should be promptly established. It is not necessary to recite all the factors that
underlie the basis of the fee, but only those that are
directly involved in its computation. It is sufficient,
for example, to state that the basic rate is an hourly
charge or a fixed amount or an estimated amount,
or to identify the factors that may be taken into
account in finally fixing the fee. When developments
occur during the representation that render an
earlier estimate substantially inaccurate, a revised
estimate should be provided to the client. A written
statement concerning the fee reduces the possibility
of misunderstanding. Furnishing the client with a
simple memorandum or a copy of the lawyer's
customary fee schedule is sufficient if the basis or
rate of the fee is set forth.
Terms of Payment
A lawyer may require advance payment of a fee,
but is obligated to return any unearned portion. See
Rule 1.14(d). A lawyer may accept property in
payment for services, such as an ownership interest
in an enterprise, providing this does not involve
acquisition of a proprietary interest in the cause of
action or subject matter of the litigation contrary to
Rule 1.80). However, a fee paid in property instead
of money may be subject to special scrutiny because
it involves questions concerning both the value of
the services and the lawyer's special knowledge of
the value of the property.
An agreement may not be made whose terms
might induce the lawyer improperly to curtail services for the client or perform them in any way contrary to the client's interest. For example, a lawyer
should not enter into an agreement whereby services
are to be provided only up to a stated amount when
it is foreseeable that more extensive services probably will be required, unless the situation is adequately explained to the client. Otherwise, the client
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might have to bargain for further assistance in the
midst of a proceeding or transaction. However, it is
proper to define the extent of services in light of the
client's ability to pay. A lawyer should not exploit a
fee arrangement based primarily on hourly charges
by using wasteful procedures. When there is doubt
whether a contingent fee is consistent with the
client's best interest, the lawyer should offer the
client alternative bases for the fee and explain their
implications. Applicable law may impose limitations
on contingent fees, such as a ceiling on the percentage.
Division of Fee
A division of fee is a single billing to a client
covering the fee of two or more lawyers who are not
in the same firm. A division of fee facilitates association of more than one lawyer in a matter in
which neither alone could serve the client as well,
and most often is used when the fee is contingent
and the division is between a referring lawyer and a
trial specialist. Paragraph (e) permits the lawyers to
divide a fee on either the basis of the proportion of
services they render or by agreement between the
participating lawyers if all assume responsibility for
the representation as a whole and the client is
advised and does not object. It does not require
disclosure to the client of the share that each lawyer
is to receive. Joint responsibility for the representation entails the obligations stated in Rule 5A for
purposes of the matter involved.
Disputes over Fees
If a procedure has been established for resolution
of fee disputes, such as an arbitration or mediation
procedure established by the Bar, the lawyer should
conscientiously consider submitting to it. Law may
prescribe a procedure for determining a lawyer's
fee, for example, in representation of an executor or
administrator, a class or a person entitled to a reasonable fee as part of the measure of damages. The
lawyer entitled to such a fee and a lawyer representing another party concerned with the fee should
comply with the prescribed procedure.
CODE COMPARISON
The factors of a reasonable fee in Rule 1.5(a) are
substantially identical to those listed in DR 2106(B). EC 2-17 states that a lawyer "should not
charge more than a reasonable fee ...."
There was no counterpart to paragraph (b) in the
Disciplinary Rules of the Code. EC 2-19 stated
that it is "usually beneficial to reduce to writing the
understanding of the parties regarding the fee, particularly when it is contingent."
There was also no counterpart to paragraph (c) in
the Disciplinary Rules of the Code. EC 2-20 provided that "(cjontingent fee arrangements in civil
cases have long been commonly accepted ,in the
United States/ but that "a lawyer generally should
decline to accept employment on a contingent fee
basis by one who is able to pay a reasonable fixed
fee.../
With regard to paragraph (d), DR 2-106(C)
prohibited "a contingent fee in a criminal case." EC
2-20 provided that "contingent fee arrangements in
domestic relation cases are rarely justified."
With regard to paragraph (e), DR 2-107(A)
permitted division of fees only if: "(1) The client
consents to employment of the other lawyer after a
full disclosure that a division of fees will be made.
(2) The division is in proportion to the services
performed and responsibility assumed by each. (3)
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The total fee does not exceed clearly reasonable
compensation ...." Paragraph (e) permits division
without regard to the services rendered by each
lawyer if they assume joint responsibility for the
representation.

RULE 1.6 CONFIDENTIALITY OF
INFORMATION
(a) A LAWYER SHALL NOT REVEAL INFORMATION RELATING TO REPRESENTATION
OF A CLIENT EXCEPT AS STATED IN PARAGRAPH (b), UNLESS THE CLIENT CONSENTS
AFTER DISCLOSURE.
(b) A LAWYER MAY REVEAL SUCH INFORMATION TO THE EXTENT THE LAWYER
BELIEVES NECESSARY:
(1) TO PREVENT THE CLIENT FROM
COMMITTING A CRIMINAL OR FRAUDULENT ACT THAT THE LAWYER BELIEVES IS
LIKELY TO RESULT IN DEATH OR SUBSTANTIAL BODILY HARM, OR SUBSTANTIAL
INJURY TO THE FINANCIAL INTEREST OR
PROPERTY OF ANOTHER;
(2) TO RECTIFY THE CONSEQUENCES OF
A CLIENTS CRIMINAL OR FRAUDULENT
ACT IN THE COMMISSION OF WHICH THE
LAWYER'S SERVICES HAD BEEN USED;
(3) TO ESTABLISH A CLAIM OR DEFENSE
ON BEHALF OF THE LAWYER IN A CONTROVERSY BETWEEN THE LAWYER AND THE
CLIENT, OR TO ESTABLISH A DEFENSE TO A
CRIMINAL CHARGE OR CIVIL CLAIM
AGAINST THE LAWYER BASED UPON
CONDUCT IN WHICH THE CLIENT WAS
INVOLVED; OR
(4) TO COMPLY WITH THE RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT OR OTHER LAW.
COMMENT:
A fundamental principle in the client-lawyer
relationship is that the lawyer maintain confidentiality of information relating to the representation.
The client is thereby encouraged to communicate
fully and frankly with the lawyer even as to embarrassing or legally damaging subject matter.
The principle of confidentiality is given effect in
two related bodies of law, the attorney-client privilege in the law of evidence and the rule of confidentiality established in professional ethics. The
attorney-client privilege applies in judicial and
other proceedings in which a lawyer may be called
as a witness or otherwise required to produce evidence concerning a client. The rule of client-lawyer
confidentiality applies in situations other than those
where evidence is sought from the lawyer through
compulsion of law. The confidentiality rule applies
not merely to matters communicated in confidence
by the client 'but also to all information relating to
the representation, whatever its source. A lawyer
may not disclose such information except as authorized or required by the Rules of Professional
Conduct or other law.
Authorized Disclosure
A lawyer may disclose information about a client
when necessary in the proper representation of the
client. In litigation, for example, a lawyer may disclose information by admitting a fact that cannot
properly be disputed, or in negotiation by making a
disclosure that facilitates a satisfactory conclusion.
Lawyers in a firm may, in the course of the
Code • Co
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firm's practice, disclose to each other information
relating to a client of the firm, unless the client has
instructed that particular information be confined to
specified lawyers.
Disclosure Adverse to Client
The confidentiality rule is subject to limited exceptions. In becoming privy to information about a
client, a lawyer may foresee that the client intends
serious and perhaps irreparable harm to another
person. To the extent a lawyer is prohibited from
making disclosure, the interests of the potential
victim! arc sacrificed in favor of preserving the
client s confidences even though the client's
purpose is wrongful. To the extent a lawyer is required or permitted to disclose a client's purposes,
the client may be inhibited from revealing facts
which would enable the lawyer to counsel against a
wrongful course of action. A. rule governing disclosure of threatened harm thus involves balancing the
interests of one group of potential victims against
those of another. On the assumption that lawyers
generally fulfill their duty to advise against the
commission of deliberately wrongful acts, the public
is better protected if full disclosure by the client is
encouraged than if it is inhibited.
Generally speaking, information relating to the
representation must be kept confidential, as stated
in paragraph (a). However, where the client is or
has been engaged in criminal or fraudulent conduct
or the integrity o? the lawyers own conduct is involved, the principle of confidentiality may have to
yield, depending on the lawyer's knowledge about
and relationship to the conduct in question, and the
seriouiness of that conduct. Several situations must
be distinguished.
Fim, the lawyer may not counsel or assist a client
in conduct that is criminal or fraudulent. See Rule
1.2(d) As noted in the Comment to that Rule, there
can be situations where the lawyer may have to
reveal information relating to the representation in
order to avoid assisting a client's criminal or fraudulent conduct. Paragraph 1.6(b)(4) permits doing
so. Similarly, a lawyer has a duty under Rule
3.3(a)(4) not to use false or fabricated evidence.
This duty is essentially a special instance of the duty
prescribed in Rule 1.2(d) to avoid assisting a client
in criminal or fraudulent conduct. Rule 1.6(b)(4)
permits revealing information to the extent necessary
to comply with Rule 3.3(a). The same is true of
compliance with Rule 4.1 concerning truthfulness of
a lawyer's own representations.
Second, the lawyer may have been innocently
involved in nast conduct by the client that was criminal or fraudulent. In such a situation the lawyer
has not violated Rule 1.2(d), because to "counsel or
assist* criminal or fraudulent conduct requires
knowing that the conduct is of that character. Even
if the involvement was innocent, however, the fact
remains that the lawyer's professional services were
made me instrument of the client's crime or fraud.
The lawyer, therefore, has a legitimate interest in
being able to rectify the consequences of such
conduct, and has the professional right although not
a professional duty to rectify the situation. Exercising that right may require revealing information
relatink to the representation. Paragraph (b)(2) gives
the lawyer professional discretion to reveal such
information to the extent necessary to accomplish
rectification.
Third, the lawyer may learn that a client intends
prospective conduct that is criminal or fraudulent.
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Inaction by the lawyer is not a violation of Rule
1.2(d), except in the limited circumstances where
failure to act constitutes assisting the client. See
Comment to Rule 1.2(d). However, the lawyers
knowledge of the client's purpose may enable the
lawyer to prevent commission of the prospective
crime or fraud. If the prospective crime or fraud is
likely to result in substantial injury, the lawyer may
feel a moral obligation to take preventive action.
When the threatened injury is grave, such as homicide or serious bodily injury, the lawyer may have
an obligation under tort or criminal law to take
reasonable preventive measures. Whether the
lawyer's concern is based on moral or legal considerations, the interest in preventing the harm may
be more compelling than the interest in preserving
confidentiality of information relating to the client.
As stated in paragraph (b)(1), the lawyer has professional discretion to reveal information in order to
prevent substantial harm likely to result from a
client's criminal or fraudulent act.
It is arguable that the lawyer should have a professional obligation to make a disclosure in order to
prevent homicide or serious bodily injury which the
lawyer knows is intended by a client. However, it is
very difficult for a lawyer to "know" when such a
heinous purpose will actually be carried out, for the
client may have a change of mind. To require disclosure when the client intends such an act, at risk of
disciplinary liability if the assessment of the client's
purpose turns out to be wrong, would be to impose
a penal risk that might interfere with the lawyer's
resolution of an inherently difficult moral dilemma.
The lawyer's exercise of discretion requires consideration of such factors as the magnitude, proximity and likelihood of the contemplated wrong, the
nature of the lawyer's relationship with the client
and with those who might be injured by the client,
the lawyer's own involvement in the transaction and
factors that may extenuate the conduct in question.
In any case, a disclosure adverse to the client's interest should be no greater that the lawyer believes
necessary to the purpose. A lawyer's decision not to
take preventive action permitted by paragraph (b)(1)
does not violate this Rule.
The term "another" in paragraph (b)(1) includes a
person, organization and government.
Paragraph (b)(2) does not apply where a lawyer is
employed after a crime of fraud has been committed
to represent the client in matters ensuing therefrom.
Dispute Concerning Lawyer's Conduct
If the lawyer is charged with wrongdoing in which
the client's conduct is implicated, the rule of confidentiality should not prevent the lawyer from defending himself. Such a charge can arise in a civil,
criminal or professional disciplinary proceeding, and
can be based on a wrong allegedly committed by the
lawyer against the client, or on a wrong alleged by a
third person; for example, a person claiming to have
been defrauded by the lawyer and client acting together. A lawyer entitled to a fee is not prevented by
the rule of confidentiality from proving the services
rendered in an action to collect it.
Disclosures Otherwise Required or Authorized
The attorney-client privilege is differently
defined in various jurisdictions. If a lawyer is called
as a witness to give testimony concerning a client,
absent waiver by the client, Rule 1.6(a) requires the
lawyer to invoke the privilege when it is applicable.
The Rules of Professional Conduct in various
circumstances permit or require a lawyer to disclose
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information relating to the representation. See Rules
1.13, 2.2, 2.3, 3.3 and 4.1. In addition to these
provisions, a lawyer may be obligated or permitted
by other provisions of law to give information about
a client. Whether another provision of law supersedes Rule 1.6 is a matter of interpretation beyond
the scope of these Rules, but a presumption should
exist against such a supersession.
Use of Information
A lawyer may not make use of information relating to the representation in a manner disadvantageous to the client. The duty of confidentiality continues after the client-lawyer relationship has terminated. See Rule 1.9.

RULE 1.7 CONFLICT OF INTEREST:
GENERAL RULE
(a) A LAWYER SHALL NOT REPRESENT A
CLIENT IF THE REPRESENTATION OF THAT
CLIENT WILL BE DIRECTLY ADVERSE TO
ANOTHER CLIENT, UNLESS:
(1) THE LAWYER REASONABLY BELIEVES THE REPRESENTATION WILL NOT
ADVERSELY AFFECT THE RELATIONSHIP
WITH THE OTHER CLIENT; AND
(2) EACH CLIENT CONSENTS AFTER
CONSULTATION.
(b) A LAWYER SHALL NOT REPRESENT A
CLIENT IF THE REPRESENTATION OF THAT
CLIENT MAY BE MATERIALLY LIMITED BY
THE LAWYER'S RESPONSIBILITIES TO
ANOTHER CLIENT OR TO A THIRD PERSON,
OR BY THE LAWYER'S OWN INTERESTS,
UNLESS:
(1) THE LAWYER REASONABLY BELIEVES THE REPRESENTATION WILL NOT BE
ADVERSELY AFFECTED; AND
(2) EACH CLIENT CONSENTS AFTER
CONSULTATION. WHEN REPRESENTATION
OF MULTIPLE CLIENTS IN A SINGLE
MATTER IS UNDERTAKEN, THE CONSULTATION SHALL INCLUDE EXPLANATION TO
EACH CLIENT OF THE IMPLICATIONS OF
THE COMMON REPRESENTATION AND THE
ADVANTAGES AND RISKS INVOLVED.
(c) A LAWYER SHALL NOT SIMULTANEOUSLY REPRESENT THE INTERESTS OF
ADVERSE PARTIES IN SEPARATE MATTERS,
UNLESS:
(1) THE LAWYER REASONABLY BELIEVES THE REPRESENTATION OF EACH WILL
NOT BE ADVERSELY AFFECTED; AND
(2) EACH CLIENT CONSENTS AFTER
CONSULTATION.
COMMENT:
Loyalty to a Client
Loyalty is an essential element in the lawyer's
relationship to a client. An impermissible conflict of
interest may exist before representation is undertaken, in which event the representation should be
declined. If such a conflict arises after representation has been undertaken, the lawyer should withdraw from the representation. See Rule 1.14. Where
more than one client is involved and the lawyer
withdraws because a conflict arises after representation, whether the lawyer may continue to represent
any of the clients is determined by Rule 1.9. See
also Rule 2.2(c). As to whether a client-lawyer
relationship exists or, having once been established,
RFPORTS

is continuing, see Comment to Rule 1.3 and Scope.
As a general proposition, loyalty to a client prohibits undertaking representation directly adverse to
that client without the client's consent. Paragraph
(1) expresses that general rule. Thus, a lawyer ordinarily may not act as advocate against a person the
lawyer represents in some other matter, even if it is
wholly tmrelated. On the other hand, simultaneous
representation in unrelated matters of clients whose
interests are only generally adverse, such as competing economic enterprises, does not require consent
of the respective clients. Paragraph (a) applies only
when the representation of one client would be directly adverse to the other.
Loyalty to a client is also impaired when a lawyer
cannot consider, recommend or carry out an appropriate course of action for the client because of the
lawyer's other responsibilities or interests. The
conflict in effect forecloses alternatives that would
otherwise be available to the client. Paragraph (b)
addresses such situations. A possible conflict does
not itself preclude the representation. The critical
questions are the likelihood that a conflict will eventuate and, if it does, whether it will materially
interfere with the lawyer's independent professional
judgment in considering alternatives or foreclose
courses of action that reasonably should be pursued
on behalf of the client. Consideration should be
given to whether the client wishes to accommodate
the other interest involved.
Consultation and Consent
A client may consent to representation notwithstanding a conflict. However, as indicated in paragraph (a)(1) with respect to representation directly
adverse to a client, and paragraph (b)(1) with
respect to material, limitations on representation of a
client, when a disinterested lawyer would conclude
that the client should not agree to the representation
under the circumstances, the lawyer involved cannot
properly ask for such agreement or provide representation on the basis of the client's consent. When
more than one client is involved, the question of
conflict must be resolved as to each client. Moreover, there may be circumstances where it is impossible to make the disclosure necessary to obtain
consent. For example, when the lawyer represents
different clients in related matters and one of the
clients refuses to consent to the disclosure necessary
to permit the other client to make an informed
. decision, the lawyer cannot properly ask the latter to
consent.
Lawyer's Interests
The lawyer's own interests should not be permitted to have adverse effect on representation of a
client. For example, a lawyer's need for income
should not lead the lawyer to undertake matters that
cannot be handled competently and at a reasonable
fee. See Rules 1.1 and 1.5. If the probity of a
lawyer's own conduct in a transaction is in serious
question, it may be difficult or impossible for the
lawyer to give a client detached advice. A lawyer
may not allow related business interests to affect
representation, for example, by referring clients to
an enterprise in which the lawyer has an undisclosed
interest.
Conflicts in Litigation
Paragraph (a) prohibits representation of opposing parties in litigation. Simultaneous representation of parties whose interests in litigation may
conflict, such as co-plaintiffs or co-defendants, is
Code«Co
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governed by paragraph (b). An impermissible conflict may exist by reason of substantial discrepancy in
the parties' testimony, incompatibility in positions
in relation to an opposing party or the fact that
the™ are substantially different possibilities of settlement of the claims or liabilities in question. Such
conflicts can arise in criminal cases as well as civil.
The potential for conflict of interest in representing s
multiple defendants in a criminal case is so grave
that ordinarily a lawyer should decline to represent
mori than one codefendant. On the other hand,
common representation of persons having similar
interests is proper if the risk of adverse affect is
minimal and the requirements of paragraph (b) are
met. Compare Rule 2.2 involving intermediation
between clients.
Ordinarily, a lawyer may not act as advocate
against a client the lawyer represents in some other
matter, even if the other matter is wholly unrelated.
However, there are circumstances in which a lawyer
may aci
act as
as an
an auvucaic
advocate against
client. For
may
against aa ciicni.
rur
example, a lawyer representing an enterprise with
diverse operations may accept employment as an
advocate against the enterprise in an unrelated
matter if doing so will not adversely affect the
lawyer's relationship with the enterprise or conduct
of the suit and if both clients consent upon consultation. By the same token, government lawyers in
some circumstances may represent government
employees in proceedings in which a government
agency is the opposing party. The propriety of
concurrent representation can depend on the nature
of the litigation. For example, a suit charging fraud
entails conflict to a degree not involved in a suit for
a declaratory judgment concerning statutory interpretation.
A lawyer may represent parties having antagonistic positions on a legal question that has arisen in
different cases, unless representation of either client
would be adversely affected. Thus, it is ordinarily
not improper to assert such positions in cases
penaing in different trial courts, but it may be
improper to do so in cases pending at the same time
in an appellate court.
Interest of Person Paying for Lawyer's Service
A lawyer may be paid from a source other than
the client if the client is informed of that fact and
consents and the arrangement does not compromise
the lawyer's duty of loyalty to the client. Sec Rule
1.8l
8(f) For example, when an insurer and its insured
havd conflicting interests in a matter arising from a
liability insurance agreement, and the insurer is
required to provide separate counsel for the insured,
arrangement should assure the separate
counsel's professional independence. So also, when
corporation and its directors or employees are
involved in a controversy in which they have conflicting interests, the corporation may provide funds
for separate legal representation of the directors or
em]pjoyees, if the clients consent after consultation
and the arrangement ensures the lawyer's professionall independence.
Other Conflict Situations
Conflicts of interest in contexts other than litigation sometimes may be difficult to assess. Relevant
factirs in determining whether there is potential for
adverse effect include the duration and intimacy of
the fawyer's relationship with the client or clients
involved the functions being performed by the
lawyeir, the likelihood that actual conflict will arise
and the likely prejudice to the client from the con-
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flict if it does arise. The question is often one of
proximity and degree.
For example, a lawyer may not represent multiple
parties to a negotiation whose interests are fundamentally antagonistic to each other but common
representation is permissible where the clients are
generally aligned in interest even though there is
some difference of interest among them.
Conflict questions may also arise in estate planning and estate administration. A lawyer may be
called upon to prepare wills for several family
members, such as husband and wife, and, depending
upon the circumstances, a conflict of interest may
arise. In estate administration the identity of the
client may be unclear under the law of a particular
jurisdiction. Under one view, the client is the fiduciary; under another view the client is the estate or
trust, including its beneficiaries. The lawyer should
make clear the relationship to the parties involved.
A lawyer for a corporation or other organization
who is also a member of its board of directors
should determine whether the responsibilities of the
two roles may conflict. The lawyer may be called on
to advise the corporation in matters involving
actions of the directors. Consideration should be
given to the frequency with which such situations
may arise, the potential intensity of the conflict, the
effect of the lawyer's resignation from the board
and the possibility of the corporation's obtaining
legal advice from another lawyer in such situations.
If there is material risk that the dual role will compromise the lawyer's independence of professional
judgment, the lawyer should not serve as a director.
Conflict Charged by an Opposing Party
Resolving questions of conflict of interest is primarily the responsibility of the lawyer undertaking
the representation. In litigation, a court may raise
the question when there is reason to infer that the
lawyer has neglected the responsibility. In a criminal
case, inquiry by the court is generally required when
a lawyer represents multiple defendants. Where the
conflict is such as clearly to call in question the fair
or efficient administration of justice, opposing
counsel may properly raise the question. Such an
objection should be viewed with caution, however,
for it can be misused as a technique of harassment.
See Scope.
CODE COMPARISON
DR 5-101 (A) provided that "[e]xcept with the
consent of his client after full disclosure, a lawyer
shall not accept employment if the exercise of his
professional judgment in behalf of the client will be
or reasonably may be affected by his own financial,
business, property, or personal interests." DR 5105(A) provided that a lawyer "shall decline preferred employment if the exercise of his independent
professional judgment in behalf of a client will be or
is likely to be adversely affected by the acceptance
of the proferred employment, or if it would be
likely to involve him in representing differing interests, except to the extent permitted under DR 5105(C)/ DR 5-105(C) provided that "a lawyer may
represent multiple clients if it was obvious that he
can adequately represent the interest of each and if
each consents to the representation after full disclosure of the possible effect of such representation
on the exercise of his independent professional
judgment on behalf of each/ DR 5-107(B) provided that a lawyer "shall not permit a person who
recommends, employs, or pays him to render legal
services for another to direct or regulate his profe-
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ssional judgment in rendering such services.
Ruie 1.7 clarifies DR 5-105(A) b> requiring that,
when the lawyer's other interests are involved, not
only must the client consent after consultation but
also that, independent of such consent, the representation reasonably appears not to be adversely
affected by the lawyer's other interests. This requirement appears to be the intended meaning of the
provision in DR 5-105(C) that "it was obvious that
he can adequately represent" the client, and was
implicit in EC 5-2, which stated that a lawyer
"should not accept proferred employment if his
personal interests or desires will, or there is a reasonable probability that they will, affect adversely
the advice to be given or services to be rendered the
prospective client."

RULE 1-8 CONFLICT OF INTEREST:
PROHIBITED TRANSACTIONS
(a) A LAWYER SHALL NOT ENTER INTO A
BUSINESS TRANSACTION WITH A CLIENT
OR KNOWINGLY ACQUIRE AN OWNERSHIP,
POSSESSORY, SECURITY OR OTHER PECUNIARY INTEREST ADVERSE TO A CLIENT
UNLESS:
(1) THE TRANSACTION AND TERMS ON
WHICH THE LAWYER ACQUIRES THE INTEREST ARE FAIR AND REASONABLE TO THE
CLIENT AND ARE FULLY DISCLOSED AND
TRANSMITTED IN WRITING TO THE CLIENT
IN A MANNER WHICH CAN BE REASONABLY
UNDERSTOOD BY THE CLIENT; AND
(2) THE CLIENT IS GIVEN A REASONABLE OPPORTUNITY TO SEEK THE ADVICE
OF INDEPENDENT COUNSEL IN THE TRANSACTION; AND
(3) THE CLIENT CONSENTS IN WRITING
THERETO.
(b) A LAWYER SHALL NOT USE INFORMATION RELATING TO REPRESENTATION OF
A CLIENT TO THE DISADVANTAGE OF THE
CLIENT UNLESS THE CLIENT CONSENTS
AFTER CONSULTATION.
(c) A LAWYER SHALL NOT PREPARE AN
INSTRUMENT GIVING THE LAWYER OR A
PERSON RELATED TO THE LAWYER AS
PARENT, CHILD, SIBLING, OR SPOUSE ANY
SUBSTANTIAL GIFT FROM A CLIENT, INCLUDING A TESTAMENTARY GIFT, EXCEPT .
WHERE THE CLIENT IS RELATED TO THE
DONEE.
(d) PRIOR TO THE CONCLUSION OF REPRESENTATION OF A CLIENT, A LAWYER
SHALL NOT MAKE OR NEGOTIATE AN
AGREEMENT GIVING THE LAWYER LITERARY OR MEDIA RIGHTS TO A PORTRAYAL
OR ACCOUNT BASED IN SUBSTANTIAL PART
ON INFORMATION RELATING TO THE REPRESENTATION.
(e) A LAWYER SHALL NOT PROVIDE FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE TO A CLIENT IN CONNECTION WITH PENDING OR CONTEMPLATED LITIGATION, EXCEPT THAT:
(1) A LAWYER MAY ADVANCE COURT
COSTS AND EXPENSES OF LITIGATION THE
REPAYMENT OF WHICH MAY BE CONTINGENT ON THE OUTCOME OF THE MATTER;
AND
(2) A LAWYER REPRESENTING AN INDIGENT CLIENT MAY PAY COURT COSTS AND
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EXPENSES OF LITIGATION ON BEHALF OF
THE CLIENT.
(0 A LAWYER SHALL NOT ACCEPT COMPENSATION FOR REPRESENTING A CLIENT
FROM ONE OTHER THAN THE CLIENT
UNLESS:
(i) THE CLIENT CONSENTS AFTER CONSULTATION;
(2) THERE IS NO INTERFERENCE WITH
THE LAWYER'S INDEPENDENCE OF PROFESSIONAL JUDGMENT OR WITH THE CLIENTLAWYER RELATIONSHIP; AND
(3) INFORMATION RELATING TO REPRESENTATION OF A CLIENT IS PROTECTED
AS REQUIRED BY RULE 1.6.
(g) A LAWYER WHO REPRESENTS TWO OR
MORE CLIENTS SHALL NOT PARTICIPATE IN
MAKING AN AGGREGATE SETTLEMENT OF
THE CLAIMS OF OR AGAINST THE CLIENTS,
OR IN A CRIMINAL CASE AN AGGREGATED
AGREEMENT AS TO GUILTY OR NOLO CONTENDERE PLEAS, UNLESS EACH CLIENT
CONSENTS AFTER CONSULTATION, INCLUDING DISCLOSURE OF THE EXISTENCE AND
NATURE OF ALL THE CLAIMS OR PLEAS
INVOLVED AND OF THE PARTICIPATION OF
EACH PERSON IN THE SETTLEMENT.
(h) A LAWYER SHALL NOT MAKE AN
AGREEMENT PROSPECTIVELY LIMITING
THE LAWYER'S LIABILITY TO A CLIENT
FOR MALPRACTICE UNLESS PERMITTED BY
LAW AND THE CLIENT IS INDEPENDENTLY
REPRESENTED IN MAKING THE AGREEMENT, OR SETTLE A CLAIM FOR SUCH LIABILITY WITH AN UNREPRESENTED CLIENT
OR FORMER CLIENT WITHOUT FIRST ADVISING THAT PERSON IN WRITING THAT
INDEPENDENT REPRESENTATION IS APPROPRIATE IN CONNECTION THEREWITH.
(i) A LAWYER RELATED TO ANOTHER
LAWYER AS PARENT, CHILD, SIBLING OR
SPOUSE SHALL NOT REPRESENT A CLIENT
IN A REPRESENTATION DIRECTLY ADVERSE
TO A PERSON WHO THE LAWYER KNOWS IS
REPRESENTED BY THE OTHER LAWYER
EXCEPT UPON CONSENT BY THE CLIENT
AFTER CONSULTATION REGARDING THE
RELATIONSHIP.
0) A LAWYER SHALL NOT ACQUIRE A
PROPRIETARY INTEREST IN THE CAUSE OF
ACTION OR SUBJECT MATTER OF LITIGATION THE LAWYER IS CONDUCTING FOR A
CLIENT. EXCEPT THAT THE LAWYER MAY:
(1) ACQUIRE A LIEN GRANTED BY LAW
TO SECURE THE LAWYER'S FEE OR EXPENSES; AND
(2) CONTRACT WITH A CLIENT FOR A
REASONABLE CONTINGENT FEE IN A CIVIL
CASE.
COMMENT:
Transactions Between Client and Lawyer
As a general principle, all transactions between
client and lawyer should be fair and reasonable to
the client. In such transactions a review by independent counsel on behalf of the client is often advisable. Furthermore, a lawyer may not exploit information relating to the representation to the client's
disadvantage. For example, a lawyer who has
learned that the client is investing in specific real
estate may not, without the client's consent, seek to
acquire nearby property where doing so would
Code • Co
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adversely affect the client's plan for investment.
Paragraph (a) does not, however, apply to standard
commercial transactions between the lawyer and the
client for products or services that the client generally markets to others, for example, banking or
brokerage services, medical services, products manufactured or distributed by the client, and utilities
serv ces. In such transactions, the lawyer has no
advantage in dealing with the client, and the restrictions in paragraph (a) are unnecessary and impracticable.
A J lawyer may accept a gift from a client, if the
transaction meets general standards of fairness. For
example, a simple gift such as a present given at a
holiday or as a token of appreciation is permitted.
If effectuation of a substantial gift requires preparing a legal instrument such as a will or conveyance,
howkver, the client should have the detached advice
that another lawyer can provide. Paragraph (c)
recognizes an exception where the client is a relative
of the donee or the gift is not substantial.
Literary Rights
An agreement by which a lawyer acquires literary
or media rights concerning the conduct of the representation creates a conflict between the interests of
the client and the personal interests of the lawyer.
Measures suitable in the representation of the client
may detract from the publication value of an
account of the representation. Paragraph (d) does
not prohibit a lawyer representing a client in a transaction concerning literary property from agreeing
that the lawyer's fee shall consist of a share in
ownership in the property, if the arrangement conforms to Rule 1.5 and paragraph (j).
Person Paying for Lawyer's Services
Rule 1.8(0 requires disclosure of the fact that the
lawyer's services are being paid for by a third party.
Such an arrangement must also conform to the
requirements of Rule 1.6 concerning confidentiality
and Rule 1.7 concerning conflict of interest. Where
the client is a class, consent may be obtained on
behalf of the class by court-supervised procedure.
Family Relationships Between Lawyers
Rule 1 .SCO applies to related lawyers who are in
different firms. Related lawyers in the same firm are
governed by Rules 1.7, 1.9, and 1.10. The disqualification stated in Rule 1.8(i) is personal and is not
imputed to members of firms with whom the
lawyers are associated.
Acquisition of Interest in Litigation
Paragraph (j) states the traditional general rule
that lawyers are prohibited from acquiring a proprietary interest in litigation. This general rule, which
has its basis in common law champerty and maintenance, is subject to specific exceptions developed in
decisional law and continued in these Rules, such as
the exception for reasonable contingent fees set
fortn in Rule 1.5 and the exception for certain
advances of the costs of litigation set forth in paragraph (e).
This Rule is not intended to apply to customary
qualifications and limitations in legal opinions and
memoranda.
CO^>E COMPARISON
with regard to Paragraph (a), DR 5-104(A)
provided that a lawyer "shall not enter into a business transaction with a client if they have differing
interests therein and if the client expects the lawyer
to exercise his professional judgment therein for the
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protection of the client, unless the client has consented after full disclosure." EC 5-3 stated that a
lawyer "should not seek to persuade his client to
permit him to invest in an undertaking of his client
nor make improper use of his professional relationship to influence his client to invest in an enterprise
in which the lawyer is interested."
With regard to paragraph (b), DR 4-101(B)(3)
provided that a lawyer should not use "a confidence
or secret of his client for the advantage of himself,
or of a third person, unless the client consents after
full disclosure.?
There was no counterpart to paragraph (c) in the
Disciplinary Rules of the Code. EC 5-5 stated that
a lawyer "should not suggest to his client that a gift
be made to himself or for his benefit. If a lawyer
accepts a gift from his client, he is peculiarly susceptible to the charge that he unduly influenced or
overreached the client. If a client voluntarily offers
to make a gift to his lawyer, the lawyer may accept
the gift, but before doing so, he should urge that
the client secure disinterested advice from an independent, competent person who is cognizant of all
the circumstances. Other than in exceptional circumstances, a lawyer should insist that an instrument
in which his client desires to name him beneficially
be prepared by another lawyer selected by the
client."
Paragraph (d) is substantially similar to DR 5104(B), but refers, to "literary or media" rights, a
more generally inclusive term than "publication"
rights.
Paragraph (e)(1) is similar to DR 5-103(B), but
eliminates the requirement that "the client remains
ultimately liable for such expenses."
Paragraph (e)(2) has no counterpart in the Code.
Paragraph (f) is substantially identical to DR 5107(A)(1).
Paragraph (g) is substantially identical to DR 5106.
The first clause of paragraph (h) is similar to DR
6-102(A). There was no .counterpart in the Code to
the second clause of paragraph (h).
Paragraph (i) has no counterpart in the Code.
Paragraph (j) is substantially identical to DR 5103(A).

RULE 1.9 CONFLICT OF INTEREST:
FORMER CLIENT
A LAWYER WHO HAS FORMERLY REPRESENTED A CLIENT IN A MATTER SHALL NOT
THEREAFTER:
(a) REPRESENT ANOTHER PERSON IN THE
SAME OR A SUBSTANTIALLY FACTUALLY
RELATED MATTER IN WHICH THAT
PERSON'S INTERESTS ARE MATERIALLY
ADVERSE TO THE INTERESTS OF THE
FORMER CLIENT UNLESS THE FORMER
CLIENT CONSENTS AFTER CONSULTATION;
OR
(b) USE INFORMATION RELATING TO THE
REPRESENTATION TO THE DISADVANTAGE
OF THE FORMER CLIENT EXCEPT AS RULE
1.6 WOULD PERMIT WITH RESPECT TO A
CLIENT OR WHEN THE INFORMATION HAS
BECOME GENERALLY KNOWN.

1.7 determine whether the interests of the present
and former client are adverse. Thus, a lawyer could
not properly seek to rescind on behalf of a new
client a contract drafted on behalf of the former
client. So also a lawyer who has prosecuted an
accused person could not properly represent the
accused in a subsequent civil action against the
government concerning the same transaction.
The scope of a "matter" for purposes of Rule
1.9(a) may depend on the facts of a particular situation or transaction. The lawyer's involvement in a
matter can also be a question of degree. When a
lawyer has been directly involved in a specific transaction, subsequent representation of other clients
with materially adverse interests clearly is prohibited. On the other hand, a lawyer who recurrently
handled a type of problem for a former client is not
precluded from later representing another client in a
wholly distinct problem of that type even though the
subsequent representation involves a position
adverse to the prior client. Similar considerations
can apply to the reassignment of military lawyers
between defense and prosecution functions within
the same military jurisdiction. The underlying question is whether the lawyer was so involved in the
matter that the subsequent representation can be
justly regarded as a changing of sides in the matter
in question.
Information acquired by the lawyer in the course
of representing a client may not subsequently be
used by the lawyer to the disadvantage of the client.
However, the fact that a lawyer has once served a
client doe§ not preclude the lawyer from using generally known information about the client when
later representing another client.
Disqualification from subsequent representation is
for the protection of clients and can be waived by
them. A waiver is effective only if there is disclosure
of the circumstances, including the lawyer's intended role in behalf of the new client.
With regard to an opposing party's raising a
question of conflict of interest, see Comment to
Rule 1.7. With regard to disqualification of a firm
with which a lawyer is associated, see Rule 1.10.
CODE COMPARISON
There was no counterpart to paragraphs (a) and
(b) in the Disciplinary Rules of the Code. The
problem addressed in paragraph (a) was sometimes
dealt with under the rubric of Canon 9 of the Code,
which provided: "A lawyer should avoid even the
appearance of impropriety." EC 4-6 stated that the
"obligation of a lawyer to preserve the confidences
and secrets of his client continues after the termination of his employment."
The provision in paragraph (a) for waiver by the
former client is similar to DR 5-105(C).
The exception in the last sentence of paragraph
(b) permits a lawyer to use information relating to a
former client that is in the "public domain," a use
that was also not prohibited by the Code, which
protected only "confidences and secrets." Since the
scope of paragraph (a) is much broader than
"confidences and secrets," it is necessary under the
Rules to define when a lawyer may make use of
information about a client after the client-lawyer
relationship has terminated.

COMMENT:
After termination of a client-lawyer relationship,
a lawyer may not represent another client except in
conformity with this Rule. The principles in Rule
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RULE 1.10 IMPUTED
DISQUALIFICATION: GENERAL
RULE
(a) WHILE LAWYERS ARE ASSOCIATED IN
A FIRM, NONE OF THEM SHALL KNOWINGLY REPRESENT A CLIENT WHEN ANY
ONE OF THEM PRACTICING ALONE WOULD
BE PROHIBITED FROM DOING SO BY RULES
1.7, 1.8(c), 1.9 OR 2.2.
(b) WHEN A LAWYER BECOMES ASSOCIATED WITH A FIRM, THE FIRM MAY NOT
KNOWINGLY REPRESENT A PERSON IN THE
SAME OR A SUBSTANTIALLY FACTUALLY
RELATED MATTER IN WHICH THAT
LAWYER, OR A FIRM WITH WHICH THE
LAWYER WAS ASSOCIATED, HAD PREVIOUSLY REPRESENTED A CLIENT WHOSE
INTERESTS ARE MATERIALLY ADVERSE TO
THAT PERSON AND ABOUT WHOM THE
LAWYER HAD ACQUIRED INFORMATION
PROTECTED BY RULES 1.6 AND 1.9(b) THAT
IS MATERIAL TO THE MATTER.
(c) WHEN A LAWYER HAS TERMINATED
AN ASSOCIATION WITH A FIRM, THE FIRM
IS NOT PROHIBITED FROM THEREAFTER
REPRESENTING A PERSON WITH INTERESTS
MATERIALLY ADVERSE TO THOSE OF A
CLIENT REPRESENTED BY THE FORMERLY
ASSOCIATED LAWYER UNLESS:
(1) THE MATTER IS THE SAME OR SUBSTANTIALLY RELATED TO THAT IN WHICH
THE FORMERLY ASSOCIATED LAWYER
REPRESENTED THE CLIENT; AND
(2) ANY LAWYER REMAINING IN THE
FIRM HAS INFORMATION PROTECTED BY
RULES 1.6 AND 1.9(b) THAT IS MATERIAL TO
THE MATTER.
(d) A DISQUALIFICATION PRESCRIBED BY
THIS RULE MAY BE WAIVED BY THE AFFECTED CLIENT UNDER THE CONDITIONS
STATED IN RULE 1.7.
COMMENT:
Definition of "Firm"

For purposes of the Rules of Professional
Conduct, the term "firm* includes lawyers in a
private firm, and lawyers employed in the legal
department of a corporation or other organization,
or in a legal services organization. Whether two or
more lawyers constitute a firm within this definition
can depend on the specific facts. For example, two
practitioners who share office space and occasionally consult or assist each other ordinarily would not
be regarded as constituting a firm. However, if they
present themselves to the public in a way suggesting
that they are a firm or conduct themselves as a firm,
they should be regarded as a firm for purposes of
the Rules. The terms of any formal' agreement
between associated lawyers are relevant in determining whether they are a firm, as is the fact that they
have mutual access to confidential information
concerning the clients they serve. Furthermore, it is
relevant in doubtful cases to consider the underlying
purpose of the rule that is involved. A group of
lawyers could be regarded as a firm for purposes of
the rule that the same lawyer should not represent
opposing parties in litigation, while it might not be
so regarded for purposes of the rule that information acquired by one lawyer is attributed to another.
Ccx^
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With respect to the law department of an organisation there is ordinarily no question that the
members of the department constitute a firm within
the meaning of the Rules of Professional Conduct.
However, there can be uncertainty as to the identity
of the client. For example, it may not be clear
whether the law department of a corporation represents a subsidiary or an affiliated corporation, as
well as the corporation by which the members of the
department are directly employed. A similar question can arise concerning an unincorporated association and its local affiliates.
Similar questions can also arise with respect to
lawyeri in legal aid. Lawyers employed in the same
unit of a legal service organization constitute a firm,
but not necessarily those employed in separate units.
As in the case of independent practitioners, whether
the lawyers should be treated as associated with each
other can depend on the particular rule that is involved, and on the specific facts of the situation.
Where the lawyer has joined a private firm after
having represented the government, the situation is
governed by Rule 1.11(a) and (b); where a lawyer
represents the government after having served
private clients, the situation is governed by Rule
1.11(c)(1). The individual lawyer involved is bound
by the Rules generally, including Rules 1.6, 1.7, and
1.9.
Different provisions are thus made for movement
of a lawyer from one private firm to another and
for movement of a lawyer between a private firm
and the government. The government is entitled to
protection of its client confidences, and therefore to
the protections provided in Rules 1.6, 1.9, and 1.11.
However, if the more extensive disqualification in
Rule 1.10 were applied to former government
lawyers, the potential effect on the government
would be unduly burdensome. The government deals
with all private citizens and organizations, and thus
has a much wider circle of adverse legal interests
than does any private law firm. In these circumstances, the government's recruitment of lawyers
would be seriously impaired if Rule 1.10 were
applied to the government. On balance, therefore,
the government is better served in the long run by
the protections stated in Rule 1.11.
Principles of Imputed Disqualification
The rule of imputed disqualification stated in
para]grjaph (a) gives effect to the principle of loyalty
to the client as it applies to lawyers who practice in
a law firm. Such situations can be considered from
the premise that a firm of lawyers is essentially one
lawyeij for purposes of the rules governing loyalty to
the client, or from the premises that each lawyer is
vicariously bound by the obligation of loyalty owed
lawyer with whom the lawyer is associated.
by
Paragraph (a) operates only among lawyers currently associated in a firm. When a lawyer moves
from one firm to another, the situation is governed
by paragraphs (b) and (c).
Lawyers Moving Between Firms
When lawyers have been associated in a firm but
then end their association, however, the problem is
more complicated. The fiction that the law firm is
the same as a single lawyer is no longer wholly realistic. There are several competing considerations.
First, the client previously represented must be reasonably assured that the principle of loyalty to the
client lis not compromised. Second, the rule of disqualification should not be as broadly cast as to
preclude other persons from having reasonable
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choice of legal counsel. Third, the rule of disqualification should not unreasonably hamper lawyers
from forming new associations and taking on new
clients after having left a previous association. In
this connection, it should be recognized that today
many lawyers practice in firms, that many to some
degree limit their practice to one field or another,
and that many move from one association to
another several times in their careers. If the concept
of imputed disqualification were defined with unqualified rigor, the result would be radical curtailment of the opportunity of lawyers to move from
one practice setting to another and of the opportunity of clients to change counsel.'
Reconciliation of these competing principles in the
past has been attempted under two rubrics. One
approach has been to seek per se rules of disqualification. For example, it has been held that a partner
in a law firm is conclusively presumed to have
access to all confidences concerning all clients of the
firm. Under this analysis, if a lawyer has been a
partner in one law firm and then becomes a partner
in another law firm, there is a presumption that all
confidences known by a partner in the first firm are
known to all partners in the second firm. This presumption might properly be applied in some circumstances, especially where the client has been extensively represented, but may be unrealistic where the
client was represented only for limited purposes.
Furthermore, such a rigid rule exaggerates the difference between a partner and an associate in modern
law firms.
The other rubric formerly used for dealing with
vicarious disqualification is the appearance of impropriety proscribed in Canon 9 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. This rubric has a
twofold problem. First, the appearance of impropriety can be taken to include any new client-lawyer
relationship that might make a former client
anxious. If that meaning were adopted, disqualification would become little more than a question of
subjective judgment by the former client. Second,
since "impropriety" is undefined, the term
"appearance of impropriety" is question-begging.
It therefore has to be recognized that the problem of
imputed disqualification cannot be properly resolved
either by simple analogy to a lawyer practicing alone
or by the very general concept of appearance of
impropriety.
A rule based on a functional analysis is more
appropriate for determining the question of vicarious disqualification. Two functions are involved:
preserving confidentiality and avoiding positions
adverse to a client.
Confidentiality
Preserving confidentiality is a question of access
to information. Access to information, in turn, is
essentially a question of fact in particular circumstances, aided by inferences, deductions or working
presumptions that reasonably may be made about
the way in which lawyers work together. A lawyer
may have general access to files of all clients of a
law firm and may regularly participate in discussions
of their affairs; it should be inferred that such a
lawyer in fact is privy to ail information about all
the firm's clients. In contrast, another lawyer may
have access to the files of only a limited number of
clients and participate in discussion of the affairs of
no other clients; in the absence of information to
the contrary, it should be inferred that such a
lawyer in fact is privy to information about the
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clients actually served but not those of other clients.
Application of paragraphs (b) and (c) depends on
a situation's particular facts. In any such inquiry,
the burden of proof should rest upon the firm
whose disqualification is sought.
Paragraphs (b) and (c) operate to disqualify the
firm only when the lawyer involved has actual
knowledge of information protected by Rules 1.6
and 1.9(b). Thus, if a lawyer while with one firm
acquired no knowledge of information relating to a
particular client of the firm, and that lawyer later
joined another firm, neither the lawyer individually
nor the second firm is disqualified from representing
another client in the same or a related matter even
though the interests of the two clients conflict.
Independent of the question of disqualification of
a firm, a lawyer changing professional association
has a continuing duty to preserve confidentiality of
information about a client formerly represented. See
Rules 1.6 and 1.9.
Adverse Positions
The second aspect of loyalty to client is the
lawyer's obligation to decline subsequent representations involving positions adverse to a former client
arising in substantially related matters. This obligation requires abstention from adverse representation
by the individual lawyer involved, but does not
properly entail abstention of other lawyers through
imputed disqualification. Hence, this aspect of the
problem is governed by Rule 1.9(a). Thus, if a
lawyer left one firm for another, the new affiliation
would not preclude the firms involved from continuing to represent clients with adverse interests in
the same or related matters, so long as the conditions of Rule 1.10(b) and (c) concerning confidentiality have been met.
CODE COMPARISON
DR 5-105(D) provided that "[i]f a lawyer is
required to decline or to withdraw from employment
under a Disciplinary Rule, no partner, or associate,
or any other lawyer affiliated with him or his firm,
may accept or continue such employment."

RULE 1.11 SUCCESSIVE
GOVERNMENT AND PRIVATE
EMPLOYMENT
(a) EXCEPT AS LAW MAY OTHERWISE
EXPRESSLY PERMIT, A LAWYER SHALL NOT
REPRESENT A PRIVATE CLIENT IN CONNECTION WITH A MATTER IN WHICH THE
LAWYER PARTICIPATED PERSONALLY AND
SUBSTANTIALLY AS A PUBLIC OFFICER OR
EMPLOYEE, UNLESS THE APPROPRIATE
GOVERNMENT AGENCY CONSENTS AFTER
CONSULTATION. NO LAWYER IN A FIRM
WITH WHICH THAT LAWYER IS ASSOCIATED MAY KNOWINGLY UNDERTAKE OR
CONTINUE REPRESENTATION IN SUCH A
MATTER UNLESS:
(1) THE DISQUALIFIED LAWYER IS SCREENED FROM ANY PARTICIPATION IN THE
MATTER AND IS APPORTIONED NO PART OF
THE FEE THEREFROM; AND
(2) WRITTEN NOTICE IS PROMPTLY
GIVEN TO THE APPROPRIATE GOVERNMENT AGENCY TO ENABLE IT TO ASCERTAIN COMPLIANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS
OF THIS RULE.
(b) EXCEPT AS LAW MAY OTHERWISE
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EXPRESSLY PERMIT, A LAWYER HAVING
INFORMATION THAT THE LAWYER KNOWS
IS CONFIDENTIAL GOVERNMENT INFORMATION ABOUT A PERSON ACQUIRED WHEN
THE LAWYER WAS A PUBLIC OFFICER OR
EMPLOYEE, MAY NOT REPRESENT A
PRIVATE CLIENT WHOSE INTERESTS ARE
ADVERSE TO THAT PERSON IN A MATTER
IN WHICH THE INFORMATION COULD BE
USED TO THE MATERIAL DISADVANTAGE
OF THAT PERSON, UNLESS THE APPROPRIATE GOVERNMENT CLIENT CONSENTS
AFTER CONSULTATION WITH THE LAWYER.
A FIRM WITH WHICH THAT LAWYER IS
ASSOCIATED MAY UNDERTAKE OR CONTINUE REPRESENTATION IN THE MATTER
ONLY IF THE DISQUALIFIED LAWYER IS
SCREENED FROM ANY PARTICIPATION IN
THE MATTER AND IS APPORTIONED NO
PART OF THE FEE THEREFROM.
(c) EXCEPT AS LAW MAY OTHERWISE
EXPRESSLY PERMIT, A LAWYER SERVING
AS A PUBLIC OFFICER OR EMPLOYEE
SHALL NOT:
(1) PARTICIPATE IN A MATTER IN
WHICH THE LAWYER PARTICIPATED PERSONALLY AND SUBSTANTIALLY WHILE IN
PRIVATE PRACTICE OR NONGOVERNMENTAL EMPLOYMENT, UNLESS UNDER APPLICABLE LAW NO ONE IS, OR BY LAWFUL
DELEGATION MAY BE, AUTHORIZED TO
ACT IN THE LAWYER'S STEAD IN THE
MATTER; OR
(2) NEGOTIATE FOR PRIVATE EMPLOYMENT WITH ANY PERSON WHO IS INVOLVED AS A PARTY OR AS ATTORNEY FOR A
PARTY IN A MATTER IN WHICH THE
LAWYER IS PARTICIPATING PERSONALLY
AND SUBSTANTIALLY, UNLESS THE APPROPRIATE GOVERNMENT CLIENT CONSENTS
AFTER CONSULTATION WITH THE LAWYER.
(d) AS USED IN THIS RULE, THE TERM
"MATTERMNCLUDES:
(1) ANY JUDICIAL OR OTHER PROCEEDING, APPLICATION, REQUEST FOR A
RULING OR OTHER DETERMINATION, CONTRACT, CLAIM, CONTROVERSY, INVESTIGATION, CHARGE, ACCUSATION, ARREST OR
OTHER PARTICULAR MATTER INVOLVING A
SPECIFIC PARTY OR PARTIES; AND
(2) ANY OTHER MATTER COVERED BY
THE CONFLICT OF INTEREST RULES OF THE
APPROPRIATE GOVERNMENT AGENCY.
(c) AS USED IN THIS RULE, THE TERM
"CONFIDENTIAL GOVERNMENT INFORMATION" MEANS INFORMATION WHICH HAS
BEEN OBTAINED UNDER GOVERNMENTAL
AUTHORITY AND WHICH, AT THE TIME
THIS RULE IS APPLIED, THE GOVERNMENT
IS PROHIBITED BY LAW FROM DISCLOSING
TO THE PUBLIC OR HAS A LEGAL PRIVILEGE NOT TO DISCLOSE, AND WHICH IS
NOT OTHERWISE AVAILABLE TO THE
PUBLIC.
COMMENT:
This Rule prevents a lawyer from exploiting
public office for the advantage of a private client. It
is the counterpart of Rule 1.10(b), which applies to
lawyers moving from one firm to another.
A lawyer representing a government agency,
whether employed or specifically retained by the
Code • C o
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government, is subject to the Rules of Professional
Conduct, including the prohibition against representing adverse interests stated in Rule 1.7 and the
protections afforded former clients in Rule 1.9. In
additon, such a lawyer is subject to Rule 1.11 and
to statutes and government regulations regarding
conflict of interest. Such statutes and regulations
may circumscribe the extent to which the government agency may give consent under this Rule.
Where the successive clients are a pubiic agency
and a private client, the risk exists that power or
discretion vested in a public authority might be used
for the special benefit of a private client. A lawyer
should not be in a position where benefit to a
private client might affect performance of the
lawyer's professional functions on behalf of public
authority. Also, unfair advantage could accrue to
the private client by reason of access to confidential
government information about the client's adversary
obtainable only through the lawyer's government
servicje. However, the rules governing lawyers should
not be so restrictive as to inhibit transfer of employment to and from the government. The government
has a legitimate need to attract qualified lawyers as
well as to maintain high ethical standards. The
provisions for screening and waiver are necessary to
prevent the disqualification rule from imposing too
severe a deterrent against entering public service.
When the client is an agency of one government,
that agency should be treated as a private client for
purposes of this Rule if the lawyer thereafter represents an agency of another government, as when a
lawyer represents a city and subsequently is employed by a federal agency.
Paragraphs (a)(1) and (b) do not prohibit a lawyer
from receiving a salary or partnership share established by prior independent agreement. They prohibit
direcjly relating the attorney's compensation to the
fee in the matter in which the lawyer is disqualified.
Paragraph (a)(2) does not require that a lawyer
give notice to the government agency at a time when
premature disclosure would injure the client; a requirement for premature disclosure might preclude
engagement of the lawyer. Such notice is, however,
required to be given as soon as practicable in order
that the government agency will have a reasonable
opportunity to ascertain that the lawyer is complying with Rule 1.11 and to take appropriate action
if it believes the lawyer is not complying.
Paragraph (b) operates only when the lawyer in
question has knowledge of the information, which
means actual knowledge; it does not operate with
respect to information that merely could be imputed
to the lawyer.
Paragraphs (a) and (c) do not prohibit a lawyer
from jointly representing a private party and a
government agency when doing so is permitted by
Rule 1.7 and is not otherwise prohibited by law.
Paragraph (c) does not disqualify other lawyers in
the agency with which the lawyer in question has
become associated.
CODE COMPARISON
Paragraph (a) is similar to DR 9-101(B), except
that the latter used the terms "in which he had
substantial responsibility while he was a public
emplbyee."
Paragraphs (b), (c), (d) and (e) have no counterparts in the Code.
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RULE 1.12 FORMER JIIDfiE OR
ARBITRATOR
(a) EXCEPT AS STATED IN PARAGRAPH (d),
A LAWYER SHALL NOT REPRESENT
ANYONE IN CONNECTION WITH A MATTER
IN WHICH THE LAWYER PARTICIPATED
PERSONALLY AND SUBSTANTIALLY AS A
JUDGE OR OTHER ADJUDICATIVE OFFICER,
ARBITRATOR OR LAW CLERK TO SUCH A
PERSON, UNLESS ALL PARTIES TO THE
PROCEEDING CONSENT AFTER DISCLOSURE.
(b) A LAWYER SHALL NOT NEGOTIATE
FOR EMPLOYMENT WITH ANY PERSON WHO
IS INVOLVED AS A PARTY OR AS ATTORNEY
FOR A PARTY IN A MATTER IN WHICH THE
LAWYER IS PARTICIPATING PERSONALLY
AND SUBSTANTIALLY AS A JUDGE OR
OTHER ADJUDICATIVE OFFICER, OR ARBITRATOR. A LAWYER SERVING AS A LAW
CLERK TO A JUDGE, OTHER ADJUDICATIVE
OFFICER OR ARBITRATOR MAY NEGOTIATE
FOR EMPLOYMENT WITH A PARTY OR
ATTORNEY INVOLVED IN A MATTER IN
WHICH THE CLERK IS PARTICIPATING
PERSONALLY AND SUBSTANTIALLY, BUT
ONLY AFTER THE LAWYER HAS NOTIFIED
THE JUDGE, OTHER ADJUDICATIVE
OFFICER OR ARBITRATOR.
(c) IF A LAWYER IS DISQUALIFIED BY
PARAGRAPH (a), NO LAWYER IN A FIRM
WITH WHICH THAT LAWYER IS ASSOCIATED MAY KNOWINGLY UNDERTAKE OR
JCONTINUE REPRESENTATION IN THE
MATTER UNLESS:
(1) THE DISQUALIFIED LAWYER IS SCREENED FROM ANY PARTICIPATION IN THE
MATTER AND IS APPORTIONED NO PART OF
THE FEE THEREFROM; AND
(2) WRITTEN NOTICE IS PROMPTLY
GIVEN TO THE APPROPRIATE TRIBUNAL TO
ENABLE IT TO ASCERTAIN COMPLIANCE
WITH THE PROVISIONS OF THIS RULE.
(d) AN ARBITRATOR SELECTED AS A
PARTISAN OF A PARTY IN A MULTIMEMBER ARBITRATION PANEL IS NOT
PROHIBITED FROM SUBSEQUENTLY REPRESENTING THAT PARTY.
COMMENT:
This Rule generally parallels Rule 1.11. The term
"personally and substantially" signifies that a judge
who was a member of a multimember court, and
thereafter left judicial office to practice law, is not
prohibited from representing a client in a matter
pending in the court, but in which the former judge
did not participate. So also the fact that a former
judge exercised administrative responsibility in a
court does not prevent the former judge from acting
as a lawyer in a matter where the judge had previously exercised remote or incidental administrative
responsibility that did not affect the merits.
Compare the Comment to Rule 1.11. The term
"adjudicative officer" includes such officials as
judges pro tempore, referees, special masters,
hearing officers and other parajudicial officers, and
also lawyers who serve as pan-time judges.
CODE COMPARISON
Paragraph (a) is substantially similar to DR 9-
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101(A), which provided that a lawyer "shall noi
accept private employment in a matter upon th<
merits of which he has acted in a judicial capacity/
Paragraph (a) differs, however, in that it is broader
in scope and states more specifically the persons to
whom it applies. There was no counterpart in the
Code to paragraphs (b), (c), or (d).
With regard to arbitrators, EC 5-20 stated that
"a lawyer (who) has undertaken to act as an impartial arbitrator or mediator, ... should not thereafter
represent in the dispute any of the parties involved."
DR 9-101 (A) did not permit a waiver of the disqualification applied to former judges by consent of
the parties. However, DR 5-105(C) was similar in
effect and could be construed to permit waiver.

RULE 1.13 SAFEKEEPING PROPERTY
(a) A LAWYER SHALL HOLD PROPERTY OF
CLIENTS OR THIRD PERSONS THAT IS IN A
LAWYER'S POSSESSION IN CONNECTION
WITH A REPRESENTATION SEPARATE FROM
THE LAWYER'S OWN PROPERTY. FUNDS
SHALL BE KEPT IN A SEPARATE ACCOUNT
MAINTAINED IN THE STATE WHERE THE
LAWYER'S OFFICE IS SITUATED, OR ELSEWHERE WITH THE CONSENT OF THE
CLIENT OR THIRD PERSON. OTHER PROPERTY SHALL BE IDENTIFIED AS SUCH AND
APPROPRIATELY SAFEGUARDED. COMPLETE RECORDS OF SUCH ACCOUNT FUNDS
AND OTHER PROPERTY SHALL BE KEPT
THE LAWYER AND SHALL BE PRESERVED
FOR A PERIOD OF FIVE YEARS AFTER TERMINATION OF THE REPRESENTATION..
(b) UPON RECEIVING FUNDS OR OTHER
PROPERTY IN WHICH A CLIENT OR THIRD
PERSON HAS AN INTEREST, A LAWYER
SHALL PROMPTLY NOTIFY THE CLIENT OR
THIRD PERSON. EXCEPT AS STATED IN THIS
RULE OR OTHERWISE PERMITTED BY LAW
OR BY AGREEMENT WITH THE CLIENT, A
LAWYER SHALL PROMPTLY DELIVER TO
THE CLIENT OR THIRD PERSON ANY FUNDS
OR OTHER PROPERTY THAT THE CLIENT
OR THIRD PERSON IS ENTITLED TO
RECEIVE AND, UPON REQUEST BY THE
CLIENT OR THIRD PERSON, SHALL PROMPTLY RENDER A FULL ACCOUNTING REGARDING SUCH PROPERTY.
(c) WHEN IN THE COURSE OF REPRESENTATION A LAWYER IS IN POSSESSION OF
PROPERTY IN WHICH BOTH THE LAWYER
AND ANOTHER PERSON CLAIM INTERESTS,
THE PROPERTY SHALL BE KEPT SEPARATE
BY THE LAWYER UNTIL THERE IS AN ACCOUNTING AND SEVERANCE OF THEIR INTERESTS. IF A DISPUTE ARISES CONCERNING
THEIR RESPECTIVE INTERESTS, THE
PORTION IN DISPUTE SHALL BE KEPT SEPARATE BY THE LAWYER UNTIL THE
DISPUTE IS RESOLVED.
COMMENT:
A lawyer should hold property of others with the
care required of a professional fiduciary. Securities
should be kept in a safe deposit box, except when
some other form of safekeeping is warranted by
special circumstances. All property which is the
property of clients or third persons should be kept
separate from the lawyer's business and personal
property and, if monies, in one or more trust acco-
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unts. Separate trust accounts may be warranted
when administering estate monies or acting in
similar fiduciary capacities.
Lawyers often receive funds from third parties
from which the lawyer's fee will be paid. If there is
risk that the client may divert the funds without
paying the fee, the lawyer is not required to remit
the portion from which the fee is to be paid.
However, a lawyer may not hold funds to coerce a
client into accepting the lawyer's contention. The
disputed portion of the funds should be kept in trust
and the lawyer should suggest means for prompt
resolution of the dispute, such as arbitration. The
undisputed portion of the funds shall he promptly
distributed.
Third parties, such as a client's creditors, may
have just claims against funds or other property in a
lawyer's custody. A lawyer may have a duty under
applicable law to protect such third-party claims
against wrongful interference by the client and accordingly may refuse to surrender the property to the
client. However, a lawyer should not unilaterally
assume to arbitrate a dispute between the client and
the third party.
The obligations of a lawyer under this Rule are
independent of those arising from activity other
than rendering legal services. For example, a lawyer
who serves as an escrow agent is governed by the
applicable law relating to fiduciaries even though the
lawyer does not render legal services in the transaction.
A "client's security fund" provides a means
through the collective efforts of the Bar to reimburse persons who have lost money or property as a
result of dishonest conduct of a lawyer. Where such
a fund has been established, a lawyer should participate.
CODE COMPARISON
With regard to paragraph (a), DR 9-102(A)
provided that "funds of clients" are to be kept in an
identifiable bank account in the state in which the
lawyer's office is situated. DR 9-102(B)(2) provided that a lawyer shall "identify and label securities
and properties of a client ... and place them in ...
safekeeping ...." DR 9-102(B)(3) required that a
lawyer "maintain complete records of all funds,
securities, and other properties of a client ...." Rule
1.13 (a) extends these requirements to property of a
third person that is in the lawyer's possession in
connection with the representation.
Paragraph (b) is substantially similar to DR 9102(B)(1), (3) and (4).
Paragraph (c) is similar to DR 9-102(A)(2),
except that the requirement regarding disputes
applies to property concerning which an interest is
claimed by a third person as well as by a client.

RULE 1.14 DECLINING OR
TERMINATING REPRESENTATION
(a) A LAWYER SHALL NOT REPRESENT A
CLIENT OR, WHERE REPRESENTATION HAS
COMMENCED, SHALL WITHDRAW FROM
THE REPRESENTATION OF A CLIENT IF:
(1) THE REPRESENTATION WILL RESULT
IN VIOLATION OF THE RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT OR OTHER LAW;
(2) THE LAWYER'S PHYSICAL OR
MENTAL CONDITION MATERIALLY IMPAIRS
THE LAWYER'S ABILITY TO REPRESENT
THE CLIENT; OR
Code • Co
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THE LAWYER IS DISCHARGED.
(b) A LAWYER MAY WITHDRAW FROM
REPRESENTING A CLIENT IF WITHDRAWAL
CAN BE ACCOMPLISHED WITHOUT MATERIAL ADVERSE EFFECT ON THE INTERESTS
OF THE CLIENT, OR IF:
(1) THE CLIENT PERSISTS IN A COURSE
OF ACTION INVOLVING THE LAWYER'S
SERVICES THAT THE LAWYER REASONABLY
BELIEVES IS CRIMINAL OR FRAUDULENT;
(2) THE C L I E N T HAS USED T H E
LAWYER'S SERVICES TO PERPETRATE A
CRIME OR FRAUD;
(3) A CLIENT INSISTS UPON PURSUING
AN OBJECTIVE THAT THE LAWYER CONSIDERS REPUGNANT OR IMPRUDENT;
(4) THE CLIENT FAILS SUBSTANTIALLY
TO FULFILL AN OBLIGATION TO THE
LAWYER REGARDING THE LAWYER'S SERVICES AND HAS BEEN GIVEN REASONABLE
WARNING THAT THE LAWYER WILL WITHDRAW UNLESS THE OBLIGATION IS FULFILLED;
(5) THE REPRESENTATION WILL RESULT
IN AN UNREASONABLE FINANCIAL BURDEN
ON THE LAWYER OR HAS BEEN RENDERED
U N R E A S O N A B L Y D I F F I C U L T BY T H E
CLIENT; OR
(6) OTHER GOOD CAUSE FOR WITHDRAWAL EXISTS.
(c) THIS RULE IS NOT VIOLATED BY A
LAWYER WHO CONTINUES REPRESENTATION WHEN ORDERED TO DO SO BY A TRIBUNAL, NOTWITHSTANDING GOOD CAUSE
FOR TERMINATING THE REPRESENTATION.
(d) UPON TERMINATION OF REPRESENTATION, A LAWYER SHALL TAKE STEPS TO
THE EXTENT REASONABLY PRACTICABLE
TO PROTECT A CLIENT'S INTERESTS, SUCH
AS GIVING REASONABLE NOTICE TO THE
CLIENT, ALLOWING TIME FOR EMPLOYMENT OF OTHER COUNSEL, SURRENDERING
PAPERS AND PROPERTY TO WHICH THE
CLIENT IS ENTITLED AND REFUNDING ANY
ADVANCE PAYMENT OF FEE THAT HAS NOT
BEEN EARNED. THE LAWYER MAY RETAIN
PAPERS RELATING TO THE CLIENT TO THE
EXTENT PERMITTED BY OTHER LAW.
COMMENT:
A lawyer should not accept representation in a
matter unless it can be performed competently,
promptly, without improper conflict of interest and
to completion.
Mandatory Withdrawal
A lawyer ordinarily must decline or withdraw
from representation if the client demands that the
lawyer engage in conduct that is illegal or violates
the Rules of Professional Conduct or other law. The
lawyer is not obliged to decline or withdraw simply
because the client suggests such a course of conduct;
a client may make such a suggestion in the hope
that a lawyer will not be constrained by a professional obligation.
When a lawyer has been appointed to represent a
client, withdrawal ordinarily requires approval of
the appointing authority. See also Rule 6.2. Difficulty may be encountered if withdrawal is based on
the client's demand that the lawyer engage in unprofessional conduct. The court may wish an explanation for the withdrawal, while the lawyer may be
bound to keep confidential the facts that would
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constitute such an explanation. The lawyer's state-'
ment that professional considerations require termination of the representation ordinarily should be
accepted as sufficient.
Discharge
A client has the right to discharge a lawyer at any
time, with or without cause, subject to liability for
payment for the lawyer's services. Where future
dispute about the withdrawal may be anticipated, it
may be advisable to prepare a written statement
reciting the circumstances.
Whether a client can discharge appointed counsel
may depend on applicable law. A client seeking to
do so should be given a full explanation of the
consequences. These consequences may include a
decision by the appointing authority that appointment of successor counsel is unjustified, thus requiring the client to represent himself.
Optional Withdrawal
A lawyer may withdraw from representation in
some circumstances. The lawyer has the option to
withdraw if it can be accomplished without material
adverse effect on the client's interests. Withdrawal
is also justified if the client persists in a course of
action that the lawyer reasonably believes is criminal
or fraudulent, for a lawyer is not required to be
associated with such conduct even if the lawyer does
not further it. Withdrawal is also permitted if the
lawyer's services were misused in the past even if
that would materially prejudice the client. The
lawyer also may withdraw where the client insists on
a repugnant or imprudent objective.
A lawyer may withdraw if the client refuses to
abide by the terms of an agreement relating to the
representation, such as an agreement concerning fees
or court costs or an agreement limiting the objectives of the representation.
Assisting the Client Upon Withdrawal
Even if the lawyer has been unfairly discharged by
the client, a lawyer must take all reasonable steps to
mitigate the consequences to the client. The lawyer
may retain papers as security for a fee only to the
extent permitted by law.
Whether or not a lawyer for an organization may
under certain unusual circumstances have a legal
obligation to the organization after withdrawing or
being discharged by the organization's highest authority is beyond the scope of these Rules.
Compliance with Applicable Court Rule Regarding
Withdrawal
When a lawyer is representing a client in a matter
before the courts, and the lawyer seeks to withdraw
from the matter under these rules, the lawyer should
consult applicable court rules regarding procedures
for withdrawal.
I
CODE COMPARISON
With regard to paragraph (a), DR 2-109(A)
provided that a lawyer "shall not accept employment
... if he knows or it is obvious that [the prospective
client] wishes to ... [bjring a legal action ... or otherwise have steps taken for him, merely for the
purpose of harassing or maliciously injuring any
person . . / Nor may a lawyer accept employment if
he is aware that the prospective client wishes to
"[p]resent a claim or defense ... that is not warranted under existing law, unless it can be supported
by good faith argument for an extension, modification, or reversal of existing law.* DR 2-110(B)
provided that a lawyer 'shall withdraw from empl-
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oyment ...if:
"(1) He knows or it is obvious that his client is
bringing the legal action ... or is otherwise having
steps taken for him, merely for the purpose of harassing or maliciously injuring any person.
"(2) He knows or it is obvious that his continued
employment will result in violation of a Disciplinary
Rule.
"(3) His mental or physical condition renders it
unreasonably difficult for him to carry out the
employment effectively.
"(4) He is discharged by his client.
With regard to paragraph (b), DR 2-110(C)
permitted withdrawal regardless of the effect on the
client if:
"(1) His client: (a) Insists upon presenting a claim
or defense that is not warranted under existing law
and cannot be supported by good faith argument
for an extension, modification, or reversal of existing law; (b) Personally seeks to pursue an illegal
course of conduct; (c) Insists that the lawyer pursue
a course of conduct that is illegal or that is prohibited under the Disciplinary Rules; (d) By other
conduct renders it unreasonably difficult for the
lawyer to carry out his employment effectively; (e)
Insists, in a matter not pending before a tribunal,
that the lawyer engage in conduct that is contrary to
the judgment and advice of the lawyer but not
prohibited under the Disciplinary Rules; (0 Deliberately disregards an agreement or obligation to the
lawyer as to expenses and fees.
*(2) His continued employment is likely to result
in a violation of a Disciplinary Rule.
"(3) fris inability to work with co-counsel indicates that the best interests of the client likely will
be served by withdrawal.
"(4) His mental or physical condition renders it
difficult for him to carry out the employment effectively.
"(5) His client knowingly and freely assents to
termination of his employment.
"(6) He believes in good faith, in a proceeding
pending before a tribunal, that the tribunal will find
the existence of other good cause for withdrawal."
With regard to paragraph (c), DR 2-110(A)(1)
provided: "If permission for withdrawal from
employment is required by the laws of the tribunal,
the lawyer shall not withdraw ... without its permission."
The provisions of paragraph (d) are substantially
identical to DR 2-110(A)(2) and (3).

COUNSELOR
RULE 2.1 ADVISOR
IN REPRESENTING A CLIENT, A LAWYER
SHALL EXERCISE INDEPENDENT PROFESSIONAL JUDGMENT AND RENDER CANDID
ADVICE. IN RENDERING ADVICE, A LAWYER
MAY REFER NOT ONLY TO LAW BUT TO
OTHER CONSIDERATIONS SUCH AS MORAL,
E C O N O M I C , SOCIAL A N D POLITICAL
FACTORS, THAT MAY BE RELEVANT TO THE
CLIENT'S SITUATION.
COMMENT:

UTAH ADVANCE REPORTS

Code • C o
Provo. Uah

Proposed Kuies oi rroiessionai i^onauci
Scope of Advice
A client is entitled to straightforward advice expressing the lawyer's honest assessment. Legal advice
often involves unpleasant facts and alternatives that
a client may be disinclined to confront. In presenting advice, a lawyer endeavors to sustain the
client's morale and may put advice in as acceptable
a form as honesty permits. However, a lawyer
should not be deterred from giving candid advice by
the prospect that the advice will be unpalatable to
the client.
Advice couched in narrowly legal terms may be of
little value to a client, especially where practical
considerations, such as costs or effects on other
people, are predominant. Purely technical legal
advice, therefore, can sometimes be inadequate. It is
proper for a lawyer to refer to relevant moral and
ethical considerations in giving advice. Although a
lawyer is not a moral advisor as such, moral and
ethical considerations impinge upon most legal
questions and may decisively influence how the law
will be applied.
A client may expressly or impliedly ask the lawyer
for purely technical advice. When such a request is
made by a client experienced in legal matters, the
lawyer may accept it at face value. When such a
request is made by#a client inexperienced in legal
matters, however, the lawyer's responsibility as
advisor may include indicating that more may be
involved than strictly legal considerations.
Matters that go beyond strictly legal questions
may also be in the domain of another profession.
Family matters can involve problems within the
professional competence of psychiatry, clinical psychology or social work; business matters can involve
problems within the competence of the accounting
profession or of financial specialists. Where consultation with a professional in another field is itself
something a competent lawyer would recommend,
the lawyer should make such a recommendation. At
the same time, a lawyer's advice at its best often
consists of recommending a course of action in the
face of conflicting recommendations of experts.
Offering Advice
In general, a lawyer is not expected to give advice
until asked by the client. However, when a lawyer
knows that a client proposes a course of action that
is likely to result in substantial adverse legal consequences to the client, duty to the client under Rule
1.4 may require that the lawyer act if the client's
course of action is related to the representation. A
lawyer ordinarily has no duty to initiate investigation of a client's affairs or to give advice that the
client has indicated is unwanted, but a lawyer may
initiate advice to a client when doing so appears to
be in the client's interest.
CODE COMPARISON
There was no direct counterpart to this Rule in
the Disciplinary Rules of the Code. DR 5-107(B)
provided that a lawyer "shall not permit a person
who recommends, employs, or pays him to render
legal services for another to direct or regulate his
professional judgment in rendering such legal services." EC 7-8 stated that "[ajdvice of a lawyer to
his client need not be confined to purely legal considerations ... In assisting his client to reach a
proper decision, it is often desirable for a lawyer to
point out those factors which may lead to a decision
that is morally just as well as legally permissible ...
In the final analysis, however, ... the decision
whether to forego legally available objectives or
Code • Co
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methods because of non-legal factors is ultimately
for the client...."

RULE 2.2 INTERMEDIARY
(a) A LAWYER MAY ACT AS INTERMEDIARY BETWEEN CLIENTS IF:
(1} THE LAWYER CONSULTS WITH EACH
CLIENT CONCERNING THE IMPLICATIONS
OF THE COMMON REPRESENTATION, INCLUDING THE ADVANTAGES AND RISKS INVOLVEp, AND THE EFFECT OF THE ATTORNEYjCLIENT PRIVILEGES, AND OBTAINS
EACH CLIENT'S CONSENT TO THE COMMON
REPRESENTATION; AND
(2) THE LAWYER REASONABLY BELIEVES THAT THE MATTER CAN BE RESOLVED ON TERMS COMPATIBLE WITH THE
CLIENT'S BEST INTEREST, THAT EACH
CLIENT WILL BE ABLE TO MAKE ADEQUATELY! INFORMED DECISIONS IN THE
MATTER AND THAT THERE IS LITTLE RISK
OF MATERIAL PREJUDICE TO THE INTERESTS OF ANY OF THE CLIENTS IF THE CONTEMPLATED RESOLUTION IS UNSUCCESSFUL; AND
(3) THE LAWYER REASONABLY BELIEVES THAT THE COMMON REPRESENTATION CAN BE UNDERTAKEN IMPARTIALLY
AND WITHOUT IMPROPER EFFECT ON
OTHER RESPONSIBILITIES THE LAWYER
HAS TO ANY OF THE CLIENTS; AND
(4J ALL REQUIREMENTS OF RULES 1.7
AND 1.8 ARE MET.
(b) WHILE ACTING AS INTERMEDIARY,
THE LAWYER SHALL CONSULT WITH EACH
CLIENT CONCERNING THE DECISIONS TO BE
MADE AND THE CONSIDERATIONS RELEVANT IN MAKING THEM. SO THAT EACH
CLIENT CAN MAKE ADEQUATELY INFORMED DECISIONS.
(c) A LAWYER SHALL WITHDRAW AS
INTERMEDIARY IF ANY OF THE CLIENTS SO
REQUESTS, OR IF ANY OF THE CONDITIONS
STATED IN PARAGRAPH (a) IS NO LONGER
SATISFIED. UPON WITHDRAWAL, THE
LAWYER SHALL NOT CONTINUE TO REPRESENT ANY OF THE CLIENTS IN THE
MATTER THAT WAS THE SUBJECT OF THE
INTERMEDIATION.
COMMENT:
A lawyer acts as intermediary under this Rule
when the lawyer represents two or more parties with
potentially conflicting interests. A key factor in
defining the relationship is whether the parties share
responsibility for the lawyer's fee, but the common
representation may be inferred from other circumstances. Because confusion can arise as to the
lawyer s role where each party is not separately
represented, it is important that the lawyer make
clear the relationship.
The Rule does not apply to a lawyer acting as
arbitrator or mediator between or among parties
who are not clients of the lawyer, even where the
lawyer has been appointed with the concurrence of
the parties. In performing such a role the lawyer
may bi subject to applicable codes of ethics, such as
the Code of Ethics for Arbitration in Commercial
Disputps prepared by a joint Committee of the
Amerkan Bar Association and the American Arbitration Association.
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A lawyer acts as intermediary in seeking to establish or adjust a relationship between clients on an
amicable and mutually advantageous basis; for
example, in helping to organize a business in which
two or more clients are entrepreneurs, working out
the financial reorganization of an enterprise in
which two or more clients have an interest, arranging a property distribution in settlement of an
estate or mediating a dispute between clients. The
lawyer seeks to resolve potentially conflicting interests by developing the parties' mutual interests. The
, alternative can be that each party may have to
obtain separate representation, with the possibility
in some situations of incurring additional cost,
complication or even litigation. Given these and
other relevant factors, all the clients may prefer that
the lawyer act as intermediary.
In considering whether to act as intermediary
between clients, a lawyer should be mindful that if
the intermediation fails the result can be additional
cost, embarrassment and recrimination. In some
situations the risk of failure is so great that intermediation is plainly impossible. For example, a lawyer
cannot undertake common representation of clients
between whom contentious litigation is imminent or
who contemplate contentious negotiations. More
generally, if the relationship between the parties has
already assumed definite antagonism, the possibility
that the clients* interests can be adjusted by intermediation ordinarily is not very good.
The appropriateness of intermediation can depend
on its form. Forms of intermediation range from
informal arbitration, where each client's case is
presented by the respective client and the lawyer
decides the outcome, to mediation, to common
representation where the clients' interests are substantially though not entirely compatible. One form
may be appropriate in circumstances where another
would not. Other relevant factors are whether the
lawyer subsequently will represent both parties on a
continuing basis and whether the situation involves
creating a relationship between the parties or terminating one.
Confidentiality and Privilege
A particularly important factor in determining the
appropriateness of intermediation is the effect on
client-lawyer confidentiality and the attorneyclient privilege. In a common representation, the
lawyer is still required both to keep each client
adequately informed and to maintain confidentiality
of information relating to the representation. See
Rutes 1.4 and 1.6. Complying with both requirements while acting as intermediary requires a delicate
balance. If the balance cannot be maintained, the
common representation is improper. With regard to
the attorney-client privilege, the prevailing rule is
that as between commonly represented clients the
privilege does not attach. Hence, it must be assumed
that if litigation eventuates between the clients, the
privilege will not protect any such communications,
and the clients should be so advised.
Since the lawyer is required to be impartial
between commonly represented clients, intermediation is improper when that impartiality cannot be
maintained. For example, a lawyer who has represented one of the clients for a long period and in a
variety of matters might have difficulty being impartial between that client and one to whom the
lawyer has only recently been introduced.
Consultation
In acting as intermediary between clients, the
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lawyer is required to consult with the clients on the
implications of doing so, and proceed only upon
consent based on such a consultation. The consultation should make clear that the lawyer's role is not
that of partisanship normally expected in other circumstances.
Paragraph (b) is an application of the principle
expressed in Rule 1.4. Where the lawyer is intermediary, the clients ordinarily must assume greater
responsibility for decisions than when each client is
independently represented.
Withdrawal
Common representation does not diminish the
rights of each client in the client-lawyer relationship. Each has the right to loyal and diligent representation, the right to discharge the lawyer as stated
in Rule 1.14, and the protection of Rule I. concerning obligations to a former client.
CODE COMPARISON
There was no direct counterpart to this Rule in
the Disciplinary Rules of the Code. EC 5-20 stated
that a "lawyer is often asked to serve as an impartial
arbitrator or mediator in matters which involve
present or former clients. He may serve in cither
capacity if he first discloses such present or former
relationships." DR 5-105(B) provided that a lawyer
"shall not continue multiple employment if the
exercise of his independent professional judgment in
behalf of a client will be or is likely to be adversely
affected by his representation of another client, or if
it would be likely to involve him in representation of
differing interests, except to the extent permitted
under DR 5-105(C)." DR 5-105(C) provided that
"a lawyer may represent multiple clients if it is
obvious that he can adequately represent the interests of each and if each consents to the representation after full disclosure of the possible effect of
such representation on the exercise of his independent professional judgment on behalf of each."

RULE 2,3 EVALUATION FOR USE BY
THIRD PERSONS
(a) A LAWYER MAY UNDERTAKE AN EVALUATION OF A MATTER AFFECTING A
CLIENT FOR THE USE OF SOMEONE OTHER
THAN THE CLIENT IF:
(1) THE LAWYER REASONABLY BELIEVES THAT MAKING THE EVALUATION IS
COMPATIBLE WITH OTHER ASPECTS OF
THE LAWYER'S RELATIONSHIP WITH THE
CLIENT; AND
(2) THE CLIENT CONSENTS AFTER CONSULTATION.
(b) EXCEPT AS DISCLOSURE IS REQUIRED
IN CONNECTION WITH A REPORT OF AN
EVALUATION, INFORMATION RELATING TO
THE EVALUATION IS OTHERWISE PROTECTED BY RULE 1.6.
COMMENT:
Definition
An evaluation may be performed at the client's
direction but for the primary purpose of establishing
information for the benefit of third parties; for
example, an opinion concerning the title of property
rendered at the behest of a vendor for the information of a prospective purchaser, or at the behest of
a borrower for the information of a prospective
lender. In some situations, the evaluation may be
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required by a government agency; for example, an
opinion concerning the legality of the securities
registered for sale under the securities laws. In other
instances, the evaluation may be required by a third
person, such as a purchaser of a business.
Lawyers for the government may be called upon
to give a formal opinion on the legality of contemplated government agency action. In making such an
evaluation, the government lawyer acts at the behest
of the government as the client but for the purpose
of establishing the limits of the agency's authorized
activity. Such an opinion is to be distinguished from
confidential legal advice given agency officials. The
critical question is whether the opinion is to be
made public.
A legal evaluation should be distinguished from
an investigation of a person with whom the lawyer
does not have a client-lawyer relationship. For
example, a lawyer retained by a purchaser to
analyze a vendor's title to property does not have a
client-lawyer relationship with the vendor. So also,
an investigation into a person's affairs by a government lawyer, or by special counsel employed by the
government, is not an evaluation as that term is
used in this Rule. The question is whether the
lawyer is retained by the person whose affairs are
being examined. When the lawyer is retained by that
person, the general rules concerning loyalty to client
and preservation of confidences apply, which is not
the case if the lawyer is retained by someone else.
For this reason, it is essential to identify the person
by whom the lawyer is retained. This should be
made clear not only to the person under examination, but also to others to whom the results are to
be made available.
Duty to Third Person
When the evaluation is intended for the information or use of a third person, a legal duty to that
person may or may not arise. That legal question is
beyond the scope of this Rule. However, since such
an evaluation involves a departure from the normal
client-lawyer relationship, careful analysis of the
situation is required. The lawyer must be satisfied as
a matter of professional judgment that making the
evaluation is compatible with other functions undertaken in behalf of the client. For example, if the
lawyer is acting as advocate in defending the client
against charges of fraud, it would normally be incompatible with that responsibility for the lawyer to
perform an evaluation for others concerning the
same or a related transaction. Assuming no such
impediment is apparent, however, the lawyer should
advise the client of the implications of the evaluation, particularly the lawyer's responsibilities to
third persons and the duty to disseminate the findings.
Access to and Disclosure of Information
The quality of an evaluation depends on the
freedom and extent of the investigation upon which
it is based. Ordinarily a lawyer should have whatever latitude of investigation seems necessary as a
matter of professional judgment. Under some circumstances, however, the terms of the evaluation
may be limited. For example, certain issues or
sources may be categorically excluded, or the scope
of search may be limited by time constraints or the
noncooperation of persons having relevant information. Any such limitations which are material to
the evaluation should be described in the report. If
after a lawyer has commenced an evaluation, the
client refuses to comply with the terms upon which
Code • Co
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it was understood the evaluation was to have been
made, the lawyer's obligations are determined by
law, hiving reference to the terms of the client's
agreement and the surrounding circumstances.
Financial Auditors' Requests for Information
Wheji a question concerning the legal situation of
a client arises at the instance of the client's financial
auditor and the question is referred to the lawyer,
the lawyer's response may be made in accordance
with procedures recognized in the legal profession.
Such a procedure is set forth in the American Bar
Association Statement of Policy Regarding
Lawyers* Responses to Auditors* Requests for
Information, adopted in 1975. •
CODE COMPARISON
Therp was no counterpart to this Rule in the
Code.

ADVOCATE
RULti 3.1 MERITORIOUS CLAIMS
AND CONTENTIONS
LAWYER SHALL NOT BRING OR DEFEND
OR ASSERT OR CONTROL S ISSUE THEREIN, UNLESS THERE IS
BASIS FOR DOING SO THAT IS NOT FRIVWHICH INCLUDES A GOOD FAITH
ARGUMENT FOR AN EXTENSION, MODIFICATION OR REVERSAL OF EXISTING LAW. A
LAWYER FOR THE DEFENDANT IN A CRIMINAL PROCEEDING, OR THE RESPONDENT
IN A PROCEEDING THAT COULD RESULT IN
INCARCERATION, MAY NEVERTHELESS SO
DEFEND THE PROCEEDING AS TO REQUIRE
THAT EVERY ELEMENT OF THE CASE BE
ESTABLISHED.
COMMENT:
The advocate has a duty to use legal' procedure
for the fullest benefit of the client's case, but also a
duty n6t to abuse legal procedure. The law, both
procedural and substantive, establishes the limits
within |which an advocate may proceed. However,
the law is not always clear and never is static. Accordingly , in determining the proper scope of advocacy a^count must be taken of the law's ambiguities and potential for change.
The filing of an action or defense or similar
action taken for a client is not frivolous merely
because the facts have not first been fully substantiated or becausc the lawyer expects to develop vital
evidence only by discovery. Such action is not frivolous ^ven though the lawyer believes that the
client's position ultimately will not prevail. The
action Js frivolous, however, if the client desires to
have the action taken primarily for the purpose of
harassing or maliciously injuring a person or if the
lawyer is unable either to make a good faith argument on the merits of the action taken or to support
the action taken by a good faith argument for an
extension , modification or reversrl of existing law.
CODE COMPARISON
DR - -102(A)(1) provided that a lawyer may not
'[f]ile i suit, assert a position, conduct a defense,
delay a trial, or take other action on behalf of his
client when he knows or when it is obvious that
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such action would serve merely to harass or maliciously injure another/ Rule 3.1 is to the same
general effect as DR 7-102(A)(1), wkh three qualifications. First, the test of improper conduct is
changed from "merely to harass or maliciously
injure another" to the requirements that there be a
basis for the litigation measure involved that is "not
frivolous." This includes the concept stated in DR 7102(A)(2) that a lawyer may advance a claim or
defense unwarranted by existing law if "it can be
supported by good faith argument for an extension,
modification, or reversal of existing law." Second,
the test in Rule 3.1 is an objective test, whereas DR
7-102(A)(1) applied only if the lawyer "knows or
when it is obvious" that the litigation is frivolous.
Third, Rule 3.1 has an exception that in a criminal
case, or a case in which incarceration of the client
may result (for example, certain juvenile proceedings), the lawyer may put the prosecution to its
proof even if there is no nonfrivolous basis for
defense.

RULE 3.2 EXPEDITING LITIGATION
A LAWYER SHALL MAKE REASONABLE
EFFORTS TO EXPEDITE LITIGATION CONSISTENT WITH THE INTERESTS OF THE
CLIENT.
COMMENT:
Dilatory practices bring the administration of
justice into disrepute. Delay should not be indulged
merely for the convenience of the advocates, or for
the purpose of frustrating an opposing party's
attempt to obtain rightful redress or repose.
CODE COMPARISON
DR 7-101(A)(l) stated that a lawyer does not
violate his duty to represent a client zealously "by
being punctual in fulfilling all professional commitments." DR 7-102(A)(l) provided that a lawyer
"shall not ... file a suit, assert a position, conduct a
defense [or] delay a trial ... when he knows or when
it is obvious that such action would serve merely to
harass or maliciously injure another."

RULE 3.3 CANDOR TOWARD THE
TRIBUNAL
(a) A LAWYER SHALL NOT KNOWINGLY:
(1) MAKE A FALSE STATEMENT OF
MATERIAL FACT OR LAW TO A TRIBUNAL;
(2) FAIL TO DISCLOSE A MATERIAL
FACT TO A TRIBUNAL WHEN DISCLOSURE
1$ NECESSARY TO AVOID ASSISTING A CRIMINAL OR FRAUDULENT ACT BY THE
CLIENT;
(3) FAIL TO DISCLOSE TO THE TRIBUNAL
LEGAL AUTHORITY IN THE CONTROLLING
JURISDICTION KNOWN TO THE LAWYER TO
BE DIRECTLY ADVERSE TO THE POSITION
OF THE CLIENT AND NOT DISCLOSED BY
OPPOSING COUNSEL; OR
(4) OFFER E V I D E N C E T H A T T H E
LAWYER KNOWS TO BE FALSE. IF A
LAWYER HAS OFFERED MATERIAL EVIDENCE AND COMES TO KNOW OF ITS
FALSITY, THE LAWYER SHALL TAKE REASONABLE REMEDIAL MEASURES.
(b) THE DUTIES STATED IN PARAGRAPH
(a) CONTINUE TO THE CONCLUSION OF THE
PROCEEDING, AND APPLY EVEN IF COMP-
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LIANCE REQUIRES DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION OTHERWISE PROTECTED BY RULE
1.6.
(c) A LAWYER MAY REFUSE TO OFFER
EVIDENCE THAT THE LAWYER REASONABLY BELIEVES IS FALSE.
(d) IN AN EX PARTE PROCEEDING, A
LAWYER SHALL INFORM THE TRIBUNAL OF
ALL MATERIAL FACTS KNOWN TO THE
LAWYER WHICH WILL ENABLE THE TRIBUNAL TO -MAKE AN INFORMED DECISION,
WHETHER OR NOT THE FACTS ARE
ADVERSE.
COMMENT:
The advocate's task is to present the client's case
with persuasive force. Performance of that duty
while maintaining confidences of the client is qualified by the advocate's duty of candor to the tribunal. However, an advocate does not vouch for the
evidence submitted in a cause; the tribunal is responsible for. assessing its probative value.
Representations by a Lawyer
An advocate is responsible for pleadings and
other documents prepared for litigation, but is
usually not required to have personal knowledge of
matters asserted therein, for litigation documents
ordinarily present assertions by the client, or by
someone on the client's behalf, and not assertions
by the lawyer. Compare Rule 3.1. However, an
assertion purporting to be on the lawyer's own
knowledge, as in an affidavit by the lawyer or in a
statement in open court, may properly be made only
when the lawyer knows the assertion is true or believes it to be true on the basis of reasonably diligent
inquiry. There are circumstances where failure to
make a disclosure is the equivalent of an affirmative
misrepresentation. The obligation prescribed in Rule
1.2(c) not to counsel a client to commit or assist the
client in committing a fraud applies in litigation.
Regarding compliance with Rule 1.2(c), see the
Comment to that Rule. See also the Comment to
Rule 8.4(b).
Misleading Legal Argument
Legal argument based on a knowingly false representation of law constitutes dishonesty toward a
tribunal. A lawyer is not required to make a disinterested exposition of the law, but must recognize the
existence of pertinent legal authorities. Furthermore,
as stated in paragraph (a)(3), an advocate has a duty
to disclose directly adverse authority in the controlling jurisdiction which has not been disclosed by the
opposing party. The underlying concept is that legal
argument is a discussion seeking to determine the
legal premises properly applicable to the case.
False Evidence
When evidence that a lawyer knows to be false is
provided by a person who is not the client, the
lawyer must refuse to offer it regardless of the
client's wishes.
When false evidence is offered by the client,
however, a conflict may arise between the lawyer's
duty to keep the client's revelations confidential and
the duty of candor to the court. Upon ascertaining
that material evidence is false, the lawyer should
seek to persuade the client that the evidence should
not be offered or, if it has been offered, that its
false character should immediately be disclosed. If
the persuasion is ineffective, the lawyer must take
reasonable remedial measures.
Except in the defense of a criminal accused, the
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rule generally recognized is that, if necessary to
rectify the situation, an advocate must disclose the
existence of the client's deception to the court or to
the other party. Such a disclosure can result in grave
consequences to the client, including not only a
sense of betrayal but also loss of the case and
perhaps a prosecution for perjury. But the alternative is that the lawyer cooperate in deceiving the
court, thereby subverting the truth-finding process
which the adversary system is designed to implement. See Rule 1.2(c). Furthermore, unless it is
clearly understood that the lawyer will act upon the
duty to disclose the existence of false evidence, the
client can simply reject the lawyer's advice to reveal
the false evidence and insist that the lawyer keep
silent. Thus the client could in effect coerce the
lawyer into being a party to fraud on the court.

remedy the situation or is impossible, the advocate
should make disclosure to the court. It is for the
court then to determine what should be donemaking a statement about the matter to the trier of
fact, ordering a mistrial or perhaps nothing. If the.
false testimony was that of the client, the client may
controvert the lawyer's version of their communic-.
ation when the lawyer discloses the situation to the
court. If there is an issue whether the client has
committed perjury, the lawyer cannot represent the
client in resolution of the issue, and a mistrial may
be unavoidable. An unscrupulous client might in
this way attempt to produce a series of mistrials and
thus escape prosecution. However, a second such
encounter could be construed as a deliberate abuse
of the right to counsel and as such a waiver of the
right to further representation.

Perjury by a Criminal Defendant
Whether an advocate for a criminally accused has
the same duty of disclosure has been intensely
debated. While it is agreed that the lawyer should
seek to persuade the client to refrain from perjurious testimony, there has been dispute concerning
the lawyer's duty when that persuasion fails. If the
confrontation with the client occurs before trial, the
lawyer ordinarily can withdraw. Withdrawal before
trial may not be possible, however, either because
trial is imminent, or because the confrontation with
the client does not take place until the trial itself, or
because no other counsel is available.
The most difficult situation, therefore, arises in a
criminal case where the accused insists on testifying
when the lawyer knows that the testimony is perjurious. The lawyer's effort to rectify the situation
can increase the likelihood of the client's being
convicted as well as opening the possibility of prosecution for perjury. On the other hand, if the
lawyer does not exercise control over the proof, the
lawyer participates, although in a merely passive
way, in deception of the court.
Three resolutions of this dilemma have been
proposed. One is to permit the accused to testify by
a narrative without guidance through the lawyer's
questioning. This compromises both contending
principles; it exempts the lawyer from the duty to
disclose false evidence but subjects the client to an
implicit disclosure of information imparted to
counsel. Another suggested resolution, of relatively
recent origin, is that the advocate be entirely
excused from the duty to reveal perjury if the
perjury is that of the client. This is a coherent solution but makes the advocate a knowing instrument
of perjury.
The other resolution of the dilemma is that the
lawyer must reveal the client's perjury if necessary
to rectify the situation. A criminal accused has a
right to the assistance of an advocate, a right to
testify and a right of confidential communication
with counsel. However, an accused should not have
a right to assistance of counsel in committing
perjury. Furthermore, an advocate has an obligation, not only in professional ethics but under the
law as well, to avoid implication in the commission
of perjury or other falsification of evidence. See
Rule 1.2(c).

Constitutional Requirements
The general rule-that an advocate must disclose the existence of perjury with respect to a material fact even that of a client-applies to defense
counsel n criminal cases, as well as in other instances Hbwever, the definition of the lawyer's ethical
duty in such a situation may be qualified by constitutional provisions for due process and the right to
counsel in criminal cases. In some jurisdictions these
provisions have been construed to require that
counsel present an accused as a witness if the
accused fishes to testify, even if counsel knows the
testimony will be false. The obligation of the advocate under these Rules is subordinate to such a
constitutional requirement.

Remedial Measures
If perjured testimony or false evidence has been
offered, the advocate's proper course ordinarily is
to remonstrate with the client confidentially. If that
fails, the advocate should seek to withdraw if that
will remedy the situation. If withdrawal will not
Code«Co
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Duration of Obligation
A practical time limit on the obligation to rectify
the presentation of false evidence has to be established. The conclusion of the proceeding is a reasonably definite point for the termination of the obligation.
Refusing to Offer Proof Believed to be False
Generally speaking, a lawyer has authority to
refuse to offer testimony or other proof that the
lawyer Mieves is untrustworthy. Offering such
proof may reflect adversely on the lawyer's ability
to discriminate in the quality of evidence and thus
impair the lawyer's effectiveness as an advocate. In
criminal cases, however, a lawyer may, in some
jurisdiictions, be denied this authority by constitutional requirements governing the right to counsel.
Ex Parte Proceedings
Ordinarily, an advocate has the limited responsibility of presenting one side of the matters that a
tribunal should consider in reaching a decision; the
conflicting position is expected to be presented by
the opposing party. However, in an ex parte proceeding, such as an application for a temporary restraining order, there is no balance of presentation by
opposing advocates. The object of an ex parte proceeding is nevertheless to yield a substantially just
result. The judge has an affirmative responsibility to
accord the absent party just consideration. The
lawyer for the represented party has the correlative
duty to make disclosures of material facts known to
the lawyer and that the lawyer reasonably believes
are necessary to an informed decision.
CODE COMPARISON
Paragraph (aXO is substantially identical to DR 7102(AK5)L which provided that a lawyer shall not
"knowingly make a false statement of law or fact."
Paragraph (a)(2) is implicit in DR 7-102(A)(3),
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which provided that a "lawyer shall not ... knowingly fail to disclose that which he is required by law
to reveal."
Paragraph (a)(3) is substantially identical to DR 7i06(B)(l).

With regard to paragraph (a)(4), the first sentence
of this subparagraph is similar to DR 7- 102(A)(4),
which provided that a lawyer shall not "knowingly
use" perjured testimony or false evidence. The
second sentence of paragraph (a)(4) resolves an
ambiguity in the Code concerning the action required of a lawyer when he discovers that he has
offered perjured testimony or false evidence. DR 7102(A)(4), quoted above, did not expressly deal with.
this situation, but the prohibition against "use" of
false evidence can be construed to preclude carrying
through with a case based on such evidence when
that fact has become known during the trial. DR 7102(B)(1), also noted in connection with Rule 1.6,
provided that a lawyer "who receives information
clearly establishing that ... his client has ... perpetrated a fraud upon ... a tribunal shall [if the client
does not rectify the situation] ... reveal the fraud to
the... tribunal ..." Since use of perjured testimony
or false evidence is usually regarded as "fraud"
upon the court, DR 7-102(B)(l) apparently required disclosure by the lawyer in such circumstances.
However, Utah has amended DR 7-102(B)(1) in
conformity with an ABA-recommended amendment to provide that the duty of disclosure does not
apply when the "information is protected a$ a privileged communication." This qualification may be
empty, for the rule of attorney-client privilege has
been construed to exclude communications that
further a crime, including a crime of perjury. On
this interpretation of DR 7-102(B)(1), the lawyer
has a duty to disclose the perjury.
Paragraph (c) confers discretion on the lawyer to
refuse to offer evidence that he "reasonably believes" is false. This gives the lawyer more latitude
than DR 7-102(A)(4), which prohibited the lawyer
from offering evidence the lawyer "knows" is false.
There was no "countermart in the Code to paragraph (d).

RULE 3.4 FAIRNESS TO OPPOSING
PARTY AND COUNSEL
A LAWYER SHALL NOT:
(a) UNLAWFULLY OBSTRUCT ANOTHER
PARTY'S ACCESS TO EVIDENCE OR UNLAWFULLY ALTER, DESTROY OR CONCEAL A
DOCUMENT OR OTHER MATERIAL HAVING
POTENTIAL EVIDENTIARY VALUE. A
LAWYER SHALL NOT COUNSEL OR ASSIST
ANOTHER PERSON TO DO ANY SUCH ACT;
(b) FALSIFY EVIDENCE, COUNSEL OR
ASSIST A WITNESS TO TESTIFY FALSELY, OR
OFFER AN INDUCEMENT TO A WITNESS
THAT IS PROHIBITED BY LAW;
(c) KNOWINGLY DISOBEY AN OBLIGATION
UNDER THE RULES OF A TRIBUNAL EXCEPT
FOR AN OPEN REFUSAL BASED ON AN ASSERTION THAT NO VALID OBLIGATION
EXISTS*
(d) IN PRETRIAL PROCEDURE, MAKE A
FRIVOLOUS DISCOVERY REQUEST OR FAIL
TO MAKE REASONABLY DILIGENT EFFORT
TO COMPLY WITH A LEGALLY PROPER
DISCOVERY REQUEST BY AN OPPOSING
PARTY;
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(e) IN TRIAL, ALLUDE TO ANY MATTER
THAT THE LAWYER DOES NOT REASONABLY BELIEVE IS RELEVANT OR THAT WILL
NOT BE SUPPORTED BY ADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE, ASSERT PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE OF
FACTS IN ISSUE EXCEPT WHEN TESTIFYING
AS A WITNESS, OR STATE A PERSONAL
OPINION AS TO THE JUSTNESS OF A CAUSE,
THE CREDIBILITY OF A WITNESS, THE
CULPABILITY OF A CIVIL LITIGANT OR THE
GUILT OR INNOCENCE OF AN ACCUSED; OR
(0 REQUEST A PERSON OTHER THAN A
CLIENT TO REFRAIN FROM VOLUNTARILY
GIVING RELEVANT INFORMATION TO
ANOTHER PARTY UNLESS:
(1) THE PERSON IS A RELATIVE OR AN
EMPLOYEE OR OTHER AGENT OF A CLIENT;
AND
(2) THE LAWYER REASONABLY BELIEVES THAT THE PERSON'S INTERESTS WILL
NOT BE ADVERSELY AFFECTED BY REFRAINING FROM GIVING SUCH INFORMATION.
COMMENT:
The procedure of the adversary system contemplates that the evidence in a case is to be marshalled
competitively by the contending parties. Fair competition in the adversary system is secured by prohibitions against destruction or concealment of evidence, improperly influencing witnesses, obstructive
tactics in discovery procedure, and the like.
Documents and other items of evidence are often
essential to establish a claim or defense. Subject to
evidentiary privileges, the right of an opposing
party, including the government, to obtain evidence
through discovery or subpoena is an important
procedural right. The exercise of that right can be
frustrated if relevant material is altered, concealed
or destroyed. Applicable law in many jurisdictions
makes it an offense to destroy material for the
purpose of impairing its availability in a pending
proceeding or one whose commencement can be
foreseen. Falsifying evidence is also generally a criminal offense. Paragraph (a) applies to evidentiary
material generally, including computerized information.
With regard to paragraph (b), it is not improper
to pay a witness's expenses or to compensate an
expert witness on terms permitted by law. The
common law rule in most jurisdictions is that it is
improper to pay an occurrence witness any fee for
testifying and that it is improper to pay an expert
witness a contingent fee.
Paragraph (0 permits a lawyer to advise employees of a client to refrain from giving information
to another party, for the employees may identify
their interests with those of the client. See also Rule
4.2.
CODE COMPARISON
With regard to paragraph (a), DR 7-102(A)
provided that a lawyer 'shall not suppress any evidence that he or his client has a legal obligation to
reveal." DR 7-109(B) provided that a lawyer "shall
not advise or cause a person to secrete himself ...
for the purpose of making him unavailable as a
witness ....* DR 7-106(C)(7) provided that a lawyer
shall not ' [intentionally or habitually violate any
established rule of procedure or of evidence."
With regard to paragraph (b), DR 7-102(A)(6)
provided that *a lawyer shall not participate in the
creation or preservation of evidence when he knows
or it is obvious that the evidence is false.* DR 7-
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, 109(C) provided that a lawyer "shall not pay, offer
to pay, or acquiesce in the payment of compensation to a witness contingent upon the content of his
testimony or the outcome of the case. But a lawyer
may advance, guarantee or acquiesce in the payment
of: (1) Expenses reasonably incurred by a witness in
attending or testifying; (2) Reasonable compensation
to a witness for his foss of time in attending or testifying; [or] (3) A reasonable fee for the professional
services of an expert witness." EC 7-28 stated that
witnesses "should always testify truthfully and
should be free from any financial inducements that
might tempt them to do otherwise."
Paragraph (c) is substantially similar to DR 7106(A), which provided that a lawyer "shall not
disregard ... a standing rule of a tribunal or a ruling
of a tribunal made in the course of a proceeding,
but he may take appropriate steps in good faith to
test the validity of such rule or ruling.
Paragraph (d) has no counterpart in the Code.
Paragraph (e) substantially incorporates DR 7106(C)(1), (2), (3) and (4). DR 7-106(C)(2) proscribed asking a question "intended to degrade a
witness or other person," a matter dealt with in Rule
4.4. DR 7-106(C)(5), providing that a lawyer shall
not "[f]ail to comply with known local customs of
courtesy or practice," was too vague to be a rule of
conduct enforceable as law.
With regard to paragraph (0. DR 7-104(A)(2)
provided that a lawyer shall not "[g]ive advice to a
person who is not represented ... other than the
advice to secure counsel, if the interests of such
person are or have a reasonable possibility of being
in conflict with the interests of his client."

RULE 3.5 IMPARTIALITY AND
DECORUM OF THE TRIBUNAL
A LAWYER SHALL NOT:
(a) SEEK TO INFLUENCE A JUDGE, JUROR,
PROSPECTIVE JUROR OR OTHER OFFICIAL
BY MEANS PROHIBITED BY LAW; OR
(b) COMMUNICATE EX PARTE WITH A
JUROR OR PROSPECTIVE JUROR BEFORE
THE DISCHARGE OF THE JURY EXCEPT AS
PERMITTED BY LAW; OR
(c) IN AN ADVERSARY PROCEEDING,
COMMUNICATE, OR CAUSE ANOTHER TO
COMMUNICATE, AS TO THE MERITS OF THE
CAUSE WITH A JUDGE OR OTHER OFFICIAL
BEFORE WHOM A MATTER IS PENDING,
EXCEPT:
(1) IN THE COURSE OF OFFICIAL PROCEEDINGS fN THE CAUSE;
(2) IN WRITING IF THE LAWYER PROMPTLY DELIVERS A COPY OF THE WRITING
TO OPPOSING COUNSEL OR TO THE
ADVERSE PARTY IF SUCH PARTY IS NOT
REPRESENTED BY A LAWYER;
(3) ORALLY UPON ADEQUATE NOTICE
TO OPPOSING COUNSEL OR ' TO THE
ADVERSE PARTY IF SUCH PARTY IS NOT
REPRESENTED BY A LAWYER; OR
(4) AS OTHERWISE AUTHORIZED BY
LAW* OR
(d)'ENGAGE IN CONDUCT INTENDED TO
DISRUPT A TRIBUNAL.
COMMENT:
Many forms of improper influence upon a tribunal are proscribed by criminal law. Others are
specified in the Code of Judicial Conduct, with
Code • Co
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which an advocate should be familiar. A lawyer is
required to avoid contributing to a violation of such
prov sions.
The advocate's function is to present evidence
and argument so that the cause may be decided
according to law. Refraining from abusive or obstreperous conduct is a corollary of the advocate's
right to speak on behalf of fttigants. A (awyer may
stand firm against abuse by a judge but should
avoid reciprocation; the judge's default is no justification for similar dereliction by an advocate. An
advocate can present the cause, protect the record
for subsequent review and preserve professional
integrity by patient firmness no less effectively than
by belligerence or theatrics.
CODE COMPARISON
with regard to paragraphs (a) and (b), DR 7108(A) provided that "[bjefore the trial of a case a
lawyer ... shall not communicate with ... anyone he
knows to be a member of the venire . . . / DR 7108(B) provided that during the trial of a case a
lawyer "shall not communicate with ... any member
ofthpjury."
Paragraph (c) is substantially similar to DR

7-flO(B).
W th regard to paragraph (d), DR 7-106(C)(6)
provided that a lawyer shall not engage in
"undignified or discourteous conduct which is degrading to a tribunal/
RLL£

3.6 TRIAL PUBLICITY

(a) A LAWYER SHALL NOT MAKE OR
CAUSE ANOTHER TO MAKE AN EXTRAJUDICIAL STATEMENT THAT A REASONABLE
PERSON WOULD EXPECT TO BE DISSEMINATED BY MEANS OF PUBLIC COMMUNICATION IF THE LAWYER KNOWS OR REASONABLY SHOULD KNOW THAT IT WILL HAVE
A SUBSTANTIAL LIKELIHOOD OF MATERIALLY INFLUENCING AN ADJUDICATIVE
PROCEEDING.
|
(b) A STATEMENT REFERRED TO IN PARAGRAPH (a) ORDINARILY IS LIKELY TO
HAVfE SUCH AN EFFECT WHEN IT REFERS
TO A CIVIL MATTER TRIABLE TO A JURY, A
CRIMINAL MATTER, OR ANY OTHER PROCEEDING THAT COULD RESULT IN INCARCERATION, AND THE STATEMENT RELATES
TO:
(1) THE CHARACTER, CREDIBILITY,
REPUTATION OR CRIMINAL RECORD OF A
PARTY, SVSPECT IS A CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION OR WITNESS, OR THE IDENTITY OF
A WITNESS, OR THE EXPECTED TESTIMONY
OF A PARTY OR WITNESS;
(2) IN A CRIMINAL CASE OR PROCEEDING THAT COULD RESULT IN INCARCERATION, THE POSSIBILITY OF A PLEA OF
GUILTY TO THE OFFENSE OR THE EXISTENCE OR CONTENTS OF ANY CONFESSION,
ADMISSION, OR STATEMENT GIVEN BY A
DEFENDANT OR SUSPECT OR THAT
PERSON'S REFUSAL OR FAILURE TO MAKE
A STATEMENT;
13) THE PERFORMANCE OR RESULTS OF
ANY EXAMINATION OR TEST OR THE
REFUSAL OR FAILURE OF A PERSON TO
SUBMIT TO AN EXAMINATION OR TEST, OR
THE IDENTITY OR NATURE OF PHYSICAL
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legal consequences and about legal proceedings
themselves. The public has a right to know about
threats to its safety and measures aimed at assuring
its security. It also has a legitimate interest in the
conduct of judicial proceedings, particularly in
matters of general public concern. Furthermore, the
subject matter of legal proceedings is often of direct
significance in debate and deliberation over questions of public policy.
No body of rules can simultaneously satisfy all
interests of fair trial and all those of free expression.
The formula in this Rule is based upon the Code of
Professional Responsibility and the ABA Standards
Relating to Fair Trial and Free Press, as amended in
1978.
Special rules of confidentiality may validly govern
proceedings in juvenile, domestic relations and
mental disability proceedings, and perhaps other
types of litigation. Rule 3.4(c) requires compliance
with such Rules.

EVIDENCE EXPECTED TO BE PRESENTED;
(4) ANY OPINION AS TO THE GUILT OR
INNOCENCE OF A DEFENDANT OR SUSPECT
IN A CRIMINAL CASE OR PROCEEDING
THAT COULD RESULT IN INCARCERATION;
(5) INFORMATION THE LAWYER KNOWS
OR REASONABLY SHOULD KNOW IS LIKELY
TO BE INADMISSIBLE AS EVIDENCE IN A
TRIAL AND WOULD IF DISCLOSED CREATE
A SUBSTANTIAL RISK OF PREJUDICING AN
IMPARTIAL TRIAL; OR
(6) THE FACT THAT A DEFENDANT HAS
BEEN CHARGED WITH A CRIME, UNLESS
THERE IS INCLUDED THEREIN A STATEMENT EXPLAINING THAT THE CHARGE IS
MERELY AN ACCUSATION AND THAT THE
DEFENDANT IS PRESUMED INNOCENT
UNTIL AND UNLESS PROVEN GUILTY.
(c) SUBJECT TO THE PROVISIONS OF PARAGRAPHS (a) and (b), A LAWYER INVOLVED
IN THE INVESTIGATION OR LITIGATION OF
A MATTER MAY STATE WITHOUT ELABORATION:
(1) THE GENERAL NATURE OF THE
CLAIM OR DEFENSE;
(2) THE INFORMATION CONTAINED IN A
PUBLIC RECORD;
(3) THAT AN INVESTIGATION OF THE
MATTER IS IN PROGRESS, INCLUDING THE
GENERAL SCOPE OF THE INVESTIGATION,
THE OFFENSE OR CLAIM OR DEFENSE INVOLVED AND, EXCEPT WHEN PROHIBITED
BY LAW, THE IDENTITY OF THE PERSONS
INVOLVED; "
(4) THE SCHEDULING OR RESULT OF
ANY STEP IN LITIGATION;
(5) A REQUEST FOR ASSISTANCE IN
OBTAINING EVIDENCE AND INFORMATION
NECESSARY THERETO;
(6) A WARNING OF DANGER CONCERNING THE BEHAVIOR OF A PERSON INVOLVED, WHEN-THERE IS REASON TO BELIEVE
THAT THERE EXISTS THE LIKELIHOOD OF
SUBSTANTIAL HARM TO AN INDIVIDUAL OR
TO THE PUBLIC INTEREST; AND
(7) IN A CRIMINAL CASE:
(i) THE IDENTITY, AGE, RESIDENCE,
OCCUPATION AND FAMILY STATUS OF THE
ACCUSED;
(ii) IF THE ACCUSED HAS NOT BEEN
APPREHENDED, INFORMATION NECESSARY
TO AID IN APPREHENSION OF THAT
PERSON;
(iii) THE FACT, TIME AND PLACE OF
ARREST; AND
(iv) THE IDENTITY OF INVESTIGATING
AND ARRESTING OFFICERS OR AGENCIES
AND THE LENGTH OF THE INVESTIGATION.

(a) A LAWYER SHALL NOT ACT AS ADVOCATE AT A TRIAL IN WHICH THE LAWYER
IS LIKELY TO BE A NECESSARY WITNESS
EXCEPT WHERE:
(1) THE TESTIMONY RELATES TO AN
UNCONTESTED ISSUE;
(2) THE TESTIMONY RELATES TO THE
NATURE AND VALUE OF LEGAL SERVICES
RENDERED IN THE CASE; OR
(3) DISQUALIFICATION OF THE LAWYER
WOULD WORK SUBSTANTIAL HARDSHIP ON
THE CLIENT.
(b) A LAWYER MAY ACT AS ADVOCATE IN
THE TRIAL IN WHICH ANOTHER LAWYER
IN THE LAWYERS FIRM IS LIKELY TO BE
CALLED AS A WITNESS UNLESS PRECLUDED
FROM DOING SO BY RULE 1.7 OR RULE 1.9.

COMMENT:
It is difficult to strike a balance between protecting the right to a fair trial and safeguarding the
right of free expression. Preserving the right to a
fair trial necessarily entails some curtailment of the
information that may be disseminated about a party
prior to trial, particularly where trial by jury is
involved. If there were no such limits, the result
would be the practical nullification of the protective
effect of the rules of forensic decorum and the
exclusionary rules of evidence. On the other hand,
there are vital social interests served by the free
dissemination of information about events having

COMMENT:
Combining the roles of advocate and witness can
prejudice the opposing party and can involve a
conflict of interest between the lawyer and client.
The opposing party has proper objection where
the combination of roles may prejudice that party's
rights in the litigation. A witness is required to
testify on the basis of personal knowledge, while an
advocate is expected to explain and comment on
evidence given by others. It may not be clear
whether a statement by an advocate-witness should
be taken as proof or as an analysis of the proof.
Paragraph (a)(1) recognizes that if the testimony

1*

CODE COMPARISON
Rule 3.6 is similar to DR 7-107, except as
follows: First, Rule 3.6 adopts the general criteria of
"substantial likelihood of materially influencing an
adjudicative proceeding" to describe impermissible
conduct. Second, Rule 3.6 transforms the particulars
in DR 7-107 into an illustrative compilation that
gives fair notice of conduct ordinarily posing unacceptable dangers to the fair administration of
justice. Finally, Rule 3.6 omits DR 7-107(C)(7),
which provided that a lawyer may reveal *[a]t the
time of seizure, a description of the physical evidence seized, other than a confession, admission or
statement." Such revelations may be substantially
prejudicial and are frequently the subject of pretrial
suppression motions, which, if successful, may be
circumvented by prior disclosure to the press.

RULE 3.7 LAWYER AS WITNESS
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will be uncontested, the ambiguities in the dual role
are purely theoretical. Paragraph (a)(2) recognizes
that where the testimony concerns the extent and
value of legal services rendered in the action in
which the testimony is offered, permitting the
lawyer to testify avoids the need for a second trial
with new counsel to resolve that issue. Moreover, in
such a situation, the judge has first hand knowledge
of the matter in issue; hence, there is less dependence on the adversary process to test the credibility
of the testimony.
Apart from these two exceptions, paragraph (a)(3)
recognizes that a balancing is required between the
interests of the client and those of the opposing
party. Whether the opposing party is likely to suffer
prejudice depends on the nature of the case, the
importance and probable tenor of the lawyer's testimony, and the probability that the lawyer's testimony will conflict with that of other witnesses. Even
if there is risk of such prejudice, in determining
whether the lawyer should be disqualified, due
regard must be given to the effect of disqualification
on the lawyer's client. It is relevant that one or both
parties could reasonably foresee that the lawyer
would probably be a witness. The principle of
imputed disqualification stated in Rule 1.10 has no
application to this aspect of the problem.
Whether the combination of roles involves an
improper conflict of interest with respect to the
client is determined by Rule 1.7 or 1.9. For
example, if there is likely to be substantial conflict
between the testimony of the client and that of the
lawyer or a member of the lawyer's firm, the representation is improper. The problem can arise
whether the lawyer is called as a witness on behalf
of the client or is called by the opposing party.
Determining whether or not such a conflict exists is
primarily the responsibility of the lawyer involved.
See Comment to Rule 1.7. If a lawyer who is a
member of a firm may not act as both advocate and
witness by reason of conflict of interest, Rule 1.10
disqualifies the firm also.
CODE COMPARISON
DR 5-102(A) prohibited a lawyer, or the
lawyer's firm, from serving as advocate if the
lawyer "learned or it is obvious that he or a lawyer
in his firm ought to be called as a witness on behalf
of his client." DR 5-102(B) provided that a lawyer,
and the lawyer's firm, may continue representation
if the "lawyer learns or it is obvious that he or a
lawyer in his firm may be called as a witness other
than on behalf of his client ... until it is apparent
that his testimony is or may be prejudicial to his
client." DR 5-101(B) permitted a lawyer to testify
while representing a client: "(1) If the testimony will
relate solely to an uncontested matterr (2) If the
testimony will relate solely to a matter of formality
and there is no reason to believe that substantial
evidence will be offered in opposition to the testimony; (3) If the testimony will relate solely to the
nature and value of legal services rendered in the
case by the lawyer or his firm to the client; (4) As to
any matter if refusal would work a substantial hardship on the client because of the distinctive value
of the lawyer or his firm as counsel in the particular
case."
The exception stated in paragraph (a)(1) consolidates provisions of DR 5-101<BMl) and (2). Testimony relating to formality, referred to in DR 5101(B)(2), in effect defined the phrase "uncontested
issue," and was redundant.
Code • C o
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RULp 3.8 SPECIAL
RESPONSIBILITIES OF A
PROSECUTOR
TH£ PROSECUTOR IN A CRIMINAL CASE
SHALL:
(A) R E F R A I N FROM P R O S E C U T I N G A
CHARGE THAT THE PROSECUTOR KNOWS IS
NOT $UPPORTED BY PROBABLE CAUSE;
(B) MAKE REASONABLE EFFORTS T O
ASSURE THAT THE ACCUSED HAS BEEN
'ADVISED O F THE RIGHT TO, AND THE
PROCEDURE FOR OBTAINING, COUNSEL
AND HAS BEEN GIVEN REASONABLE OPPORTUNITY T O OBTAIN COUNSEL;
(C) NOT SEEK TO OBTAIN FROM AN UNREPRESENTED ACCUSED A WAIVER OF IMPORTANT PRETRIAL RIGHTS, SUCH AS THE
RIGHF TO A PRELIMINARY HEARING;
(D) MAKE TIMELY DISCLOSURE TO T H E
DEFENSE OF ALL EVIDENCE OR INFORMATION KNOWN T O THE PROSECUTOR THAT
TENDS TO NEGATE THE GUILT OF T H E
ACCUSED OR MITIGATES THE OFFENSE,
AND, IN CONNECTION WITH SENTENCING,
DISCLOSE TO THE DEFENSE ALL UNPRIVILEGED MITIGATING INFORMATION KNOWN
TO THE PROSECUTOR, EXCEPT WHEN THE
PROSECUTOR IS RELIEVED OF THIS RESPONSIBILITY BY A PROTECTIVE ORDER O F
THETJRIBUNAL;AND
(E) EXERCISE REASONABLE CARE T O
PREVENT INVESTIGATORS, LAW ENFORCEMENT PERSONNEL, EMPLOYEES OR OTHER
PERSONS ASSISTING OR ASSOCIATED WITH
THE PROSECUTOR IN A CRIMINAL CASE
FROM MAKING AN EXTRAJUDICIAL STATEMENT THAT, THE PROSECUTOR WOULD BE
PROHIBITED FROM MAKING UNDER RULE
3.6.
COMMENT:
A prosecutor has the responsibility of a minister
of justice and not simply that of an advocate. This
responsibility carries with it specific obligations to
see that the defendant is accorded procedural justice
and that guilt is decided upon the basis of sufficient
evidence. Precisely how far the prosecutor is required to go in this direction is a matter of debate and
varies in different jurisdictions. See Rule 3.3(d),
governing ex parte proceedings, among which grand
jury proceedings are included. Applicable law may
require other measures by the prosecutor and
knowing disregard of those obligations or systematic
abuse of prosecutorial discretion could constitute a
violation of Rule 8.4.
Paragraph (c) does not apply to an accused appearing pro se with the approval of the tribunal. Nor
does it forbid the lawful questioning of a suspect
who has knowingly waived the rights to counsel and
silence.
The exception in paragraph (d) recognizes that a
prosecutor may seek an appropriate protective order
from the tribunal if disclosure of information to the
defensei could result in substantial harm to an individual 4r to the public interest.
CODE COMPARISON
DR 1- 103(A) provided that a 'public prosecutor
... shal} not institute ... criminal charges when he
knows or it is obvious that the charges are not
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supported by probable cause/ DR 7-103(B) provided that "[a] public prosecutor ... shall make timely
disclosure ... of the existence of evidence, known to
the prosecutor ... that tends to negate the guilt of
the accused, mitigate the degree of the offense, or
reduce the punishment.*

RULE 3.9 ADVOCATE IN
NONADJUDICATIVE PROCEEDINGS
A LAWYER REPRESENTING A CLIENT
BEFORE A LEGISLATIVE OR ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL IN A NONADJUDICATIVE'
PROCEEDING SHALL DISCLOSE THAT THE
APPEARANCE IS IN A REPRESENTATIVE
CAPACITY AND SHALL CONFORM TO THE
PROVISIONS OF RULES 3.3(a) THROUGH (c),
3.4(a) THROUGH (c), and 3.5.
COMMENT:
In representation before bodies such as legislatures, municipal councils, and executive and administrative agencies acting in a rule-making or policymaking capacity, lawyers present facts, formulate
issues and advance argument in the matters under
consideration. The decision-making body, like a
court, should be able to rely on the integrity of the
submissions made to it. A lawyer appearing before
such a body should deal with the tribunal honestly
dure.
Lawyers have no exclusive right to appear before
nonadjudicative bodies, as they do before a court.
The requirements of this Rule therefore may subject
lawyers to regulations inapplicable to advocates who
are not lawyers. However, legislatures and administrative agencies have a right to expect lawyers to
deal with them as they deal with courts.
This Rule does not apply to representation of a
client in negotiation or other bilateral transaction
with a governmental agency; representation in such
a transaction is governed by Rules 4.1 through 4.4.

ai v^unuuci

TRANSACTIONS WITH
PERSONS OTHER THAN
CLIENTS
RULE 4.1 TRUTHFULNESS IN
STATEMENTS TO OTHERS
IN THE COURSE OF REPRESENTING A
CLIENT A LAWYER SHALL NOT KNOWINGLY:
(a) MAKE A FALSE STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACT OR LAW TO A THIRD PERSON;
OR
(b) FAIL TO DISCLOSE A MATERIAL FACT
TO A THIRD PERSON WHEN DISCLOSURE IS
NECESSARY TO AVOID ASSISTING A CRIMINAL OR FRAUDULENT ACT BY A CLIENT,
UNLESS DISCLOSURE IS PROHIBITED BY
RULE 1.6.
COMMENT:
Misrepresentation

A lawyer is required to be truthful when dealing
with others on a client's behalf, but generally has
no affirmative duty to inform an opposing party of
relevant facts. A misrepresentation can occur if the
lawyer incorporates or affirms a statement of
another person that the lawyer knows is false. Misrepresentations can also occur by failure to act.
Statements of Fact

This rule refers to statements of fact. Whether a
particular statement should be regarded as one of
fact can depend on circumstances. Under generally
accepted conventions in negotiation, certain types of
statements ordinarily are not taken as statements of
niaterial fact. Estimates of price or value placed on
the subject of a transaction and a party's intentions
CODE COMPARISON
ai to an acceptable settlement of a claim are in this
EC 7-15 stated that a lawyer "appearing before category, and so is the existence of an undisclosed
an administrative agency, regardless of the nature of principal except where nondisclosure of the principal
the proceeding it is conducting, has the continuing would constitute fraud.
duty to advance the cause of his client within the
bounds of the law." EC 7-16 stated that "[w]hen a Fraud by Client
Paragraph (b) recognizes that substantive law may
lawyer appears in connection with proposed legislation, he ... should comply with applicable laws and require a lawyer to disclose certain information to
legislative rules." EC 8-5 stated that "fraudulent, avoid being deemed to have assisted the client's
deceptive, or otherwise illegal conduct by a partici- crime or fraud. The requirement of disclosure
paivi \TI % pioctt&ttg btioit a ... teg&taivtt bo<ty ... coaxed by this. paxa&ta.yK U, however > yibscct to tte
should never be participated in ... by lawyers." DR obligations created by Rule 1.6.
7-106(B)(l) provided that "[i)n presenting a matter CODE COMPARISON
to a tribunal, a lawyer shall disclose ... [u)niess
Paragraph (a) is substantially similar to DR 7privileged or irrelevant, the identity of the clients he 102(A)(5), which stated that *[i]n his representation
represents and of the persons who employed him."
of a client, a lawyer shall not ... [kjnowingly make a
false statement of law or fact."
With regard to paragraph (b), DR 7-102(A)(3)
provided that a lawyer shall not *[c]onceal or knowingly fail to disclose that which he is required by
law to reveal/

RULE 4.2 COMMUNICATION WITH
PERSON REPRESENTED BY
COUNSEL
IN REPRESENTING A CLIENT, A LAWYER
SHALL NOT COMMUNICATE ABOUT THE
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SUBJECT OF THE REPRESENTATION WITH A
PARTY THE LAWYER KNOWS TO BE REPRESENTED BY ANOTHER LAWYER IN THE
MATTER, UNLESS THE LAWYER HAS THE
CONSENT OF THE OTHER LAWYER OR IS
AUTHORIZED BY LAW TO DO SO.
COMMENT:
This Rule does not prohibit communication witn a
party, or an employee or agent of a party, concerning matters outside the representation. For
example, the existence of a controversy between a
government agency and a private party, or between
two organizations, does not prohibit a lawyer for
either from communicating with nonlawyer representatives of the other regarding a separate matter.
Also, parties to a matter may communicate directly
with each other and a lawyer having independent
justification for communicating with the other party
is permitted to do so. Communications authorized
by law include, for example, the right of a party to
a controversy with a government agency to speak
with government officials about the matter.
In the case of an organization, this Rule prohibits
communications by a lawyer for one party concerning the matter in representation with persons
having a managerial responsibility on behalf of the
organization, and with any other person whose act
or omission in connection with that matter may he
imputed to the organization for purposes of civil or
criminal liability or whose statement may constitute
an admission on the part of the organization. If an
agent or employee of the organization is represented
in the matter by his or her own counsel, the consent
by that counsel to a communication will be sufficient for purposes of this Rule. Compare Rule 3.4(0.
This Rule also covers any person, whether or not
a party to a formal proceeding, who is represented
by counsel concerning the matter in question.
CODE COMPARISON
This Rule is substantially identical to DR 7104<AX1).

RULE 4.3 DEALING WITH
UNREPRESENTED PERSON
(a) DURING THE COURSE OF A LAWYER'S
REPRESENTATION OF A CLIENT, THE
LAWYER SHALL NOT GIVE ADVICE TO AN
UNREPRESENTED PERSON OTHER THAN
THE ADVICE TO OBTAIN COUNSEL.
(b) IN DEALING ON BEHALF OF A~CLIENT
WITH A PERSON WHO IS NOT REPRESENTED
BY COUNSEL, A LAWYER SHALL NOT STATE
OR IMPLY THAT THE LAWYER IS DISINTERESTED. WHEN THE LAWYER KNOWS OR
REASONABLY SHOULD KNOW THAT THE
UNREPRESENTED PERSON MISUNDERSTANDS THE LAWYER'S ROLE IN THE
MATTER, THE LAWYER SHALL MAKE REASONABLE EFFORTS TO CORRECT THE MISUNDERSTANDING.
COMMENT:
An unrepresented person, particularly one not
experienced in dealing with legal matters, might
assume that a lawyer is disinterested in loyalties or is
a disinterested authority on the law even when the
lawyer represents a client.
CODE COMPARISON
There was no direct counterpart to this Rule in
Code* Co

the Code. DR 7-104(A)(2) provided that a lawyer
shall not *[g]ive advice to a person who is not represented by a lawyer, other than the advice to secure
counsel..."

RULE 4.4 RESPECT FOR RIGHTS OF
TfflRD PERSONS
IN REPRESENTING A CLIENT, A LAWYER
SHALL NOT USE MEANS THAT HAVE NO
SUBSTANTIAL PURPOSE OTHER THAN TO
EMBARRASS, DELAY, OR BURDEN A THIRD
PERSON, OR USE METHODS OF OBTAINING
EVIIDENCE THAT VIOLATE THE LEGAL
RIGHTS OF SUCH A PERSON.

COMMENT:
Responsibility to a client requires a lawyer to
subordinate the interests of others to those of the
client, but that responsibility does not imply that a
lawyer may disregard the rights of third persons. It
is impractical to catalogue all such rights, but they
include legal restrictions on methods of obtaining
evidence from third persons.
CODE COMPARISON
Dk 7-106(C)(2) provided that a lawyer shall not
"[a]sk any question that he has no reasonable basis
to believe is relevant to the case and that is intended
to degrade a witness or other person/ DR 7102(^X0 provided that a lawyer shall not "take ...
actioh on behalf of his client when he knows or
when it is obvious that such action would serve
merely to harass or maliciously injure another." DR
7-108(D) provided that "[ajfter discharge of the
jury ... the lawyer shall not ask questions or make
comments to a member of that jury that are calculated merely to harass or embarrass the juror ..."
DR 7-108(E) provided that a lawyer "shall not
conduct ... a vexatious or harassing investigation of
either| a venireman or a juror."

LAW FIRMS AND
ASSOCIATIONS
RULE 5.1 RESPONSIBILITIES OR A
PARTNER OR SUPERVISORY
LAWYER
A PARTNER IN A LAW FIRM SHALL
E REASONABLE EFFORTS TO ENSURE
THAt THE FIRM HAS IN EFFECT MEASURES
GIVING REASONABLE ASSURANCE THAT
ALL LAWYERS IN THE FIRM CONFORM TO
THE RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT.
(b) A LAWYER HAVING DIRECT SUPERVISORY AUTHORITY OVER ANOTHER LAWYER
SHALL MAKE REASONABLE EFFORTS TO
ENSURE THAT THE OTHER LAWYER CONFORMS TO THE RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT.
(c) A LAWYER SHALL BE RESPONSIBLE
FOR (ANOTHER LAWYER'S VIOLATION OF
THE RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT IF:
. (1) THE LAWYER ORDERS OR, WITH
KNOWLEDGE OF THE SPECIFIC CONDUCT,
RATIFIES THE CONDUCT INVOLVED; OR
0 THE LAWYER IS A PARTNER IN THE
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LAW FIRM IN WHICH THE OTHER LAWYER
PRACTICES, OR HAS DIRECT SUPERVISORY
AUTHORITY OVER THE OTHER LAWYER,
AND KNOWS OF THE CONDUCT AT A TIME
WHEN ITS CONSEQUENCES CAN BE
AVOIDED OR MITIGATED BUT FAILS TO
TAKE REASONABLE REMEDIAL ACTION.
COMMENT:
Paragraphs (a) and (b) refer to lawyers who have
supervisory authority over the professional work of
a firm or legal department of a government agency.
This includes members of a partnership and the
shareholders in a law firm organized as a professional corporation; lawyers having supervisory authority in the law department of an enterprise or
government agency; and lawyers who have intermediate managerial responsibilities in a firm.
The measures required to fulfill the responsibility
prescribed in paragraphs (a) and (b) can depend on
the firm's structure and the nature of its practice.
In a small firm, informal supervision and occasional
admonition ordinarily might be sufficient. In a large
firm, or in practice situations in which intensely
difficult ethical problems frequently arise, more
elaborate procedures may be necessary. Some firms,
for example, have a procedure whereby junior
lawyers can make confidential referral of ethical
piobkms d\ttc\iv to & designated stnios partotT OT
special committee. See Rule 5.2. Firms, whether
large or small, may also -rely on continuing legal
education in professional ethics. In any event, the
ethical atmosphere of a firm can influence the
conduct of all its members and a lawyer having
authority over the work of another may not assume
that the subordinate lawyer will inevitably conform
to the Rules.
Paragraph (c)(1) expresses a general principle of
responsibility for acts of- another. See also Rule
8.4(a).
Paragraph (c)(2) defines the duty of a lawyer
having direct supervisory authority over performance of specific legal work by another lawyer.
Whether a lawyer has such supervisory authority in
particular circumstances is a question of fact. Partners of a private firm have at least indirect responsibility for all work being done by the firm, while a
partner in charge of a particular matter ordinarily
has direct authority over other firm lawyers engaged
in the matter. Appropriate remedial action by a
partner would depend on ^the immediacy of the
panati's iiwoNtnvttvt and the seriousness of the
misconduct. The supervisor is required to intervene
to prevent avoidable consequences of miscondua if
the supervisor knows that the misconduct occurred.
Thus, if a supervising lawyer knows that a subordinate misrepresented a matter to an opposing party
in negotiation, the supervisor as well as the subordinate has a duty to correct the resulting misapprehension.
Professional misconduct by a lawyer under supervision could reveal a violation of paragraph (b) on
the part of the supervisory lawyer even though it
does not entail a violation of paragraph (c) because
there was no direction, ratification or knowledge of
the violation.
Apart from this Rule and Rule 8.4(a), a lawyer
does not have disciplinary liability for the conduct
of a partner, associate or subordinate. Whether a
lawyer may be liable civilly or criminally for another
lawyer's conduct is a question of law beyond the
scope of these Rules.

COPE COMPARISON
There was no direct counterpart to this Rule in
the Code. DR 1-103(A) provided that a lawyer
"possessing unprivileged knowledge of a violation of
DR 1-102 shall report such knowledge to ... authority empowered to investigate or act upon such
violation."

RULE 5-2 RESPONSIBILITIES OF A
SUBORDINATE LAWYER
(a) A LAWYER IS BOUND BY THE RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT NOTWITHSTANDING THAT THE LAWYER ACTED AT THE
DIRECTION OF ANOTHER PERSON.
(D) A SUBORDINATE LAWYER DOES NOT
VIOLATE THE RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT IF THAT LAWYER ACTS IN ACCORPANCE WITH A SUPERVISORY LAWYER'S
REASONABLE RESOLUTION OF A QUESTION
OF PROFESSIONAL DUTY.
COMMENT:
Although a lawyer is not relieved of responsibility
for a violation by the fact that the lawyer acted at
the direction of a supervisor, that fact may be relevant in determining whether a lawyer had the knowledge required to render conduct a violation of the
Rules. For example, if a subordinate filed a frivolous pleading at the direction of a supervisor, the
subordinate would not be guilty of a professional
violation unless the subordinate knew of the document's frivolous character.
When lawyers in a supervisor-subordinate relationship encounter a matter involving professional
judgment as to ethical duty, the supervisor may
assume responsibility for making the judgment.
Otherwise a consistent course of action or position
could not be taken. If the question can reasonably
be answered only one way, the duty of both lawyers
is clear and they are equally responsible for fulfilling
it. If the question is reasonably arguable, someone
has to decide upon the course of action. That authority ordinarily reposes in the supervisor, and a
subordinate may be guided accordingly. For
example, if a question arises whether the interests of
two clients conflict under Rule 1.7, the supervisor's
reasonable resolution of the question should protect
the subordinate professionally if the resolution is
subsequently challenged.
CODE COMPARISON
There was no counterpart to this Rule in the
Code.

RULE 5.3 RESPONSIBILITIES
REGARDING NONLAWYER
ASSISTANTS
WITH RESPECT TO A NONLAWYER EMPLOYED OR RETAINED BY OR ASSOCIATED
WITH A LAWYER:
(a) A PARTNER IN A LAW FIRM SHALL
MAKE REASONABLE EFFORTS TO ENSURE
THAT THE FIRM HAS IN EFFECT MEASURES
GIVING REASONABLE ASSURANCE THAT
THE PERSON'S CONDUCT IS COMPATIBLE
WITH THE PROFESSIONAL OBLIGATIONS OF
THE LAWYER;
(b) A LAWYER HAVING DIRECT SUPERVISORY AUTHORITY OVER THE NONLAWYER
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SHALL MAKE REASONABLE EFFORTS TO
ENSURE THAT THE PERSON'S CONDUCT IS
COMPATIBLE WITH THE PROFESSIONAL
OBLIGATIONS OF THE LAWYER; AND
' (c) A LAWYER SHALL RE RESPONSIBLE
FOR CONDUCT OF SUCH A PERSON THAT
WOULD BE A VIOLATION OF THE RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT IF ENGAGED IN
BY A LAWYER IF:
(1) THE LAWYER ORDERS OR, WITH
KNOWLEDGE OF THE SPECIFIC CONDUCT,
RATIFIES THE CONDUCT INVOLVED; OR
(2) THE LAWYER IS A PARTNER IN THE
LAW FIRM IN WHICH THE PERSON IS EMPLOYED, OR HAS DIRECT SUPERVISORY
AUTHORITY OVER THE PERSON, AND
KNOWS OF THE CONDUCT AT A TIME WHEN
ITS CONSEQUENCES CAN BE AVOIDED OR
MITIGATED BUT FAILS TO TAKE REASONABLE REMEDIAL ACTION.
COMMENT:
Lawyers generally employ assistants in their practice, including secretaries, investigators, law student
interns, and paraprofessionals. Such assistants,
whether employees or independent contractors, act
for the lawyer in rendition of the lawyer's professional services. A lawyer should give such assistants
appropriate instruction and supervision concerning
the ethical aspects of their employment, particularly
regarding the obligation not to disclose information
relating to representation of the client, and should
be responsible for their work product. The measures
employed in supervising nonlawyers should take
account of the fact that they do not have legal training and are not subject to professional discipline.
CODE COMPARISON
There was no direct counterpart to this Rule in
the Code. DR 4-101(D) provided that a lawyer
"shall exercise reasonable care to prevent his employees, associates, and others whose services are
utilized by him.from disclosing or using confidences
or secrets of a client ... * DR 7-107(J) provided
that "[a] lawyer shall exercise reasonable care to
prevent his employees and associates from making
an extrajudicial statement that he would be prohibited from making under DR 7-107."

RULE 5.4 PROFESSIONAL
INDEPENDENCE OF A LAWYER
(a) A LAWYER OR LAW FIRM SHALL NOT
SHARE LEGAL FEES WITH A NONLAWYER,
EXCEPT THAT:
(1) AN AGREEMENT BY A LAWYER WITH
THE LAWYER'S FIRM, PARTNER, OR ASSOCIATE MAY PROVIDE FOR THE PAYMENT
OF MONEY, OVER A REASONABLE PERIOD
OF TIME AFTER THE LAWYER'S DEATH, TO
THE LAWYER'S ESTATE OR TO ONE OR
MORE SPECIFIED PERSONS;
(2) A LAWYER WHO UNDERTAKES TO
COMPLETE UNFINISHED LEGAL BUSINESS
OF A DECEASED LAWYER MAY PAY TO THE
ESTATE OF THE DECEASED LAWYER THAT
PROPORTION OF THE TOTAL COMPENSATION WHICH FAIRLY REPRESENTS THE
SERVICES RENDERED BY THE DECEASED
LAWYER;AND
(3) A LAWYER OR LAW FIRM MAY
INCLUDE NONLAWYER EMPLOYEES IN A !
Code • Co
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COMPENSATION OR RETIREMENT PLAN,
EVE1> THOUGH THE PLAN IS BASED IN
jLE OR IN PART ON. A PROFITING ARRANGEMENT.- ?•• •
LAWYER SHALL NOT FORM A PARiHIP WITH A NONLAWYER IF ANY OF
ACTIVITIES OF THE PARTNERSHIP
CONSIST OF THE PRACTICE OF LAW.
(c) A LAWYER SHALL NOT PERMIT A
PERSON WHO RECOMMENDS, EMPLOYS, OR
PAYS THE LAWYER TO RENDER LEGAL
SERVICES FOR ANOTHER TO DIRECT OR
REGULATE THE LAWYER'S PROFESSIONAL
JUDGMENT IN RENDERING SUCH LEGAL
SERVICES.
(d) A LAWYER SHALL NOT PRACTICE
WITH OR IN THE FORM OF A PROFESSIONAL
CORPORATION OR ASSOCIATION AUTHORX> PRACTICE LAW FOR A PROFIT, IF:
A NONLAWYER OWNS ANY INTEREST
ilN, EXCEPT THAT A FIDUCIARY
•SENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE OF A
•R MAY HOLD THE STOCK OR INTEREST OF THE LAWYER FOR A REASONABLE
TIME DURING ADMINISTRATION;
(2) A NONLAWYER IS A CORPORATE
"OR OR OFFICER THEREOF; OR
A NONLAWYER HAS THE RIGHT TO
OR CONTROL THE PROFESSIONAL
•NT OF A LAWYER.
LAWYER MAY PRACTICE IN A NONPROFIT CORPORATION WHICH IS ESTABLISHED TO SERVE THE PUBLIC INTEREST
PROVIDED THAT THE NONLAWYER DIRECTORS AND OFFICERS OF SUCH CORPORATION DO NOT INTERFERE WITH THE INDEPENDENT PROFESSIONAL JUDGMENT OF
THE LAWYER.
COMMENT:
The provisions of this Rule express traditional
limitations on sharing fees. These limitations are to
protect the lawyer's professional independence of
judgment. Where someone other than the client pays
the lawyer's fee or salary, or recommends employment of the lawyer, that arrangement does not
modify the lawyer's obligation to the client. As
stated in paragraph (c), such arrangements should
not interfere with the lawyer's professional judgment. I
The Rule is intended to prevent lay interference
with the attorney/client relationship in non-profit
public interest law firms. Typically, these organizations are structured so that a lay board of directors
decides to undertake or fund a case or category of
cases on behalf of a third party. The organization
thus becomes the payor or provider of legal services
for others.
CODE COMPARISON
Paragraph (a) is substantially identical to UK 3102(A).
Paragraph (b) is substantially identical to DR 3103(A).
Paragraph (c) is substantially identical to DR 5107(B).
. . . • • . . . . Paragraph (d) is substantially identical to DR 5107(C).
Paragraph (e) bad no countermart in the Code.
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RULE 5.5 UNAUTHORIZED
PRACTICE OF LAW
-A LAWYER SHALL NOT:
(a) PRACTICE LAW IN A JURISDICTION
WHERE DOING SO VIOLATES THE REGULATION OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION IN THAT
JURISDICTION; OR
(b) ASSIST ANY PERSON IN THE PERFORMANCE OF ACTIVITY THAT CONSTITUTES
THE UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW.
COMMENT:
The definition of the practice of law is established
by law and varies from one jurisdiction to another.
Whatever the definition, limiting the practice of law
to members of the Bar protects the public against
rendition of legal services by unqualified persons.
Paragraph (b) does not prohibit a lawyer from
employing the services of paraprofessionals and
delegating functions to them, so long as the lawyer
supervises the delegated work and retains responsibility for their work. See Rule 5.3. Likewise, it does
not prohibit lawyers from providing professional
advice and instruction to nonlawyers whose employment requires knowledge of law; for example,
claims adjusters, employees of financial or commercial institutions, social workers, accountants and
persons employed in government agencies. In addition, a lawyer may counsel nonlawyers who wish to
proceed pro se.
CODE COMPARISON
With regard to paragraph (a), DR 3-101(B) of
the Code provided that "[a] lawyer shall not practice
law in a jurisdiction where to do so would be in
violation of regulations of the profession in that
jurisdiction/
With regard to paragraph (b), DR 3-101(A) of
the Code provided that '[a] lawyer shall not aid a
nonlawyer in the unauthorized practice of law/

RULE 5.6 RESTRICTIONS ON RIGHT
TO PRACTICE
A LAWYER SHALL NOT PARTICIPATE IN
OFFERING OR MAKING:
(a) A PARTNERSHIP OR EMPLOYMENT
AGREEMENT THAT RESTRICTS THE RIGHTS
OF A LAWYER TO PRACTICE AFTER TERMINATION OF THE RELATIONSHIP, EXCEPT
AN AGREEMENT CONCERNING BENEFITS
UPON RETIREMENT; OR
(b) AN AGREEMENT IN WHICH A RESTRICTION ON THE LAWYER'S RIGHT TO PRACTICE IS PART OF THE SETTLEMENT OF A
CONTROVERSY BETWEEN PRIVATE
PARTIES.
COMMENT:
An agreement restricting the right of partners or
associates to practice after leaving a firm not only
limits their professional autonomy but also limits
the freedom of clients to choose a lawyer. Paragraph (a) prohibits such agreements except for restrictions incident to provisions concerning retirement
benefits for service with the firm.
Paragraph (b) prohibits a lawyer from agreeing
not to represent other persons in connection with
settling a claim on behalf of a client.

CODE COMPARISON
This Rule is substantially similar to DR 2-108.

PUBLIC SERVICE
RULE 6.1 PRO BONO PUBLICO
SERVICE
A LAWYER SHOULD RENDER PUBLIC
INTEREST LEGAL SERVICE. A LAWYER MAY
DISCHARGE THIS RESPONSIBILITY BY PROVIDING PROFESSIONAL SERVICES AT NO
FEE OR A REDUCED FEE TO PERSONS OF
LIMITED MEANS OR TO PUBLIC SERVICE OR
CHARITABLE GROUPS OR ORGANIZATIONS,
BY SERVICE IN ACTIVITIES FOR IMPROVING
THE LAW, THE LEGAL SYSTEM OR THE
LEGAL PROFESSION, AND BY FINANCIAL
SUPPORT FOR ORGANIZATIONS THAT
PROVIDE LEGAL SERVICES TO PERSONS OF
LIMITED MEANS.
COMMENT:
The ABA House of Delegates has formally acknowledged 'the basic responsibility of each lawyer
engaged in the practice of law to provide public
interest legal services" without fee, or at a substantially reduced fee, in one or more of the following
areas*: poverty law, civil rights law, public rights
law, charitable organization representation and the
administration of justice. This Rule expresses that
policy but is not intended to be enforced through
disciplinary process.
The rights and responsibilities of individuals and
organizations in the Umted States are increasingly
defined in legal terms. As a consequence, legal assistance in coping with the web of statutes, rules and
regulations is imperative for persons of modest and
limited means, as well as for the relatively well-todo.
The basic responsibility for providing legal services for those unable to pay ultimately rests upon
the individual lawyer, and personal involvement in
the problems of the disadvantaged can be one of the
most rewarding experiences in the life of a lawyer.
Every lawyer, regardless of professional prominence
or professional workload, should find time to participate in or otherwise support the provision of legal
services to the disadvantaged. The provision of free
legal service to those unable to pay reasonable fees
continues to be an obligation of each lawyer as well
as the profession generally, but the efforts of individual lawyers are often not enough to meet the
need. Thus, it has been necessary for the profession
and government to institute additional programs to
provide legal services. Accordingly, legal aid offices,
lawyer referral services and other related programs
have been developed, and others will be developed
by the profession and government. Every lawyer
should support all proper efforts to meet this need
for legal services.
CODE COMPARISON
There was no counterpart of this rule in the Disciplinary Rules of the Code. EC 2-25 stated that
the 'basic responsibility for providing legal services
for those unable to pay ultimately rests upon the
individual lawyer .... Every lawyer, regardless of
professional prominence or professional workload,
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should find time to participate in serving the disadvantaged/ EC 8-9 stated that *[t]he advancement
of our legal system is of vital importance in maintaining the rule of law ... [and] lawyers should encourage, and should aid in making, needed changes
and improvements/ EC 8-3 stated that *[t]hose
persons unable to pay for legal services should be
provided needed services/

RULE 6.2 ACCEPTING
APPOINTMENTS

reasons do not include such factors as the repugn
ance of the subject matter of the proceeding, th<
identity or position of a person involved in the case
the belief of the lawyer that the defendant in a cri
minal proceeding is guilty, or the belief of th<
lawyer regarding the merits of the civil case/ EC 2
30 stated that "a lawyer should decline employmenl
if the intensity of his personal feelings, as distinguished from a community attitude, may impair his
effective representation of a prospective client/

RULE 6.3 MEMBERSHIP IN LEGAL
SERVICES ORGANIZATION

A LAWYER SHALL NOT SEEK TO AVOID
APPOINTMENT BY A TRIBUNAL TO REPRESENT A PERSON EXCEPT FOR GOOD CAUSE,
SUCH AS:
(a) REPRESENTING THE CLIENT IS LIKELY
TO RESULT IN VIOLATION OF THE RULES
OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT OR OTHER
LAW;
(b) REPRESENTING THE CLIENT IS LIKELY
TO RESULT IN AN UNREASONABLE FINANCIAL BURDEN ON THE LAWYER; OR
(c) THE CLIENT OR THE CAUSE IS SO
REPUGNANT TO THE LAWYER AS TO BE
LIKELY TO IMPAIR THE CLIENT-LAWYER
RELATIONSHIP OR THE LAWYER'S ABILITY
TO REPRESENT THE CLIENT.
COMMENT:
A lawyer ordinarily is not obliged to accept a
client whose character or cause the lawyer regards as
repugnant. The lawyer's freedom to select clients is,
however, qualified. All lawyers have a responsibility
to assist in providing pro bono publico service. See
Rule 6.1. An individual lawyer fulfills this responsibility by accepting a fair share of unpopular
matters or indigent oriunpopular clients. A lawyer
may also be subject to appointment by a court to
serve unpopular clients or persons unable to afford
legal services.
Appointed Counsel
For good cause a lawyer may seek to decline an
appointment to represent a person who cannot
afford to retain counsel or whose cause is unpopular. Good cause exists if the lawyer could not
handle the matter competently, see Rule 1.1, or if
undertaking the representation would result in an
improper conflict of interest, for example, when the
client or the cause is so repugnant to the lawyer as
to be likely to impair the client-lawyer relationship
or the lawyer's ability to represent the client. A
lawyer may also seek to decline an appointment if
acceptance would be unreasonably burdensome, for
example, when it would impose a financial sacrifice
so great as to be unjust.
An appointed lawyer has the same obligations to
the client as retained counsel, including the obligations of loyalty and confidentiality, and is subject to
the same limitations on the client-lawyer relationship, such as the obligation to refrain from assisting
the client in violation of the Rules.

RUtE 6.4 LAW REFORM ACTIVITIES
AFFECTING CLIENT INTERESTS

CODE COMPARISON
There was no counterpart to this Rule in the
Disciplinary Rules of the Code. EC 2-29 stated
that when a lawyer is "appointed by a court or
requested by a bar association to undertake representation x>f a person unable to obtain counsel,
whether for financial or other reasons, he should
not seek to be excused from undertaking the representation except for compelling reasons. Compelling

A LAWYER MAY SERVE AS A DIRECTOR,
OFFICER OR MEMBER OF AN ORGANIZATION INVOLVED IN REFORM OF THE LAW
OR ITS ADMINISTRATION NOTWITHSTANDING^ THAT THE REFORM MAY AFFECT THE
INTERESTS OF A CLIENT OF THE LAWYER.
WHEN THE LAWYER KNOWS THAT THE
INTERESTS OF A CLIENT MAY BE MATERIALLY BENEFITTED BY A DECISION IN

Code* Co

4 LAWYER MAY SERVE AS A DIRECTOR,
OFFICER OR MEMBER OF A LEGAL SERVICES ORGANIZATION, APART FROM THE
LAW FIRM IN WHICH THE LAWYER PRACTICES, NOTWITHSTANDING THAT THE
ORGANIZATION SERVES PERSONS HAVING
INTERESTS ADVERSE TO A CLIENT OF THE
LAWYER. THE LAWYER SHALL NOT KNOWINGLY PARTICIPATE IN A DECISION OR
ACTION OF THE ORGANIZATION:
(i) IF PARTICIPATION IN THE DECISION
WOULD BE INCOMPATIBLE WITH THE
LAWYER'S OBLIGATIONS TO A CLIENT
UNDER RULE 1.7; OR
(b) WHERE THE DECISION COULD HAVE A
MATERIAL ADVERSE EFFECT ON THE REPRESENTATION OF A CLIENT OF THE ORGANIZATION WHOSE INTERESTS ARE ADVERSE
TO A CLIENT OF THE LAWYER, OR ON THE
REPRESENTATION OF A CLIENT OF THE
LAWYER OR THE LAWYER'S FIRM.
COMMENT:
Lawyers should be encouraged to support and
participate in legal service organizations. A lawyer
who is an officer or a member of such an organization does not thereby have a client-lawyer relationship with persons served by the organization.
However, there is potential conflict between the
interests of such persons and the interests of the
lawyer's clients. If the possibility of such conflict
disqualified a lawyer from serving on the board of a
legaJ services organization, the profession's involvement in such organizations would be severely curtailed.
It may be necessary in appropriate cases to reassure a client of the organization that the representatioi<q will not be affected by conflicting loyalties of
a m< aber of the board. Established, written policies
respect can enhance the credibility of such
in t
ass ices.
CODE COMPARISON
There was no counterpart to this Rule in the
Code.
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WHICH THE LAWYER PARTICIPATES, THE
LAWYER SHALL DISCLOSE THAT FACT BUT
NEED NOT IDENTIFY THE CLIENT.
COMMENT:
Lawyers involved in organizations seeking law
reform generally do not have a client-lawyer relationship with the organization. Otherwise, it might
follow that a lawyer could not be involved in a bar
association law reform program that might indirectly affect a client. For example, a lawyer specializing in antitrust litigation might be regarded as disqualified from participating in drafting revisions of
rules governing that subject. In determining the
nature and scope of participation in such activities,
a lawyer should be mindful of obligations to clients
under other Rules, particularly Rule 1.7. A lawyer is
professionally obligated to protect the integrity of
the program by making an appropriate disclosure
within the organization when the lawyer knows a
private client might be materially benefitted.
CODE COMPARISON
There was no counterpart to this Rule in the
Code.

INFORMATION ABOUT LEGAL
SERVICES
RULE 7.1 COMMUNICATIONS
CONCERNING A LAWYER'S
SERVICES
A LAWYER SHALL NOT MAKE A FALSE OR
MISLEADING COMMUNICATION ABOUT THE
LAWYER OR THE LAWYER'S SERVICES. A
COMMUNICATION IS FALSE OR MISLEADING
IF IT:
(a) CONTAINS A MATERIAL MISREPRESENTATION OF FACT OR LAW, OR OMITS A
FACT NECESSARY TO MAKE THE STATEMENT CONSIDERED AS A WHOLE NOT
MATERIALLY MISLEADING;
(b) IS LIKELY TO CREATE AN UNJUSTIFIED
EXPECTATION ABOUT RESULTS THE
LAWYER CAN ACHIEVE, OR STATES OR
IMPLIES THAT THE LAWYER CAN ACHIEVE
RESULTS BY MEANS THAT VIOLATE THE
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT OR
OTHER LAW; OR
(c) COMPARES THE LAWYER'S SERVICES
WITH OTHER LAWYERS' SERVICES, UNLESS
THE COMPARISON CAN BE FACTUALLY
SUBSTANTIATED.
COMMENT:
This Rule governs all communications about a
lawyer's services, including advertising permitted by
Rule 7.2. Whatever means are used to make known
a lawyer's services, statements about them should
be truthful. The prohibition in paragraph (b) of
statements that may create 'unjustified expectations* would ordinarily preclude advertisements
about results obtained on behalf of a client, such as
the amount of a damage award or the lawyer's
record in obtaining favorable verdicts, and advertisements containing client endorsements. Such information may create the unjustified expectation that
similar results can be obtained for others without

reference to the specific factual and legal circumstances.
CODE COMPARISON
DR 2-101 provided that *[aj lawyer shall not ...
use ... any form of public communication containing a false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, selflaudatory or unfair statement or claim/ DR 2101(B) provided that a lawyer "may publish or
broadcast ... the following information ... in the
geographic area or areas in which the lawyer resides
or maintains offices or in which a significant part of
the lawyer's clientele resides, provided that the information complies with DR 2-101 (A), and is presented in a dignified manner . . . / DR 2-101(B)
then specified twenty-five categories of information that may be disseminated. DR 2-101(C) provided that *[a]ny person desiring to expand the
information authorized for disclosure in DR 2101(B), or to provide for its dissemination through
other forums may apply to [the agency having jurisdiction under state law] ..., The relief granted in
response to any such application shall be promulgated as an amendment to DR 2-101(B), universally
applicable to all lawyers/

RULE 7.2 ADVERTISING
(a) SUBJECT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF
RULE 7.1, A LAWYER MAY ADVERTISE SERVICES THROUGH PUBLIC MEDIA, SUCH AS A
TELEPHONE DIRECTORY, LEGAL DIRECTORY, NEWSPAPER OR OTHER PERIODICAL,
OUTDOOR, RADIO OR TELEVISION, OR
THROUGH WRITTEN COMMUNICATION NOT
INVOLVING SOLICITATION AS DEFINED IN
RULE 7.3.
(b) A COPY OR RECORDING OF AN ADVERTISEMENT OR WRITTEN COMMUNICATION
SHALL BE KEPT FOR TWO YEARS AFTER ITS
LAST DISSEMINATION ALONG WITH A
RECORD OF WHEN AND WHERE IT WAS
USED.
(c) A LAWYER SHALL NOT GIVE ANYTHING OF VALUE TO A PERSON FOR RECOMMENDING THE LAWYER'S SERVICES,
EXCEPT THAT A LAWYER MAY PAY THE
REASONABLE COST OF ADVERTISING OR
WRITTEN COMMUNICATION PERMITTED BY
THIS RULE AND MAY PAY THE USUAL
C H A R G E S OF A N O T - F O R - P R O F I T
LAWYER REFERRAL SERVICE OR OTHER
LEGAL SERVICE ORGANIZATION.
(d) ANY COMMUNICATION MADE PURSUANT TO THIS RULE SHALL INCLUDE THE
NAME OF AT LEAST ONE LAWYER RESPONSIBLE FOR ITS CONTENT.
COMMENT:
To assist the public in obtaining Jegal services,
lawyers should be allowed to make known their
services not only through reputation but also
through organized information campaigns in the
form of advertising. Advertising Evolves an active
quest for clients, contrary to the tradition that a
lawyer should not seek clientele. However, the
public's need to know about legal services can be
fulfilled in part through advertising. This need is
particularly acute in the case of persons of moderate
means who have not made extensive use of legal
services. The interest in expanding public information about legal services ought to prevail over con-
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siderations of tradition. Nevertheless, advertising by
lawyers entails the risk of practices that are misleading or overreaching.
This Rule permits public dissemination of information concerning a lawyer's name or firm name,
address and telephone number; the kinds of services
the lawyer will undertake; the basis on which the
lawyer's fees are determined, including prices for
specific services and payment and credit arrangements; a lawyer's foreign language ability; names of
references and, with their consent,, names of clients
regularly represented; and other information that
might invite the attention of those seeking legal
assistance.
Questions of* effectiveness and taste in advertising
are matters of speculation and subjective judgment.
Some jurisdictions have had extensive prohibitions
against television advertising, against advertising
going beyond specified facts about a lawyer, or
against "undignified" advertising. Television is now
one of the most powerful media for getting information to the public, particularly persons of low
and moderate income; prohibiting television advertising, therefore, would impede the flow of information about legal services to many sectors of the
public. Limiting the information that may be advertised has a similar effect and assumes that the Bar
can accurately forecast the kind of information that
the public would regard as relevant.
Neither this Rule nor Rule 7.1 prohibits communications authorized by law, such as notice to
members of a class in class action litigation.
Record of Advertising
Paragraph (b) requires that a record of the
content and use of advertising be kept in order to
facilitate enforcement of this Rule. It does not
require that advertising be subject to review prior to
dissemination. Such a requirement would be burdensome and expensive relative to its possible benefits, and may be of doubtful constitutionality.
Paying Others to Recommend a Lawyer
A lawyer is allowed to pay for advertising permitted by this Rule, but otherwise is not permitted to
pay another person for channeling professional
work. This restriction does not prevent an organization or person other than the lawyer from advertising or recommending the lawyer's services. Thus,
a legal aid agency or prepaid legal services plan may
pay to advertise .legal services provided under its
auspices. Likewise, a lawyer may participate in notfor-profit lawyer referral programs and. pay the
usual fees charged by such programs. Paragraph (c)
does not prohibit paying regular compensation to an
assistant, such as a secretary, to prepare communications permitted by this Rule.
CODE COMPARISON
With regard to paragraph (a), DR 2-101(B)
provided that a lawyer "may publish or broadcast,
subject to DR 2-103, ... in print media ... or television or radio ...." With regard to paragraph (b),
DR 2-101(D) provided that if the advertisement is
'communicated to the public over television or
radio, ... a recording of the actual transmission shall
be retained by the lawyer/

RULE 7.3 DIRECT CONTACT WITH
PROSPECTIVE CLIENTS
A LAWYER MAY NOT SOLICIT PROFESSIONAL EMPLOYMENT FROM A PROSPECTIVE

ENT WITH WHOM THE LAWYER HAS NO
1ILY OR PRIOR PROFESSIONAL RELATI$HIP, BY MAIL, IN-PERSON OR OTHERWHEN A SIGNIFICANT MOTIVE FOR
LAWYER'S DOING SO IS THE
BR'S PECUNIARY GAIN. THE TERM
-ICIT" INCLUDES CONTACT IN PERSON,
ELEPHONE OR TELEGRAPH, BY LETTER
)THER WRITING, OR BY OTHER COMMOTION DIRECTED TO A SPECIFIC RECENT, BUT DOES NOT INCLUDE LETTERS
ADDRESSED OR ADVERTISING CIRCULARS
DISTRIBUTED GENERALLY TO PERSONS NOT
KNOWN TO NEED LEGAL SERVICES OF THE
KIND PROVIDED BY THE LAWYER IN A
PARTICULAR MATTER, BUT WHO ARE SO
SITUATED THAT THEY MIGHT IN GENERAL
FIND SUCH SERVICES USEFUL.
COMMENT:
There is a potential ior aouse mnerem in aireci
solicitation by a lawyer of prospective clients known
to need legal service. It subjects the lay person to
the private importuning of a trained advocate, in a
direci interpersonal encounter. A prospective client
often feels overwhelmed by the situation giving rise
to the need for legal services, and may have an
impaired capacity for reason, judgment and protective self-interest. Furthermore, the lawyer seeking
the retainer is faced with a conflict stemming from
the lawyer's own interest, which may color the
advice and representation offered the vulnerable
prospect.
Thi situation is therefore fraught with the possibility of undue influence, intimidation, and overreaching. This potential for abuse inherent in direct
solicitation of prospective clients justifies its prohibition, particularly since lawyer advertising permitted under Rule 7.2 offers an alternative means of
communicating necessary information to those who
may be in need of legal services.
Advertising makes it possible for a prospective
client to be informed about the need for legal services, and about the qualifications of available
lawyers and law firms, without subjecting the prospective client to direct personal persuasion that may
overwhelm the client's judgment.
The use of general advertising to transmit information from lawyer to prospective client, rather
than direct private contact, will help to assure that
the information flows cleanly as well as freely.
Advertising is out in public view, thus subject to
scrutiny by those who know the lawyer. This informal review is itself likely to help guard against
statements and claims that might constitute false or
misleading communications, in violation of Rule
7.1. direct, private communications from a lawyer
to a prospective client are not subject to such third
party scrutiny and consequently are much more
likely jo approach (and occasionally cross) the dividing line between accurate representations and •
those that are false and misleading. Thwe dangers attend direct solicitation whether inperson or by mail. Direct mail solicitation cannot be
effectively regulated by means less drastic than
outright prohibition. One proposed safeguard is to
requird that the designation "Advertising* l>e
stamped on any envelope containing a solicitation
letter. This would do nothing to assure the accuracy
and reliability of the contents. Another suggestion is
that solicitation letters be filed with a state regulatory agpncy. This would be ineffective as a practical
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matter. State lawyer discipline agencies struggle for TICE MAY COMMUNICATE THAT FACT. A
resources to investigate specific complaints, much LAWYER SHALL NOT HOLD HIMSELF OUT
less for those necessary to screen lawyers' mail sol- PUBLICLY AS A SPECIALIST AND SHALL
icitation material. Even if they could examine such NOT INDICATE ANY CERTIFICATION OR
materials, agency staff members are unlikely to DESIGNATION AS A SPECIALIST, EXCEPT AS
know anything about the lawyer or about the pros- FOLLOWS:
pective client's underlying problem. Without such
(a) A LAWYER ADMITTED TO PRACTICE
knowledge they cannot determine whether the BEFORE THE UNITED STATES PATENT AND
lawyer's representations are misleading. In any TRADEMARK OFFICE MAY USE THE DESIGevent, such review would be after the fact, potenti- NATION "PATENT ATTORNEY" OR A SUBSally Joo late ta avert the undesirable consequences TANTIALLY SIMILAR DESIGNATION; AND
of disseminating false and misleading material.
(b) IN ACCORDANCE WITH ANY PLAN
General mailings not speaking to a specific matter REGULATING LAWYER SPECIALIZATION
do not pose the same danger of abuse as targeted APPROVED AND PROMULGATED BY THE
mailings, and therefore are not prohibited by this | UTAH SUPREME COURT.
Rule. The representations made in such mailings are [ COMMENT:
necessarily general rather than tailored, less imporSee In re: UTAH STATE BAR PETITION FOR
tuning than informative. They are addressed to APPROVAL OF CHANGES IN DISCIPLINARY
recipients unlikely to be specially vulnerable at the RULES ON ADVERTISING, 647 P.2d 991 (Utah
time, hence who are likely to be more skeptical 1982).
about unsubstantiated claims. General mailings not
addressed to recipients involved in a specific legal CODE COMPARISON
Rule 7.4 is substantially identical to DR 2-105.
matter or incident, therefore, more closely resemble
permissible advertising rather than prohibited solicitation.
Similarly, this Rule would not prohibit a lawyer RULE 7.5 FIRM NAMES AND
from contacting representatives of organizations or LETTERHEADS
groups that may be interested in establishing a
(a) A LAWYER SHALL NOT USE A FIRM
group or prepaid legal plan for its members, insu- NAME, LETTERHEAD OR OTHER PROFESSIreds, beneficiaries or other third parties for the ONAL DESIGNATION THAT VIOLATES RULE
purpose of informing such entities of the availability 7.1. A TRADE NAME MAY BE USED BY A
of and details concerning the plan or arrangement LAWYER IN PRIVATE PRACTICE IF IT DOES
which the lawyer or the lawyer's firm is willing to NOT IMPLY A CONNECTION WITH A GOVEoffer. This form of communication is not directed RNMENT AGENCY OR WITH A PUBLIC OR
to a specific prospective client known to need legal CHARITABLE LEGAL SERVICES ORGANIZAservices related to a particular matter. Rather, it is TION AND IS NOT OTHERWISE IN VIOLAusually addressed to an individual acting in a fidu- TION OF RULE 7.1.
ciary capacity seeking a supplier of legal services for
(b) A LAW FIRM WITH OFFICES IN MORE
others who may, if they choose, become prospective THAN ONE JURISDICTION MAY USE THE
clients of the lawyer. Under these circumstances, the SAME NAME IN EACH JURISDICTION, BUT
activity which the lawyer undertakes in communic- IDENTIFICATION OF THE LAWYERS IN AN
ating with such representatives and the type of inf- OFFICE OF THE FIRM SHALL INDICATE THE
ormation transmitted to the individual are functio- JURISDICTIONAL LIMITATIONS ON THOSE
nally similar to and serve the same purpose as adv- NOT LICENSED TO PRACTICE IN THE JURIertising permitted under Rule 7.2.
SDICTION WHERE THE OFFICE IS LOCATED.
(c) THE NAME OF A LAWYER HOLDING A
CODE COMPARISON
DR 2-104(A) provided with certain exceptions PUBLIC OFFICE SHALL NOT BE USED IN THE
that *[a] lawyer who has given in-person unsolici- NAME OF A LAW FIRM, OR IN COMMUNICtated advice to a layperson that he should obtain ATIONS ON ITS BEHALF, DURING ANY SUBcounsel or take legal action shall not accept emplo- STANTIAL PERIOD IN WHICH THE LAWYER
yment resulting from that advice . . . / The except- IS NOT ACTIVELY AND REGULARLY PRACions include DR 2-104(A)(l), which provided that TICING WITH THE FIRM.
(d) LAWYERS MAY STATE OR IMPLY THAT
a lawyer "may accept employment by a close friend,
relative, former client (if the advice is germane to THEY PRACTICE IN A PARTNERSHIP OR
the former employment), or one whom the lawyer OTHER ORGANIZATION ONLY WHEN THAT
reasonably believes to be a client/ DR 2-104(A)(2) IS THE FACT.
through DR 2-104(AK5) provided other exceptions COMMENT:
relating, respectively, to employment resulting from
A firm may be designated by the names of all or
public educational programs, recommendation by a some of its members, by the names of deceased
legal assistance organization, public speaking or members where there has been a continuing succeswriting and representing members of a class in class sion in the firm's identity or by a trade name such
action litigation.
as "ABC Legal Clinic/ Although the United States
Supreme Court has held that legislation may prohibit
the use of trade names in professional practice,
RULE 7.4 COMMUNICATION OF
use of such names in law practice is acceptable so
FIELDS OF PRACTICE
long as it is not misleading. If a private firm uses a
A LAWYER MAY COMMUNICATE THE trade name that includes a geographical name such
FACT THAT THE LAWYER WILL ACCEPT as "Springfield Legal Clinic/ an express disclaimer
EMPLOYMENT IN SPECIFIED AREAS OF that it is a public legal aid agency may be required
PRACTICE. A LAWYER WHOSE PRACTICE IS to avoid a misleading implication. It may be obseLIMITED TO SPECIFIED AREAS OF PRAC- rved that any firm name including the name of a

deceased partner is, strictly speaking, a trade name.
The use of such names to designate law firms has
proven a useful means of identification. However, it
is misleading to use the name of a lawyer not associated with thefirmor a predecessor of the firm.
With regard to paragraph (d), lawyers sharing
office facilities, but who are not in fact partners,
may not denominate themselves as, for example,
"Smith and Jones,* for that title suggests partnership in the practice of law.
CODE COMPARISON
With regard to paragraph (a), DR 2-102(A)
provided that "[a] lawyer ... shall not use ... professional cards ... letterheads, or similar professional
notices or devices, [except! ... if they are in dignified
form . . / DR 2-102(B) provided that "[a] lawyer in
private practice shall not practice under a trade
name, a name that is misleading as to the identity of
the lawyer or lawyers practicing under such name,
or a firm name containing names other than those
of one or more of the lawyers in the firm, except
that ... a firm may use as ... its name the name or
names of one or more deceased or retired members
of the firm or of a predecessor firm in a continuing
line of succession/
With regard to paragraph (a), DR 2-102(A)
provided that "[a] lawyer or law firm shall not use
or participate in the use of professional cards, professional announcement cards, office signs, letterheads, firm name or other professional designation,
notice or device that violates the provisions of DR 2101(A) and (B), this Rule or DR 2-105/
With regard to paragraph (b), DR 2-102(D)
provided that a partnership "shall not be formed or
continued between or among lawyers licensed in
different jurisdictions unless all enumerations of the
members and associates of the firm on its letterhead
and in other permissible listings make clear the jurisdictional limitations on those members and associates of the firm not licensed to practice in all listed
jurisdictions; however, the same firm name may be
used in each jurisdiction/
With regard to paragraph (c), DR 2-102(B)
provided that "[a] lawyer who assumes a judicial,
legislative, or public executive or administrative post
or office shall not permit his name to remain in the
name of a law firm ... during any significant period
in which he is not actively and regularly practicing
law as a member of the firm.../
Paragraph (d) is substantially identical to DR 2102(C).

MAINTAINING THE
INTEGRITY OF THE
PROFESSION

COR
The duty imposed oy inis Rule extends to persons
seeking admission to the bar as well as to lawyers.
Hence] if a person makes a material false statement
in connection with an application for admission, it
may be the basis for subsequent disciplinary action
if the person is admitted, and in any event may be
relevant in a subsequent admission application. The
duty imposed by this Rule applies to a lawyer's own
admission or discipline as well as that of others.
Thus, it is a separate professional offense for a
lawyer to knowingly make a misrepresentation or
omission Jn connection with a disciplinary investigation of the lawyer's own conduct. This Rule also
requires affirmative clarification of any misunders-'
tanding on the part of the admissions or disciplinary
authority of which the person involved becomes
aware. [
This Rule is subject to the provisions of the Fifth
Amendment of the United States Constitution and
corresponding provisions of state constitutions. A
person relying on such a provision in response to a
question, however, should do so openly and not use
the right of non-disclosure as a justification for
failure to comply with this Rule.
A lawyer representing an applicant for admission
to the par, or representing a lawyer who is the
subject of a disciplinary inquiry or proceeding, is
governed by the rules applicable to the clientlawyer relationship.
CODE COMPARISON
DR lflOl(A) provided that a lawyer is 'subject
to discipline if he has made a materially false statement in, or if he has deliberately failed to disclose a
material fact requested in connection with, his
application for admission to the bar.' DR 1-101(B)
provided that a lawyer "shall not further the application for admission to the bar of another person
known by him to be unqualified in respect to character, education, or other relevant attribute/ With
respect to paragraph (b), DR 1-102(A)(5) provided
that a lawyer shall not engage in "conduct that is
prejudicial to the administration of justice."

RULE B.2 JUDICIAL OFFICIALS

RULE 8.1 BAR ADMISSION AND
DISCIPLINARY MATTERS
AN APPLICANT FOR ADMISSION TO THE
BAR, OR A LAWYER IN CONNECTION WITH
A BAR ADMISSION APPLICATION OR IN
CONNECTION WITH A DISCIPLINARY
MATTER, SHALL NOT:
(a) KNOWINGLY MAKE A FALSE STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACT; OR
(b) FAIL TO DISCLOSE A FACT NECESSARY
Cnd* • Co

)RRECT A MISAPPREHENSION KNOWN
PERSON TO HAVE ARISEN IN THE
*ER, OR KNOWINGLY FAIL TO
)ND TO A LAWFUL DEMAND FOR
^MATION FROM AN ADMISSIONS OR
BINARY AUTHORITY, EXCEPT THAT
RULE DOES NOT REQUIRE DISCLOI OF INFORMATION OTHERWISE PROT• BY RULE 1.6.

(a) Al LAWYER SHALL NOT MAKE A
PUBLIC STATEMENT THAT THE LAWYER
KNOWS TO BE FALSE OR WITH RECKLESS
DISREGARD AS TO ITS TRUTH OR FALSITY
CONCERNING THE QUALIFICATIONS OR
INTEGRITY OF A JUDGE, ADJUDICATORY
OFFICER, OR OF A CANDIDATE FOR ELECTION OR APPOINTMENT TO JUDICIAL
OFFICE.
(b) A LAWYER WHO IS A CANDIDATE FOR
JUDICIAL OFFICE SHALL COMPLY WITH
THE APPLICABLE PROVISIONS OF THE
CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT.
COMMENT:
Assessments by lawyers are relied on in evaluating
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the professional or personal fitness of persons being
considered for election or appointment to judicial
office. Expressing honest and candid opinions on
such matters contributes to improving the administration of justice. Conversely, false statements by a
lawyer can unfairly undermine public confidence in
the administration of justice.
When a lawyer seeks judicial office, the lawyer
should be bound by applicable limitations on political activity.
To maintain the fair and independent administration of justice, lawyers are encouraged to continue
traditional efforts to defend judges and courts unjustly criticized.
CODE COMPARISON
With regard to paragraph (a), DR 8«102(A)
provided that a lawyer "shall not knowingly make
false statements of fact concerning the qualifications
of a candidate for election or appointment to judicial office/ DR 8-102(B) provided that a lawyer
"shall not knowingly make false accusations against
a judge or other adjudicatory officer/
Paragraph (b) is substantially identical to DR 8103.

RULE 8.3 REPORTING
PROFESSIONAL MISCONDUCT

measure of judgment is, theiefore, required in
complying with "the provisions of this Rule. The
term "substantial" refers to the seriousness of the
possible offense and not the quantum of evidence of
which the lawyer is aware. A report should be made
to the bar disciplinary agency unless some other
agency, such as a peer review agency, is more appropriate in the circumstances. Similar considerations
apply to the reporting of judicial misconduct.
The duty to report professional misconduct does
not apply to a lawyer retained to represent a lawyer
whose professional conduct is in question. Such a
situation is governed by the rules applicable to the
client-lawyer relationship.
CODE COMPARISON
DR 1-103(A) provided that "[a] lawyer possessing unprivileged knowledge of a violation of [a
Disciplinary Rule) shall report such knowledge to ...
authority empowered to investigate or act upon such
violation."

RULE 8.4 MISCONDUCT
IT IS PROFESSIONAL MISCONDUCT FOR A
LAWYER TO:
(a) VIOLATE OR ATTEMPT TO VIOLATE
THE RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT,
KNOWINGLY ASSIST OR INDUCE ANOTHER
TO DO SO, OR DO SO THROUGH THE ACTS
OF ANOTHER;
(b) COMMIT A CRIMINAL ACT THAT REFLECTS ADVERSELY ON THE LAWYER'S
HONESTY, TRUSTWORTHINESS OR FITNESS
AS A LAWYER IN OTHER RESPECTS;
(c) ENGAGE IN CONDUCT INVOLVING
DISHONESTY, FRAUD, DECEIT OR MISREPRESENTATION;
(d) ENGAGE IN CONDUCT THAT IS PREJUDICIAL TO THE ADMINISTRATION OF
JUSTICE;
(e) STATE OR IMPLY AN ABILITY TO INFLUENCE IMPROPERLY A GOVERNMENT
AGENCY OR OFFICIAL; OR
(f) KNOWINGLY ASSIST A JUDGE OR JUDICIAL OFFICER IN CONDUCT THAT IS A
VIOLATION OF APPLICABLE RULES OF
JUDICIAL CONDUCT OR OTHER LAW.

(a) A LAWYER HAVING KNOWLEDGE THAT
ANOTHER LAWYER HAS COMMITTED A
VIOLATION OF THE RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT THAT RAISES A SUBSTANTIAL QUESTION AS TO THAT LAWYER'S
HONESTY, TRUSTWORTHINESS OR FITNESS
AS A LAWYER IN OTHER RESPECTS, SHALL
INFORM THE APPROPRIATE PROFESSIONAL
AUTHORITY.
(b) A LAWYER HAVING KNOWLEDGE
THAT A JUDGE HAS COMMITTED A VIOLATION OF THE APPLICABLE RULES OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT THAT RAISES A SUBSTANTIAL QUESTION AS TO THE JUDGE'S
FITNESS FOR OFFICE SHALL INFORM THE
APPROPRIATE AUTHORITY.
(c) THIS RULE DOES NOT REQUIRE DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION OTHERWISE
PROTECTED BY RULE 1.6.
COMMENT:
COMMENT:
Many kinds of illegal conduct reflect adversely on
Self-regulation of the legal profession requires
that members of the profession initiate disciplinary fitness to practice law, such as offenses involving
investigation when they know of a violation of the fraud and the offense of willful failure to file an
Rules of Professional Conduct. Lawyers have a income tax return. However, some kinds of offenses
similar obligation with respect to judicial miscon- carry no such implication. Traditionally, the distinduct. An apparently isolated violation may indicate ction was drawn in terms of offenses involving
a pattern of misconduct that only a disciplinary "moral turpitude." That concept can be construed to
investigation can uncover. Reporting a violation is include offenses concerning some matters of persespecially important where the victim is unlikely to onal morality, such as adultery and comparable
offenses, that have no specific connection to fitness
discover the offense.
A report about misconduct is not required where for the practice of law. Although a lawyer is persit would involve violation of Rule 1.6. However, a onally answerable to the entire criminal law, a
lawyer should encourage a client to consent to dis- lawyer should be professionally answerable only for
closure where prosecution would not substantially offenses that indicate lack of those characteristics
I relevant to law practice. Offenses involving violence,
prejudice the client's interests.
If a lawyer were obliged to report every violation dishonesty, or breach of trust, or serious interfcr- ^
of the Rules, the failure to report any violation ence with the administration of justice are in that *
would itself be a professional offense. Such a req- category. A pattern of repeated offenses, even ones
uirement existed in many jurisdictions but proved to of minor significance when considered separately,
be unenforceable. This Rule limits the reporting can indicate indifference to legal obligation.
A lawyer may refuse to comply with an obligation
obligation to those offenses that a self-regulating
imposed
by law upon a good faith belief that no
profession must vigorously endeavor to prevent. A
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valid obligation exists. The provisions of Rule 1.2(c)
concerning a good faith challenge to the validity,
scope, meaning or application of the law apply to
challenges of legal regulation of the practice of law.
Lawyers holding public office assume legal responsibilities going beyond those of other citizens. A I
lawyer's abuse of public office can suggest an ina- I
bility to fulfill the professional role of attorney. The I
same is true of abuse of positions of private trust
such as trustee, executor, administrator, guardian,
agent and officer, director or manager of a corpor- I
ation or other organization.
I
CODE COMPARISON
With regard to paragraphs (a) through (d), DR 1102(A) provided that a lawyer shall not:
*
» J
*(l) Violate a Disciplinary Rule.
I
"(2) Circumvent a Disciplinary Rule through
actions of another.
'
J
"(3) Engage in illegal conduct involving moral I
turpitude.
I
"(4) Engage in conduct involving dishonesty,
fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation.
I
"(5) Engage in conduct that is prejudicial .to the
administration of justice.
I
"(6) Engage in any other conduct that adversely I
reflects on his fitness to practice law. •
I
Paragraph (c) is substantially similar to DR 9- I
101(C).
There is no direct counterpart to paragraph (e) in
the Disciplinary Rules of the Code. EC 7-34 stated
in part that '[a] lawyer ... is never justified in
making a gift or a loan to a [judicial officer] except
as permitted by ... the Code of Judicial Conduct/
EC 9-1 stated that a lawyer 'should promote I
public confidence in our [legal] system and in the I
legal profession.9
I

RULE 8.5 JURISDICTION
A LAWYER ADMITTED TO PRACTICE IN
THIS JURISDICTION IS SUBJECT TO THE
DISCIPLINARY AUTHORITY OF THIS JURISDICTION ALTHOUGH ENGAGED IN PRACTICE ELSEWHERE.
COMMENT:
In modern practice lawyers frequently act outside I
the territorial limits of the jurisdiction in which they I
are licensed to practice, either in another state or I
outside the United States. In doing so, they remain I
subject to the governing authority of the jurisdiction
in which they are licensed to practice. If their activity in another jurisdiction is substantial and conti- I
nuous, it may constitute practice of law in that
jurisdiction. See Rule 5.5.
.If the rules of professional conduct in the two
jurisdictions differ, principles of conflict of laws I
may apply. Similar problems arise when a lawyer is I
licensed to practice in more than one jurisdiction.
I
Where a lawyer is licensed to practice law in two I
jurisdictions which impose conflicting obligations,
applicable rules of choice of law may govern the I
situation. A related problem arises with respect to I
practice before a federal tribunal, where the general I
authority of the states to regulate the practice of law I
must be reconciled with such authority as federal I
tribunals may have to regulate practice before them. I
CODE COMPARISON
There was no counterpart to this Rule in the I
Code.
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